Number of reports processed by the Operations and Alarm Centre
Ensuring the police know what they know
fedpol is the hub for police cooperation – in Switzerland with other countries. Information is the police’s greatest asset in the fight against crime. The success of fedpol’s work hinges both on its employees and on reliable information systems.
The exchange of information between the various national and international authorities is crucial in the fight against crime.
The Combined DNA Index System (CODIS), the Automated Fingerprint Identification System (AFIS), the national computerised police search system (RIPOL) and the Schengen Information System (SIS) are essential instruments in the fight against crime – for all Swiss law enforcement and security agencies, as well as for the migration and border control authorities. As in previous years, the number of incoming reports in 2023 rose again, this time totalling 423,115.
National and international tasks to support the police
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023
Incoming communications for CEA fedpol / SIRENE / Europol / INTERPOL
303 182
339 715
381 487
394 266
423 115
Incoming communications for CCPD* and police attachés**
The war in Ukraine and other conflict hotspots around the world have influenced migration and refugee movements. As a result, rapid checks in particular remain at a high level. When asylum seekers arrive in Switzerland, the State Secretariat for Migration (SEM) examines their asylum application and takes fingerprints for identification purposes.
The national computerised police search system RIPOL
RIPOL data
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023
People
285 785
273 731
243 039
239 633
238 847
Vehicles (including bicycles and motorcycles)
572 661
592 579
569 295
552 894
542 509
Vehicle registrations
434 253
441 854
409 384
374 025
342 764
Unsolved offences
2 770 544
2 818 595
2 801 055
2 796 446
2 803 712
Objects
3 138 467
2 943 846
2 837 320
2 807 192
2 803 317
Reports (descriptions)
80 981
81 635
81 947
82 501
84 982
Data entered concerning searches for persons (RIPOL)
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023
Arrest warrants
68 906
68 842
63 033
75 029
78 092
Searches for whereabouts
43 118
33 189
29 182
37 694
45 266
Police measures against terrorism
5
4
Expulsions – fedpol
5
14
Expulsion measures
3 381
2 997
3 599
4 638
6 092
Pre-trial detention
13 969
13 621
13 821
15 164
17 040
Serving sentences and undergoing measures
418
411
421
333
363
Missing persons
4 764
3 318
3 657
4 328
4 547
Child abductions prevented
262
271
267
382
550
Bans on travel to a given country (HOOGAN)
2
0
0
46
0
Covert surveillance
140
118
312
186
130
Covert surveillance – State security
455
435
447
320
333
Targeted checks
8
12
8
16
22
Targeted checks – State security
153
114
71
72
88
Data entered concerning searches for property (RIPOL)
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023
Cases
170 969
137 761
152 933
182 002
198 122
Reports (descriptions)
5 692
5 573
5 180
5 707
6 392
Items
139 645
104 887
117 851
146 884
161 697
Data entered concerning searches for vehicles (RIPOL)
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023
Vehicles
4 811
3 999
4 140
5 148
6 272
Bicycles, motorcycles and stolen Vehicle Identification Numbers (VINs)
26 110
24 557
24 422
28 397
32 292
Vehicle number plates
35 570
31 951
32 623
35 331
39 108
Bicycle and motorcycle number plates
2 251
2 062
2 147
2 394
2 330
Data entered concerning active searches (RIPOL)
2019
2020
2021
2022
2023
Urgent messages regarding persons
17 733
17 149
17 862
19 375
20 914
Positive responses in the Schengen Information System (SIS) in 2023
Switzerland
Results abroad on Swiss data
Arrests for extradition purposes
337
244
Entry bans
5 445
4 725
Disappearances
1 249
218
Searches on behalf of judicial authorities (e.g. for witnesses)
1 788
469
Covert recording of movements*
4 861
727
Property (vehicles, documents, weapons, etc.)
2 521
1 250
Total
18187
14832
* Covert recording in the SIS allows the movement of persons suspected of being involved in terrorist activities to be traced.
[{"id":996,"permalink":"\/en\/report-2023\/editorial\/","breadcrumbs":[{"title":"Report 2023","permalink":"\/en\/"}],"title":"Editorial","lead":"","content":" editorial "},{"id":1813,"permalink":"\/en\/report-2023\/editorial\/fedpol-on-duty-for-switzerland-anytime-anywhere\/","breadcrumbs":[{"title":"Report 2023","permalink":"\/en\/"},{"title":"Editorial","permalink":"\/en\/report-2023\/editorial\/"}],"title":"fedpol on duty for Switzerland – anytime & anywhere","lead":"The world seems to be falling apart with wars, polarisation, hatred, anti-Semitism, racism and climate change. All this has a knock-on effect on Switzerland. In the midst of it all, fedpol is on duty for Switzerland – anytime and anywhere. I am pleased to give you an insight into our work with our annual report.","content":"the world seems to be falling apart with wars, polarisation, hatred, anti-semitism, racism and climate change. all this has a knock-on effect on switzerland. in the midst of it all, fedpol is on duty for switzerland – anytime and anywhere. i am pleased to give you an insight into our work with our annual report. the law enforcement authorities in belgium, france and the netherlands cracked the sky ecc encrypted messaging network in 2021. huge amounts of data became available, organised crime structures and networks were confirmed or became suddenly visible. europol also provided switzerland with its ‹country package› containing sky ecc information relevant to switzerland. this led to an intensive phase of data analysis for fedpol and the cantonal police forces and resulted in the first cantonal criminal court proceedings at the beginning of 2023 and in various investigations in the cantons and at federal level. national and international cooperation, meticulous investigations and careful data analysis had borne fruit. in spring 2023, the hacker group ‹play› launched a ransomware attack on the company xplain, a fedpol service provider. data were stolen and published on the darknet. once again, fedpol began an intensive phase of data analysis. thanks to its dedicated and highly competent employees and cooperation with partner authorities, fedpol was able to respond quickly and effectively to the attack and learn from the incident. then came 7 october 2023, when hamas launched a terrorist attack on israel and murdered almost 1,200 people. more than 250 people were kidnapped and taken hostage, triggering a military conflict between israel and hamas. switzerland experienced a wave of anti-semitism and threats against jewish citizens and institutions. existing security measures had to be strengthened. the jewish community in switzerland was unsettled. time and again we see that crime knows no borders – whether in real life or in digital space. we can only win the fight against cross-border crime through cooperation. that is why it is so important that cooperation and intelligence do not stop at borders; not at national borders, nor at cantonal borders. «anyone who works at fedpol is fully committed to fighting crime and to ensuring switzerland's security – we demonstrated this again in 2023. we don’t simply cope with crime – we fight it.» national and international police cooperation is part of fedpol's dna.switzerland is a founding member of interpol. at its 100th general assembly, fedpol will once again take the opportunity to exchange ideas with the heads of 196 police authorities worldwide. international contacts are crucial when the police have to operate beyond territorial borders, yesterday, today and tomorrow. as an associated schengen state, switzerland is also a member of europol and fedpol has a very busy liaison office in the hague. when members of our government travel to a crisis area, fedpol ensures cooperation with the authorities of the host country and the security of the swiss delegation. when activists attempt to disrupt parliamentary business, fedpol works with the bern cantonal police to ensure order. when federal and cantonal security and migration authorities need information in their daily work, fedpol provides them with information systems and the services of its competence centres around the clock. 2023 was an intense, challenging and instructive year. in the midst of it all, fedpol is on duty for switzerland – anytime & anywhere. i wish you an exciting read! nicoletta della valle, director of fedpol what does fedpol do? fedpol combats terrorism and violent extremism, organised and serious crime and white-collar crime in switzerland and abroad. fedpol protects people, authorities and federal buildings. in addition, fedpol ensures national and international police cooperation and the exchange of information. in this way, fedpol contributes to safeguarding internal security and protecting democracy and the rule of law. strategy ‹invia fedpol 2024–2027› fedpol on duty for switzerland – anytime & anywhere the world seems to be falling apart with wars, polarisation, hatred, anti-semitism, racism and climate change. all this has a knock-on effect on switzerland. in the midst of it all, fedpol is on duty for switzerland – anytime and anywhere. i am pleased to give you an insight into our work with our annual report."},{"id":1020,"permalink":"\/en\/report-2023\/editorial\/seek-and-you-shall-find\/","breadcrumbs":[{"title":"Report 2023","permalink":"\/en\/"},{"title":"Editorial","permalink":"\/en\/report-2023\/editorial\/"}],"title":"Seek and you shall find","lead":"«Who seeks shall find; who sits with folded hands or sleeps is blind.» So said the Greek poet Sophocles. 2,500 years later, this is the mantra in the fight against organised crime. How a situation report is created.","content":"«who seeks shall find; who sits with folded hands or sleeps is blind.» so said the greek poet sophocles. 2,500 years later, this is the mantra in the fight against organised crime. how a situation report is created. switzerland, in the 1970s. rumour has it that the mafia is active in switzerland – no one knows for sure. there is a lack of awareness and no obvious leads. it takes more than 10 years before suspicions become hard evidence. how deeply have these structures penetrated swiss society? this question is the beginning of an ongoing information cycle that lays the foundations for the current situation. the information cycle the information cycle is an important process in criminal analysis. analysts collect information, evaluate it, process it into products and pass it on. the cycle is a continuous process involving a variety of partners. it begins with the collection of information from various sources, such as police information exchanges, witness statements or court judgments. analysts look for patterns and correlations in the information. they pass their conclusions on to decision-makers. in the 1990s, answers to these questions were slow in coming. but then the era of international cooperation began. investigators and analysts dug deeper, the network of information sources and partners grew. reports from immigration and police authorities, court judgments from italy, findings from europol and interpol – every report, every witness statement and every court judgment sharpened the picture: the mafias were not just a problem in italy, they were also here, woven into the social and economic fabric of switzerland. what new threats had emerged and how could switzerland take more effective action against them? every piece of information, every new lead was fed into the ongoing investigation cycle and switzerland began to understand the network of organised crime. new findings triggered new questions and new information cycles. networked investigations sharing information and cooperating with partners – this is how fedpol analysts continuously sharpen their picture of the situation. they specialise in specific topics and exchange information: findings they make about italian organised crime can provide the specialists with another piece of the puzzle in their investigations. decision-makers can set strategic priorities and investigative teams can refocus their investigations. the new millennium marked a turning point. new technologies and globalisation – fedpol began making use of both in its analyses. the development reached its temporary peak in 2021 when the dutch, belgian and french police took action against the encrypted messaging service, sky ecc. what had been considered an opaque fortress of encrypted messaging suddenly became a source of intelligence. what did the communication patterns reveal about the dirty tricks of the criminal networks? the analysts at fedpol meticulously evaluated the messages of serious criminals, providing a deep insight into the abysses of organised crime in our country. technological progress in criminal analysis the decryption of the encrypted messaging service, sky ecc, illustrates the impact of technological advances on crime analysis. such breakthroughs are transforming data collection and analysis, which in turn leads to a deeper understanding of criminal networks and allows the police to target the weaknesses in organised crime. sky ecc revealed what analysts and investigators had long suspected, that organised crime in switzerland goes far beyond the italian mafias. the ongoing analysis cycles, supported by advanced data analytics, revealed trends and patterns and helped analysts to produce a new situation report for switzerland. the italian mafias: they specialise in drug trafficking and money laundering, using switzerland as an operational base, strategic transit point and retreat. the dutch-belgian ‹mocro mafia›: it orchestrates atm blasts, drug trafficking and money laundering on a grand scale. southeast european networks; they dominate the cocaine trade. russian organised crime: it covers white-collar crime and money laundering, and is often linked to the political and financial influence of oligarchs. nigerian brotherhoods such as the ‹black axe›: they are known for their complex transnational operations in drug trafficking and fraud. turkish groups: they are involved in drug trafficking, illegal gambling and money laundering.they are all operating on swiss soil. fedpol’s policing policy fedpol policing policy has eight focus areas: terrorism and violent extremism organised crime trafficking in narcotics human trafficking \/ human smuggling cybercrime and digital crime financial and economic crime security of persons and buildings security of civil aviation fedpol maintains detailed situation reports for each of these focus areas. these reports are essential for setting the right strategic priorities and deploying operational resources effectively. as the situation becomes clearer, the outlook gets more bleak. what the analysts see today is only part of the bigger and more precise picture of what they will see tomorrow. «as sophocles said quite rightly said 2,500 years ago: ‹who seeks shall find; who sits with folded hands or sleeps is blind!› this guiding principle remains at the heart of the fight against organised crime: a constant reminder that attention and meticulous processes are the key to uncovering the shadow world. what new findings will the future bring, and how will we respond?» stephane, crime analyst a close look at state denying groups ingenious, highly organised, quick and ruthless money laundering: more reports seek and you shall find «who seeks shall find; who sits with folded hands or sleeps is blind.» so said the greek poet sophocles. 2,500 years later, this is the mantra in the fight against organised crime. how a situation report is created."},{"id":979,"permalink":"\/en\/report-2023\/serious-crime\/","breadcrumbs":[{"title":"Report 2023","permalink":"\/en\/"}],"title":"Serious crime","lead":"","content":" serious crime "},{"id":1587,"permalink":"\/en\/report-2023\/serious-crime\/from-fantasy-to-real-life-radicalisation-in-the-making\/","breadcrumbs":[{"title":"Report 2023","permalink":"\/en\/"},{"title":"Serious crime","permalink":"\/en\/report-2023\/serious-crime\/"}],"title":"From fantasy to real life: radicalisation in the making","lead":"It was six o'clock in the morning when an emergency operation woke the residents of a modern district of a Swiss city. Following leads provided by a foreign authority, fedpol stepped in to prevent an imminent jihadist attack.","content":"it was six o'clock in the morning when an emergency operation woke the residents of a modern district of a swiss city. following leads provided by a foreign authority, fedpol stepped in to prevent an imminent jihadist attack. in the early hours of the morning, fedpol, with the support of the local emergency services, broke down the door of an apartment in a modern neighbourhood. the suspect, who had been living there, had consulted detailed manuals on how to make a bomb. several clues had put investigators on the trail of a potentially imminent jihadist attack. a foreign authority had passed on the initial information to fedpol.the problem was that the suspect wasn’t at home. a plan b was needed to find the suspect: relatives were apparently living nearby. the police acted with discretion and speed, and, bingo, they found him and hauled him down to the police station. even though the audio was not very clear, the devices seized spoke for themselves. investigators were able to gain a better idea of the suspect, leotrim* when they analysed a private messaging app with around 1.5 million messages from exchanges he was involved in. it was like finding a needle in a haystack. the meticulous analysis by the investigators revealed leotrim’s radicalisation. the messages contained fantasies of murderous violence and a fascination with weapons. the suspect also expressed the desire to join the jihad several times. leotrim was also well connected offline: two jihadists known to fepdol were part of his immediate entourage, and he appeared interested in the ideologies they were spreading. investigations show that he may have edited and distributed propaganda videos. evidence against him included a photo of him posing as a mujahid with a knife in his hand. he also tried to gather information online to make his fantasies a reality; he had searched the web for instructions on building bombs and detonators. he was interested in the islamic state (is) and consulted documents explaining how to travel to a war zone. for fedpol, the evidence pointed to leotrim posing a danger to switzerland's national security. as a preventive police measure, fedpol issued an expulsion order against him. leotrim would then await judgment outside switzerland. «security is a collective effort. by joining forces, we can fit the separate pieces of the puzzle together to form the whole picture. this is essential in the fight against terrorism.» fabio*, investigator, terrorism department * name changed entry bans and expulsion orders counterterrorism measures from fantasy to real life: radicalisation in the making it was six o'clock in the morning when an emergency operation woke the residents of a modern district of a swiss city. following leads provided by a foreign authority, fedpol stepped in to prevent an imminent jihadist attack."},{"id":1028,"permalink":"\/en\/report-2023\/serious-crime\/a-close-look-at-state-denying-groups\/","breadcrumbs":[{"title":"Report 2023","permalink":"\/en\/"},{"title":"Serious crime","permalink":"\/en\/report-2023\/serious-crime\/"}],"title":"A close look at state denying groups","lead":"‹Reichsbürger› and state-denying groups are causing a stir in Germany. fedpol, with the support of the cantons, is examining the situation in Switzerland: a complex picture of ideology, rejection and potential violence – a challenge for security and society.","content":"‹reichsburger› and state-denying groups are causing a stir in germany. fedpol, with the support of the cantons, is examining the situation in switzerland: a complex picture of ideology, rejection and potential violence – a challenge for security and society. in december 2022, german authorities took decisive action against groups known to be ‹citizens of the reich› and deniers of state legitimacy. these groups reject the state, were planning a coup, and have links with switzerland. in order to shed more light on these links and activities, fedpol has set up a special working group. its mission: to make a detailed analysis of the situation and encourage national and international cooperation. in order to obtain a comprehensive picture of the activities of these groups in switzerland, fedpol has turned primarily to the cantons. the response from seventeen cantons provides valuable intelligence, even if the information is fragmented and varied in form. despite these challenges, it is becoming clear that currently there are no direct plans for a coup in switzerland. the phenomenon of state deniers is becoming increasingly visible in switzerland. they consistently reject the authority of the state, do not recognise court judgments and oppose cooperation with state institutions. although their ideology is not expressly violent, violent incidents can occur, especially if they feel threatened by state measures. «this issue shines a spotlight on the importance of fedpol’s cooperation with the cantons, and its foreign partners. but also that interdisciplinary work between different authorities and police specialists is becoming increasingly important.» marco, police specialist some experts suspect that there are also financial motives behind the activities of reichsburger and others who reject the state. they warn against fraud and the misappropriation of assets that have been invested in so-called ‹imaginary banks›. the groups make targeted use of social media to spread their message, organise seminars and lectures and recruit new members. topics such as esotericism, conspiracy theories, alternative medicine and the self-proclaimed status as a ‹human being›, which is supposed to free them from any obligations to the state, are the focus of their interest. the development of these movements in switzerland is still at an early stage compared to germany and austria. it is important to understand structures, ideologies and networks both within switzerland and internationally. this is the only way to recognise developments, including unrest or even violent incidents, at an early stage, and take suitable measures where necessary. preventive work and the exchange of information between the cantons and at an international level play a key role in this. the heart of democracy ingenious, highly organised, quick and ruthless entry bans and expulsion orders a close look at state denying groups ‹reichsburger› and state-denying groups are causing a stir in germany. fedpol, with the support of the cantons, is examining the situation in switzerland: a complex picture of ideology, rejection and potential violence – a challenge for security and society."},{"id":1034,"permalink":"\/en\/report-2023\/serious-crime\/money-laundering-network-smashed-an-international-success\/","breadcrumbs":[{"title":"Report 2023","permalink":"\/en\/"},{"title":"Serious crime","permalink":"\/en\/report-2023\/serious-crime\/"}],"title":"Money laundering network smashed: An international success","lead":"In June 2023, Switzerland joined forces with two neighbouring countries to send a strong signal to organised crime gangs. Their Joint Investigations Team (JIT) uncovered a complex network that had been involved for years in smuggling valuable metals and luxury goods, as well as money laundering.","content":"in june 2023, switzerland joined forces with two neighbouring countries to send a strong signal to organised crime gangs. their joint investigations team (jit) uncovered a complex network that had been involved for years in smuggling valuable metals and luxury goods, as well as money laundering. it all started unremarkably: in 2019, fedpol received a police enquiry about a vehicle registered in the canton of zurich. what was odd was that two neighbouring countries made the same request at the same time. the owner of the vehicle had met with people for a handover – believed to be millions in cash. the police suspected possible links to the powerful 'ndrangheta. the investigation led right across europe. switzerland and its partners joined forces to form a jit. after years of investigation, suspicions of a network of criminals were confirmed. specialising in the smuggling of valuable metals, luxury goods and cash, the network was involved in extensive money laundering operations. in june 2023, after months of careful planning and coordination, the jit finally reached a milestone: a coordinated operation in three countries – over 150 police forces deployed.in switzerland, searches were carried out in several cantons, and two people suspected of large-scale money laundering were arrested. at the same time, police raids were carried out in the neighbouring countries, the culmination of intensive surveillance and investigations. in total ten suspects, believed to play a key role in this international network, were arrested. «the intensive, time-consuming but extremely tense surveillance operations, along with the close cooperation with the countries involved led to this international success. after exchanging information and through working with europol, further proceedings are underway across europe targeting the financiers and drug dealers.» sandra, white-collar crime investigator the three countries reveal a complex system. it is thought that the suspects collected large sums of money from criminal gangs and exchanged it for valuable metals and luxury goods. they transported them across borders in vehicles equipped with special hiding places and then flew them out to more distant countries. the intensive international investigations showed the jit that much of the money was likely to come from international drug trafficking. this operation is a prime example of international co-operation. it illustrates how important such joint-investigation teams are for breaking up internationally active gangs. collaboration, commitment and modern technologies achieve significant success. the case is both a warning and a glimmer of hope: it shows that criminal networks, however clever and well-organised they may be, are not above the law. seek and you shall find money laundering: more reports money laundering network smashed: an international success in june 2023, switzerland joined forces with two neighbouring countries to send a strong signal to organised crime gangs. their joint investigations team (jit) uncovered a complex network that had been involved for years in smuggling valuable metals and luxury goods, as well as money laundering."},{"id":1031,"permalink":"\/en\/report-2023\/serious-crime\/ransomware-attack-on-xplain-the-fedpol-task-force\/","breadcrumbs":[{"title":"Report 2023","permalink":"\/en\/"},{"title":"Serious crime","permalink":"\/en\/report-2023\/serious-crime\/"}],"title":"Ransomware attack on Xplain: The fedpol task force","lead":"Switzerland faces a growing threat from ransomware attacks. Criminals hack into computer systems, steal or encrypt data and extort money from companies. After an attack on a fedpol service provider, extensive incident management was required.","content":"switzerland faces a growing threat from ransomware attacks. criminals hack into computer systems, steal or encrypt data and extort money from companies. after an attack on a fedpol service provider, extensive incident management was required. ransomware attacks are becoming a serious threat for switzerland. criminals exploit vulnerabilities in the security of computer systems to gain access, and then steal or encrypt data. extortion is often involved. the hackers' ultimatum: pay up or the stolen data becomes public or permanently inaccessible. for the organisations concerned, the cost involved is enormous in terms of personnel, management and money. ransomware attacks go far beyond an immediate loss of data, as they not only cause long-term financial damage to companies and individuals, but also damage to reputations. in switzerland, several companies were the target of such attacks in 2023, including the company xplain. the hacker group ‹play› – professionals who use this method to blackmail hundreds of companies every year – attacked xplain in the spring. xplain’s main customers: the cantonal and federal authorities, including fedpol. «we bore a heavy burden of responsibility, but at the same time i was also aware of how closely we were working together at fedpol and appreciated the immense support my colleagues were giving me.» dominic*, police analyst a ransomware attack on a service provider can also have serious repercussions for the provider’s clients:after the attack on xplain, fedpol immediately set up a task force – an in-house crisis team comprising experts from various departments. dealing with the possible consequences of the attack on fedpol's service provider became a top priority. at times, over 60 staff were working round the clock; their day-to-day business had to be handled by colleagues. the task force’s mission: to identify and analyse the stolen data; to bring in measures to protect people, infrastructure and data; to notify other organisations affected; to provide legal support in identifying shortcomings in invitations to tender and contracts so as to prevent future incidents; to support partners within the federal administration; to provide internal and external communication services; and, above all, to learn from the experience. read the report by dominic*, a police analyst involved, to find out more about working in the task force. report by dominic*, a police analyst in the task force when i was assigned to the task force, my everyday work as a police analyst was completely turned upside down from one day to the next. along with my superior, i was given the task of setting up an intelligence and analysis centre for the task force, both physically and structurally. we worked day and night, sometimes up to 16 hours at a time, even at weekends. we bore a heavy burden of responsibility, but at the same time i was also aware of how closely we were working together at fedpol and appreciated the immense support my colleagues were giving me. day-to-day business continued alongside the task force. i was always able to count on the valuable support of my team in dealing with this. despite the hardships, i always realised that we had to overcome this crisis. this gave me additional drive and motivation. even at home, family and friends showed a great deal of understanding for my unusual situation, even though i was not allowed to talk about what we were doing. it fills me with pride to have been part of the task force, which worked tirelessly. it was an extremely enriching experience; i learnt a lot and got to know many new colleagues. this job has changed me and shown me how important it is to stick together and support each other in times of crisis. it reminded me that we are stronger together fedpol immediately informed the federal data protection commissioner (fdpic) and filed a criminal complaint, even though the perpetrators are still unidentified. an independent body has been tasked with finding out how fedpol data, some sensitive, ended up on xplain's servers and remained there. at the time of publication of this text, in addition to the criminal proceedings against persons unknown and the fdpic's investigations, an administrative investigation is underway, commissioned by the federal council. lots of questions remain unanswered. even if many lessons have already been learnt from the case, they are not conclusive. but one thing is certain: the dedication of fedpol's task force has made a significant contribution to averting potential risks to people, data and infrastructure. * name changed seek and you shall find ransomware attack on xplain: the fedpol task force switzerland faces a growing threat from ransomware attacks. criminals hack into computer systems, steal or encrypt data and extort money from companies. after an attack on a fedpol service provider, extensive incident management was required."},{"id":1024,"permalink":"\/en\/report-2023\/serious-crime\/ingenious-highly-organised-quick-and-ruthless\/","breadcrumbs":[{"title":"Report 2023","permalink":"\/en\/"},{"title":"Serious crime","permalink":"\/en\/report-2023\/serious-crime\/"}],"title":"Ingenious, highly organised, quick and ruthless","lead":"The numbers bring some relief: ATM attacks fell by almost half in 2023. But the numbers are only part of the story. A glance at the perpetrators shows they are ingenious, highly organised, quick and more ruthless than ever.","content":"two perpetrators prepare to blow up an atm in munchenstein. they tie up and gag an innocent bystander (pixilated) in the entrance area to the bank. the public prosecutor's office in bamberg (germany) is responsible for the case. the numbers bring some relief: atm attacks fell by almost half in 2023. but the numbers are only part of the story. a glance at the perpetrators shows they are ingenious, highly organised, quick and more ruthless than ever. it usually takes four to five minutes to blow up an atm. the criminals are professionals. normally everything goes according to plan. not so on 17 march 2023 in munchenstein. when the perpetrators arrived at the basellandschaftliche kantonalbank at 2.10am, someone was already in the entrance area of the bank. the two perpetrators did not hesitate: they hog-tied the innocent bystander, gagged him and took away his phone. they then blew up two cash machines and a coin counter. but they still couldn’t get the loot; the banknotes were protected by dye cartridges. shortly afterwards, the police came upon the unfortunate man, untied him and helped him back to his feet. he escaped with a scare. the perpetrators had fled. the unscrupulous behaviour of these criminals was no exception. the total number of attacks has fallen by around 40 % (from 56 to 32 attacks in 2023). however, the proportion of attacks using explosive devices – the criminals' favourite method and also the most dangerous – remains consistently high. attacks by igniting gas pumped into the machine or break-ins using tools, on the other hand, have fallen. the conclusion: the perpetrators want to get the cash quickly – regardless of the consequences. who are the perpetrators? romanian gangs are responsible for around half of the attacks using explosive devices. they began targeting atms across europe 20 years ago, including machines in switzerland. they have abandoned their initial lasso tactics – ripping the atms out with a steel cable – and since 2018 have been operating mainly with high-explosive devices. atm attacks are their main source of income, although gang members often earn extra income from burglaries and shoplifting. fedpol knows from investigations in switzerland and abroad that they use brothels as hiding places and contact points. the city of tecuci in romania is a stronghold of atm burglars. the netherlands also plays a key role in europe’s atm blasting business, and has done so for around 15 years. in switzerland, the atm gangs have emerged since 2020. a large proportion of the attacks in switzerland are down to organised crime groups from the netherlands. gang members are often, but not always, of moroccan origin (hence the name ‹mocro maffia›). they are young and part of a subculture that celebrates the atm attacks in music videos. they launder the stolen money in swiss casinos and are also believed to use the cash to fund drug deals. «atm attacks are the bank robberies of today. the perpetrators target atms and their weapon is explosives. when atms are blown up, it's only a matter of time before an innocent bystander is injured.» sebastian*, criminal analyst what fedpol knows, … ... it knows thanks to an exchange of information with the cantonal police forces and foreign partner authorities. criminal networks can only be weakened in the long term if their members are identified. working with french, dutch, german and other authorities, fedpol managed to make several arrests in 2023. even if the figures for 2023 have fallen by almost half, any atm attack is one too many. every blast brings the risk of harm to innocent members of the public. * name changed seek and you shall find entry bans and expulsion orders authorisations and purchases involving precursors for explosive substances ingenious, highly organised, quick and ruthless the numbers bring some relief: atm attacks fell by almost half in 2023. but the numbers are only part of the story. a glance at the perpetrators shows they are ingenious, highly organised, quick and more ruthless than ever."},{"id":1127,"permalink":"\/en\/report-2023\/protection\/","breadcrumbs":[{"title":"Report 2023","permalink":"\/en\/"}],"title":"Protection","lead":"","content":" protection "},{"id":1060,"permalink":"\/en\/report-2023\/protection\/the-heart-of-democracy\/","breadcrumbs":[{"title":"Report 2023","permalink":"\/en\/"},{"title":"Protection","permalink":"\/en\/report-2023\/protection\/"}],"title":"The heart of democracy ","lead":"The heart of democracy beats – sometimes at a faster, sometimes at a slower rate. On 14 February 2023, it seemed to stand still for a brief moment.","content":"a remotely operated robot examines the jaguar parked on the bundesplatz. the heart of democracy beats – sometimes at a faster, sometimes at a slower rate. on 14 february 2023, it seemed to stand still for a brief moment. on tuesday, 14 february 2023, 1:50pm, a black jaguar parked in the middle of the bundesplatz. gerard* got out of the car dressed in combat gear and made his way towards the federal palace. also on their way there were employees of the federal security service (fss) for their late shift at 2pm. when they caught sight of gerard from the window of their car, they knew something was wrong. they didn’t hesitate before stopping him at the visitors' entrance to the parliament building and carried out an identity check. who was this man? why was he wearing military fatigues? what did he have in his rucksack? and what was the story behind the empty pistol holster on his belt?! gerard wanted to see federal councillor viola amherd, but remained vague in his explanation. even though no parliamentary sessions were taking place on this day, various members of parliament, staff and external guests were in the building. «to onlookers, our work may appear static, but mentally we are constantly on the go. we're always ready for action, keep a close eye on what's happening in the area and keep a cool head.» roberto, head of security operations the fss agents stood their ground, surrounded gerard, informed the head of operations and carried out an explosives test for safety reasons. the test was positive. such situations require getting a full overview, neutralising any immediate danger and keeping a cool head. all the more so, since the scenario on 14 february was reminiscent of the actions of convicted right-wing extremist anders behring breivik in oslo in 2011. breivik attack breivik parked a van in front of the government building in oslo on 22 july 2011. the van contained a bomb – made from artificial fertilizer and diesel. eight people died in the explosion and numerous buildings were damaged. the fss agents immediately informed the cantonal police. after all, what should the security forces expect to find in the vehicle if gerard tested positive for explosives? now there was no time to lose. the police ordered the evacuation of the bundesplatz. gerard was taken away. an inspection of the vehicle was carried out using a robot designed specifically for such tasks. after several hours, there was a sigh of relief. the vehicle posed no danger. was gerard an isolated case? no. as a symbol of swiss democracy, the federal palace and the parliament building have long been targeted by citizens wanting to express their dissatisfaction with politics. the coronavirus pandemic caused particularly serious discontent, culminating in an incident in mid-september 2021 when angry citizens attempted to storm the federal palace. but repeatedly individuals have also attempted to smuggle unauthorised objects – from knuckledusters to butterfly knives and ammunition – into the federal palace. to cause damage there? every day, fedpol officers patrol the area of parliament building and surrounding official buildings to ensure that the heart of our democracy continues to beat, undamaged – even in these challenging times. * name changed a close look at state denying groups number of threats down, but content is worrying the heart of democracy the heart of democracy beats – sometimes at a faster, sometimes at a slower rate. on 14 february 2023, it seemed to stand still for a brief moment."},{"id":1063,"permalink":"\/en\/report-2023\/protection\/top-security-is-needed-to-celebrate-switzerlands-birthday\/","breadcrumbs":[{"title":"Report 2023","permalink":"\/en\/"},{"title":"Protection","permalink":"\/en\/report-2023\/protection\/"}],"title":"Top security is needed to celebrate Switzerland’s birthday ","lead":"Activist campaigns, thunderstorms or risky situations caused by large gatherings of people? Many things were possible in Bern on 1 and 2 July 2023 in Bern. To mark the 175th anniversary of the Federal Constitution, government buildings opened their doors to the public. fedpol provided security.","content":"the doors of the federal capital are opened: many flock to the centre of swiss democracy for a unique visit. the occasion: the 175th anniversary of the federal constitution of 1848. activist campaigns, thunderstorms or risky situations caused by large gatherings of people? many things were possible in bern on 1 and 2 july 2023 in bern. to mark the 175th anniversary of the federal constitution, government buildings opened their doors to the public. fedpol provided security. tens of thousands of visitors were expected to participate in the celebration of the anniversary of the federal constitution of 1848, the foundation of modern switzerland. on these two summer days, they would be moving between the national council chamber and the national bank and between the bernerhof and bellevue palace. federal councillors and parliamentarians would be right in the middle of all the activity. this was not a routine operation for fedpol! it took nine months of planning and preparation to provide the public with the best possible access to the celebration venues and to ensure the safety of all those involved. fedpol drew up an overall security plan to anticipate all eventualities. fedpol used the permanent situation analysis to assess the potential risks and determine the required security measures. the evacuation plan for the two festive days, which ensured crowd management and open rescue routes in the event of any incidents, completed fedpol’s preparations. «in our profession it is often said: 'expect the worst, experience the best'. preparation and experience are crucial for staying safe and calm during an operation. close collaboration in a well-coordinated team is also of fundamental importance.» yannick, security officer in uniform from the cantonal police to meteoschweizboth before and during the anniversary celebrations, fedpol worked with various partners. in the command room, the joint management structure offered the bern cantonal police and fedpol a broad overview of the situation. there were also partners called in specifically for the event, including meteoschweiz: if there was any forecast of hail or a thunderstorm, the authorities would put protective measures in place. other partners helped with special security measures related to transport and the sale of commemorative coins. access controls were one of the more standard tasks, although normally there were far fewer people to deal with. the rule was ‹no id – no entry›; all persons and their bags and backpacks had to go through a security check.both days went by without incident, not least thanks to the measures taken by fedpol and all partners involved. the police were quick to respond to minor disturbances and incidents; they called emergency services to deal with a few people under the influence and turned away small activist groups who saw the event as an opportunity to voice their agenda. cooperation begets securityan event of this size requires a large-scale security plan. staff from all fedpol’s divisions provided support, volunteering to direct the stream of visitors. for fedpol, joining forces contributed to the success of this historic event! government buildings open their doors to celebrate 175 years of the federal constitution to mark the anniversary of the federal constitution of 1848, the foundation of modern switzerland, numerous federal buildings in bern opened their doors on 1 and 2 july 2023. the overall project was managed by the parliamentary services. fedpol was responsible for coordinating and implementing the security measures in close cooperation with a number of partners: security officers from the departments and other participating institutions as well as emergency services such as the cantonal police, ambulance service and fire department. top security is needed to celebrate switzerland’s birthday activist campaigns, thunderstorms or risky situations caused by large gatherings of people? many things were possible in bern on 1 and 2 july 2023 in bern. to mark the 175th anniversary of the federal constitution, government buildings opened their doors to the public. fedpol provided security."},{"id":946,"permalink":"\/en\/report-2023\/protection\/bodyguards\/","breadcrumbs":[{"title":"Report 2023","permalink":"\/en\/"},{"title":"Protection","permalink":"\/en\/report-2023\/protection\/"}],"title":"Bodyguards ","lead":"President of the Confederation Alain Berset made an official visit to the Democratic Republic of Congo in 2023. The eastern part of the country, where fierce fighting was ongoing, was part of the programme. fedpol and the authorities in the host country put security measures in place.","content":"president of the confederation alain berset made an official visit to the democratic republic of congo in 2023. the eastern part of the country, where fierce fighting was ongoing, was part of the programme. fedpol and the authorities in the host country put security measures in place. during the two years (2023 to 2024) that switzerland held a seat on the united nations security council, alain berset travelled to the democratic republic of congo (drc) for a bilateral meeting with his counterpart president felix tshisekedi. for fedpol, the starting point was to analyse the situation – to anticipate the unforeseeable. all risk scenarios were examined, and information was exchanged with all partners involved. safety measures were then drawn up. the president of the confederation enjoys protection under international law, so responsibility for the security of the swiss delegation lies with the authorities of the host country. fedpol worked closely with them, and completed the security arrangements in the drc. «personal protection missions in war zones are particularly demanding. we prepare everything down to the smallest detail and must remain agile at all times, because it is precisely in such places that the risk of a change of plan or unforeseen events is highest. this only works thanks to a highly qualified team that is ready for action at a moment’s notice.» robert*, commissioner, protection of persons and property division mr berset arrived safely in kinshasa; however the situation in the drc remained volatile. the authorities were on the alert and on the lookout for the slightest suspicious behaviour or suspect object. after his meeting with mr tshisekedi, mr berset crossed the country heading east; in goma he visited the bushagara camp for displaced persons. goma was also the stronghold of the rebels of the march 23 movement, also known as m23, accused of numerous acts of violence against civilians by the international criminal court. fierce fighting between the army and the rebels was frequent. extra vigilance was called for. this was also necessary when driving to bukavu, 200 kilometres south of goma – an eight-hour journey on roads that are often unpaved. the crime rate in this area was high. mr berset and his delegation travelled on secure routes. an addition challenge was fake news rumours were circulating among the population. a number of people wanted to boycott mr berset’s visit. the reason? his meeting with president tshisekedi, who, they claimed, was neglecting the region. the police were ready to intervene, under orders to respond immediately to any emergency. fortunately, no incidents were reported. solidarity and hope this stage of the visit was marked by two meetings. the first took place at the panzi hospital with the nobel laureate dr denis mukwege, a doctor committed to the cause of women victims of sexual violence. the second was with christine schuler deschryver, vice-president of the panzi foundation and co-founder and director of city of joy, a community for women survivors of violence. the meetings were fine example of solidarity and hope and an inspiring interlude for fedpol's dedicated employees. at the same time, back at headquarters, fedpol employees are still at work. reachable 24 hours a day, they were the single point of contact for the people working on site. they followed the trip closely, making sure that the teams in the drc had the resources required to carry out their security measures. whether visible or invisible measures are deployed on the ground or remotely, at fedpol, protection goes hand in hand with discretion. * name changed bodyguards president of the confederation alain berset made an official visit to the democratic republic of congo in 2023. the eastern part of the country, where fierce fighting was ongoing, was part of the programme. fedpol and the authorities in the host country put security measures in place."},{"id":1924,"permalink":"\/en\/report-2023\/protection\/high-level-visit\/","breadcrumbs":[{"title":"Report 2023","permalink":"\/en\/"},{"title":"Protection","permalink":"\/en\/report-2023\/protection\/"}],"title":"High-level visit","lead":"2015 was the last time that a President of the French Republic made a state visit. Eight years later, Emmanuel Macron was in Switzerland for two days. fedpol was in charge of security for the visit, during which President Macron travelled from Bern to Geneva, stopping in Lausanne.","content":"2015 was the last time that a president of the french republic made a state visit. eight years later, emmanuel macron was in switzerland for two days. fedpol was in charge of security for the visit, during which president macron travelled from bern to geneva, stopping in lausanne. day one at belp airport looked good – the skies were clear and the weather was mild for november – ideal for welcoming president macron and his wife brigitte. the tarmac was abuzz with activity, and no detail was left to chance. shortly before the presidential aircraft landed, there was a final briefing to make sure everything was under control. the swiss president, alain berset, and his wife muriel welcomed the french presidential couple. the tone was friendly, the atmosphere relaxed. a bern cantonal police vehicle led the convoy heading for the hotel bellevue palace in bern. as the cars from the swiss police and french security forces drove by, passers-by stopped to give the presidents a welcoming wave. other onlookers took pictures. «a state visit is the biggest type of formal visit in switzerland. the programme for state visits is meticulously planned and coordinated with all the police forces involved. as the commissioner for protective security, i need to keep a close eye on everything and keep track of even the smallest deviation from the programme.» adriano, commissioner of the protective security division restricted access: the streets around the federal palace were closed. fedpol and the bern cantonal police had set up access points and were controlling entry. the entire federal council was there to receive the french president and his wife in front of the federal palace. after military honours and a walkabout, the official programme continued, as did the police operation. day two began in lausanne. for fedpol, coordination and communication were the keywords. the bern cantonal police passed the baton to their colleagues in the canton of vaud. plans included a conference on europe with students from the university of lausanne and a visit to the jean monnet foundation. an unauthorised demonstration was being held there, with people wanting to protest about the conflict in the middle east. freedom of expression was not challenged, but nothing escaped the attention of fedpol and the vaud cantonal police: they were ready to act and react. geneva was the next stop that day. the delegations travelled there by train, which does not pose any less of a risk. security was adapted accordingly. the geneva cantonal police took responsibility for the security of the delegations on their trip from the airport to cern for a visit and for the departure of the presidential aircraft. that brought the operation to an end for fedpol and the cantonal police forces from bern, vaud and geneva. mission accomplished, with no major incidents. high-level visit 2015 was the last time that a president of the french republic made a state visit. eight years later, emmanuel macron was in switzerland for two days. fedpol was in charge of security for the visit, during which president macron travelled from bern to geneva, stopping in lausanne."},{"id":1055,"permalink":"\/en\/report-2023\/protection\/ugly-dangerous-and-a-threat-to-democracy\/","breadcrumbs":[{"title":"Report 2023","permalink":"\/en\/"},{"title":"Protection","permalink":"\/en\/report-2023\/protection\/"}],"title":"Ugly, dangerous, and a threat to democracy","lead":"It might be simply ‹letting off steam› for some, but it feels deeply threatening to those on the receiving end: hate speech. What happens if someone threatens to shoot people walking out of the Parliament Building? A case study:","content":"it might be simply ‹letting off steam› for some, but it feels deeply threatening to those on the receiving end: hate speech. what happens if someone threatens to shoot people walking out of the parliament building? a case study: paul* has been angry for a long time. he has been in physical pain since he went for the covid-19 vaccination. the pandemic is over, but paul feels let down, not taken seriously and frustrated. he uses emails, which he sends to all and sundry, as an outlet. on this evening in september 2023, he sits down at his computer and agitatedly starts writing. he’ll show them in bern how angry he is! thursday, 2.57 pm: fedpol reacts the second it receives the e-mail. someone is threatening to shoot anyone walking out of the parliament building, federal councillors included. fedpol informs the bern cantonal police and the security staff manning the entrances to government buildings. the cantonal police order security around the parliament building to be tightened: keep an eye out for suspicious persons and unattended objects. in the meantime, fedpol investigates who the sender of the e-mail is. the zurich cantonal police, working with fedpol, detain the man at his home on the monday. paul lives alone and is surprised to find the police at his door. he had not meant his threat to be taken seriously and would never have actually done anything. he was angry and feeling unwell. paul apologises for his foolish email. it is unlikely that he will commit an act of violence – this is what the police officers conclude after questioning paul and observing him throughout. once again, all’s well that ends well. « we attach great importance to being able to establish a dialogue with citizens. law enforcement is sometimes unavoidable; however, prevention is always the first step. in many cases – fortunately – law enforcement measures are no longer necessary after talking to the people who send potentially threatening messages. » sabrina, head of the threat management and property security division switzerland, a haven of peace where federal councillors travel to work by tram and cool off in the aare with the masses on hot summer days? today, post-pandemic, the picture no longer looks quite so idyllic. hate speech – like paul's email – was around long before the pandemic, but not to the same extent, not with the same aggression. those responsible are often creative, creating blood-curdling, violence-filled photomontages and videos. hate speech: definition the federal council says: «hate speech has no standard definition. in general, it is understood to mean the disparagement or defamation of people that is based on group-related characteristics. the aim is to marginalise groups and exclude them from society. it is therefore in direct contradiction to the values of a free and democratic order (equality of all before the law). hate speech can, but does not have to involve calls for violence.» hate crimes, however, are not limited to the spoken or written word - hate speech is just one example. hate crimes also include attacks, vandalism, assault, sexual harassment, rape and even murder. hate crimes can target not only people but also locations, such as places of worship or community centres. in most cases, the people sending hate messages do not themselves take any action. but the fact is that they incite others and prepare the ground for like-minded people to send further hate messages. and who knows? at some point, someone may feel goaded to such an extent that they actually do something. and although the sender may see the message simply as an outlet for anger, something that can be done quickly, easily and anonymously via social media or email, the threat triggers fear among the recipients and their relatives; it shocks and intimidates them, perhaps forcing them to withdraw from a public position. hate speech not only threatens people, but also institutions, democracy and freedom. roundtable on hate speech on 11 december 2023, the federal department of justice and police (fdjp) met with political parties, associations, security services and academics to discuss hate speech in swiss politics. numerous cases of threats and assaults against politicians have shown that hate speech has become a problem, at federal, cantonal and communal levels. hate speech threatens democratic discourse. * name changed a close look at state denying groups entry bans and expulsion orders number of threats down, but content is worrying violence: back to pre-pandemic levels ugly, dangerous, and a threat to democracy it might be simply ‹letting off steam› for some, but it feels deeply threatening to those on the receiving end: hate speech. what happens if someone threatens to shoot people walking out of the parliament building? a case study:"},{"id":1065,"permalink":"\/en\/report-2023\/cooperation\/","breadcrumbs":[{"title":"Report 2023","permalink":"\/en\/"}],"title":"Cooperation","lead":"","content":" cooperation "},{"id":1067,"permalink":"\/en\/report-2023\/cooperation\/support-in-urgent-identification\/","breadcrumbs":[{"title":"Report 2023","permalink":"\/en\/"},{"title":"Cooperation","permalink":"\/en\/report-2023\/cooperation\/"}],"title":"Support in urgent identification ","lead":"7 October 2023 is now a date etched in history. The massacre of the civilians in Israel perpetrated by Hamas was unprecedented. Israel asked Switzerland for help in identifying those killed. fedpol coordinated the effort.","content":"7 october 2023 is now a date etched in history. the massacre of the civilians in israel perpetrated by hamas was unprecedented. israel asked switzerland for help in identifying those killed. fedpol coordinated the effort. on 7 october 2023, israel was celebrating yom kippur, the day of atonement. at 6:25am, the population woke up to the sound of sirens. the sound of sirens early in the morning is nothing new, only this time the situation was different. a barrage of smartphone messages spreading fear and anxiety confirmed the urgency of the situation. this was the first time israel had suffered such a violent attack on its soil. the bloody day claimed many civilian victims: children, women, men, young and old. the task of recovering and identifying their bodies was underway, with soldiers and volunteers pitching in to help. action had to be taken quickly, because according to jewish tradition, the dead had to be identified and buried as quickly as possible.the israeli national center for forensic medicine, overwhelmed by the number of victims, lacked the necessary resources to identify the bodies. this why on 12 october, the israeli authorities asked switzerland to provide humanitarian aid. switzerland responded immediately, the federal department of foreign affairs instructing fedpol’s disaster victim identification (dvi ch) team to assist. disaster victim identification the swiss disaster victim identification (dvi ch) team supports national and international crisis organisations in the event of disasters and major events. it was established in 2001 by the conference of cantonal police commanders of switzerland (ccpcs). it comprises some 400 experts, including forensic specialists and investigators from fedpol and all cantonal and city police forces, as well as forensic doctors and dentists. the dvi ch is currently under the strategic direction of the commander of the bern cantonal police. operational management is the responsibility of the head of the forensic division. fedpol supports and coordinates the dvi ch's international operations. the dvi ch contacted the cantonal police forces, which alerted the pool of specialists, many of whom volunteered their services. at the same time, fedpol set up a task force that was to provide operational management, ensure communication with partner authorities, and monitor future involvement in israel. the security of the dvi ch delegation was the responsibility of the israeli authorities. in order to gain a better understanding of the identification requirements in israel, a fedpol officer and two experts from the dvi team flew to tel aviv. this enabled the fedpol coordinator to liaise between the task force and the national center for forensic medicine. it was decided that five forensic specialists were needed. they would identify the deceased according to the international practices, using unique characteristics such as dna and fingerprints. «the mission in israel ran smoothly thanks to the competence, professionalism and selfless commitment of all those involved, whether in the task force, the back office or above all on the ground in israel. these were strenuous days for everyone.» beni, head of the international police cooperation division the workload was intense. the experts had to identify some 30 bodies, some of them unrecognisable. although death is part of their work, the situation was sensitive and highly emotional. their days in tel aviv were filled with blaring sirens. at fedpol, the task force took stock of the situation on a daily basis: how were the specialists doing? was the operation going to plan? were their communication systems working? there were no issues to report; everything was going according to plan. their mission lasted five days. on their return, the team met with a psychologist. it was important for them to be able to discuss their feelings and experiences. everyone returned for a well-deserved rest. the task force was stood down, mission accomplished. support in urgent identification 7 october 2023 is now a date etched in history. the massacre of the civilians in israel perpetrated by hamas was unprecedented. israel asked switzerland for help in identifying those killed. fedpol coordinated the effort."},{"id":1073,"permalink":"\/en\/report-2023\/cooperation\/international-child-abduction\/","breadcrumbs":[{"title":"Report 2023","permalink":"\/en\/"},{"title":"Cooperation","permalink":"\/en\/report-2023\/cooperation\/"}],"title":"International child abduction","lead":"When a child doesn't come home, the alarm bells start ringing. In the worst-case scenario, everyone gets involved – including fedpol.","content":"three-year-old julian* is not returned to his mother at the agreed time. when a child doesn't come home, the alarm bells start ringing. in the worst-case scenario, everyone gets involved – including fedpol. july 2023: three-year-old julian* spent the weekend with his father hasan*, who shares custody with his mother. at the time agreed for julian to return, his mother is left waiting in vain for her son. she reports her child missing to the fribourg cantonal police. but hasan and julian are already long gone. hasan probably intends to return to his home country, a former war zone in the middle east. hasan has committed an offence under article 220 of the criminal code: child abduction is a serious crime. the fribourg cantonal police and fedpol join forces: the child is made the subject of an alert in ripol, switzerland's police search system for missing and wanted persons, as well as in the schengen information system (sis) and the interpol database. sis tender since march 2023, it has been possible to enter preventive alerts for vulnerable persons in the sis. the child and adult protection authority or the court can order a precautionary alert if, for example, there is a risk that one parent wants to take their child abroad against the will of the other parent. an alert can also be ordered in other circumstances, for example in imminent cases of forced marriage or female genital mutilation. in 2023, the swiss authorities ordered 535 alerts. unfortunately, the alerts in the search systems do not always prevent people from leaving switzerland. hasan is travelling by car with his son across the balkans towards greece. in many child abduction cases, the abducting parent flees by land to a foreign country. they take advantage of the absence of internal borders in the schengen area. in greece, hasan obtains forged passports for himself and julian and manages to enter turkey. from there, he contacts julian's mother; more and more frequently. «whether a child can be brought home often depends on how well the various authorities work together. in switzerland, these include the cantonal authorities, the federal department of foreign affairs (fdfa) with consular protection and its local consulates, fedpol with its international police contacts and the federal office of justice.» pia, police specialist the fedpol police attache in turkey liaises with the local authorities on behalf of the fribourg cantonal police. they check whether hasan and julian are actually in turkey; they appear to have gone into hiding - thanks to the fake passports. the fribourg cantonal police manage to contact hasan by telephone. they try to reach an agreement with him to bring julian safely back to his mother in switzerland. the discussions drag on for weeks; the father makes demands. an agreement seems to have been reached by the end of december. hasan is afraid to leave turkey because of the forged documents. his whereabouts are now known and the police attache - on behalf of the fribourg cantonal police - requests the local authorities to have julian taken into care. finally, on 29 december the turkish authorities take three-year-old julian away from hasan. he is back in his mother’s arms by the beginning of 2024. network of police attache(s) fedpol and the federal office for customs and border security (focbs) operate a network of police attaches in europe, the maghreb, the middle east, and south america; they are also represented at europol and interpol. the police attaches are the contact persons in these regions and at these organisations: they handle urgent and important cases with a swiss connection, speed up ongoing investigations and the exchange of information, and arrange contacts. the cases mainly involve persons in physical danger, drug trafficking, terrorism, paedophilia and abduction. * name changed ensuring the police know what they know international child abduction when a child doesn't come home, the alarm bells start ringing. in the worst-case scenario, everyone gets involved – including fedpol."},{"id":1079,"permalink":"\/en\/report-2023\/information-systems\/","breadcrumbs":[{"title":"Report 2023","permalink":"\/en\/"}],"title":"Information systems","lead":"","content":" information systems "},{"id":1526,"permalink":"\/en\/report-2023\/information-systems\/a-concentrate-of-technology\/","breadcrumbs":[{"title":"Report 2023","permalink":"\/en\/"},{"title":"Information systems","permalink":"\/en\/report-2023\/information-systems\/"}],"title":"A concentrate of technology","lead":"In 2023, Switzerland introduced a new identity card, a masterpiece of technology and design. Boasting both visible and invisible security features, this card achieves perfect harmony between modernity and Swiss tradition.","content":"like the passport, the identity card features various security features, such as small optically variable ink peaks, embossed elements and a hologram to protect the holder’s photograph. in 2023, switzerland introduced a new identity card, a masterpiece of technology and design. boasting both visible and invisible security features, this card achieves perfect harmony between modernity and swiss tradition. always present and yet so discreet, it is featherlight, just 5 grammes, so much so that it might go unnoticed. it is predominantly blue, but also contains other colours, which sometimes sparkle. there is even a hidden flower that only the most discerning eyes will spot. what is the purpose of this essential little item? to identify someone when travelling or when carrying out legal transactions. in 2023, the card was given a makeover. it is of course the new swiss id card! «it was quite an adventure that led us to this prize-winning id card; lots of discussions with all our partners and stimulating challenges along the way. i am proud that the result has won over both the public and the experts. it shows me that every discussion was worthwhile.» stephan, document expert it was introduced in february 2023, just a few months after the new swiss passport. both identity documents were created using the same design, including mountains, rivers and the latest technology, making them a family of documents as it were. like the passport, the identity card features various security features, such as small optically variable ink peaks, embossed elements and a hologram to protect the holder’s photograph. but that’s not all. under ultraviolet light, the card takes on a different appearance, with level lines in multiple colours, microelements, writing in the shape of a swiss cross and a typically swiss flower: the edelweiss. is there anything more swiss than switzerland’s identity documents? they are a tribute to tradition combined with another typically swiss virtue: an unwavering commitment to quality and technological precision. best identity card in the world as you can see, switzerland is proud of its identity documents. our pride is not entirely subjective. international experts from the high security printing conference have awarded the identity card the prestigious best new identity card prize. like its big brother, the passport, which won the best new passport prize in 2023, the identity card is an emblem of swiss demand for exceptional quality. a concentrate of technology in 2023, switzerland introduced a new identity card, a masterpiece of technology and design. boasting both visible and invisible security features, this card achieves perfect harmony between modernity and swiss tradition."},{"id":1521,"permalink":"\/en\/report-2023\/information-systems\/a-cross-border-case\/","breadcrumbs":[{"title":"Report 2023","permalink":"\/en\/"},{"title":"Information systems","permalink":"\/en\/report-2023\/information-systems\/"}],"title":"A cross-border case","lead":"Pedro* uses the anonymity of the internet to blackmail young people. He persuades them to send him photos with sexual content and then uses the pictures to extort money from them. There are no limits on the dark side of social media, or so Pedro thinks.","content":"pedro* uses the anonymity of the internet to blackmail young people. he persuades them to send him photos with sexual content and then uses the pictures to extort money from them. there are no limits on the dark side of social media, or so pedro thinks. pedro is in his mid-20s and still lives with his parents in the mittelland. he spends a lot of time on social media, making online friends, often with teenagers. he encourages these young people to send him photographs of themselves – explicit photos. he later threatens to publish the photos – and demands more pictures from his victims if the images are to remain private. pedro makes good on his threats and publishes some of the photos online. outraged users report this to the platform operators (e.g. facebook and tiktok). and they forward the reports to the national center for missing & exploited children (ncmec) in the usa. from there, fedpol also receives reports of images with potentially illegal content. fedpol checks the reports and forwards them to the local cantonal police, as the offences in question fall under cantonal jurisdiction. «sextortion targets the most private aspect of its victim’s lives. time and again, we also deal with cases where young people threaten to harm themselves if their photos are published. our work helps to convict offenders and protect victims.» monika, police specialist in cybercrime pedro doesn't realise any of this. he treats himself to a holiday abroad. and continues from there, contacting his online friends and threatening them. this results in more ncmec reports: now pedro has come to the attention of law enforcement agencies at the holiday resort. they search his holiday apartment and seize evidence that proves pedro is up to no good. shortly after he returns to switzerland, an international police request for information and further enquiries arrives from his holiday destination; the investigation in switzerland now gathers more pace. it reveals that pedro has been putting out feelers all around the world. pedro's victims are spread around the globe. fedpol asks its partner authorities abroad for support and coordinates the flow of information between the cantonal police forces in switzerland. the international police operation is the beginning of the end for pedro's life of crime. the canton responsible for the case is making decisive progress thanks to the exchange of information. the case shows how important cross-border police cooperation is for success in the fight against digitalised crime. however, the case also highlights the global challenges and the need for effective international police work in a digitally networked world. * name changed paedophile criminals on the lookout a cross-border case pedro* uses the anonymity of the internet to blackmail young people. he persuades them to send him photos with sexual content and then uses the pictures to extort money from them. there are no limits on the dark side of social media, or so pedro thinks."},{"id":1532,"permalink":"\/en\/report-2023\/information-systems\/using-dna-to-track-down-a-suspect\/","breadcrumbs":[{"title":"Report 2023","permalink":"\/en\/"},{"title":"Information systems","permalink":"\/en\/report-2023\/information-systems\/"}],"title":"Using DNA to track down a suspect","lead":"21 crimes, 21 instances of DNA being found at the crime scene, one perpetrator. For ten months, he was on the move in eastern Switzerland and Liechtenstein, committing one burglary after another. Thanks to Europe-wide cooperation, he was finally identified.","content":"criminals always leave some traces, if only a strand of hair or skin cell. several dozen of the crime scene samples analysed by the police were sufficient to produce dna profiles. 21 crimes, 21 instances of dna being found at the crime scene, one perpetrator. for ten months, he was on the move in eastern switzerland and liechtenstein, committing one burglary after another. thanks to europe-wide cooperation, he was finally identified. from march to december 2023, 21 burglaries in eastern switzerland and the principality of liechtenstein were apparently committed by the same person: in zurich, st. gallen, vaduz, winterthur and many other towns and villages. the police records indicate there were burglaries in apartments, houses and offices, committed mainly in the evening and at night. was any evidence left after the break-ins? doors and windows were drilled open. there were no fingerprints or handprints – gloves were probably used. but perpetrators always leave some trace, if only a strand of hair or skin cell. several dozen of the crime scene samples analysed by the police were sufficient to produce dna profiles. the analysis revealed that the dna found at the various crime scenes was from the same male individual. however, a search in the national codis dna database showed that the individual was not yet known to the police in switzerland. «biometric data are unique to a person and therefore decisive in identifying the perpetrator. whether it's a fingerprint, dna profile or facial image – our job as police is to put these pieces of the puzzle together to form a coherent overall picture in order to solve crimes.» axel, head of the biometric identification section at the request of the zurich cantonal police, fedpol sent the dna profile to foreign partner authorities via interpol on 30 may, asking them to run it through their national dna databases. the carabinieri in rome reported a match with an individual who already had a criminal record in italy. fedpol then ran the dna profile from italy through the codis dna database and found a full match between the dna profile provided by the carabinieri and the 21 dna profiles obtained from the crime scenes. the person whose dna was found at the scene, the prime suspect, now had a name! prum convention swiss law enforcement authorities currently request information on dna profiles and fingerprints from foreign authorities via interpol. the request is sent to each country individually. there is no guarantee of a prompt response. this is set to change thanks to the prum convention, under which a single query will trigger an automated database search in all the requested eu countries. in future, fedpol will receive information within 24 hours with just a single request: does any country have any useful information about this specific case? but there was a catch: the carabinieri had neither the fingerprints nor photos of the suspect. fedpol then sent the dna profile to the police authorities in albania, the suspect’s country of origin, and found another full match. the interpol national central bureau in tirana reported that the suspect was already known in albania for burglaries and provided a photograph from a previous investigation. the suspect now had a face. on 20 december, the st. gallen cantonal police arrested the suspect. before his forays into switzerland, he had already been active in northern italy while part of a criminal gang. the suspect is now on remand, and will not be breaking doors and windows open for the foreseeable future, or certainly not with a drill. ensuring the police know what they know using dna to track down a suspect 21 crimes, 21 instances of dna being found at the crime scene, one perpetrator. for ten months, he was on the move in eastern switzerland and liechtenstein, committing one burglary after another. thanks to europe-wide cooperation, he was finally identified."},{"id":1084,"permalink":"\/en\/report-2023\/fedpol-in-figures\/","breadcrumbs":[{"title":"Report 2023","permalink":"\/en\/"}],"title":"fedpol in figures","lead":"","content":" fedpol in figures "},{"id":1088,"permalink":"\/en\/report-2023\/fedpol-in-figures\/entry-bans-and-expulsion-orders\/","breadcrumbs":[{"title":"Report 2023","permalink":"\/en\/"},{"title":"fedpol in figures","permalink":"\/en\/report-2023\/fedpol-in-figures\/"}],"title":"Entry bans and expulsion orders ","lead":"In order to protect internal and external security, fedpol can issue entry bans against foreign nationals.","content":"in order to protect internal and external security, fedpol can issue entry bans against foreign nationals. based on article 67 paragraph 4 and article 68 of the federal act on foreign nationals and integration (fnia), fedpol can issue entry bans and expulsion orders against foreign nationals who pose a threat to switzerland's internal or external security. it can do so on the basis of its own findings or at the request of other authorities, in particular the federal intelligence service (fis). entry bans20192020202120222023terrorism65144921981violent extremism130021organised crime124251516espionage70197027675total160167187312173 in 2023, the majority of entry bans were issued for terrorism and espionage. fedpol issued 173 entry bans in 2023. this is 139 fewer than the previous year.espionage did not decrease, but returned to ‘normal’ levels. levels reached a peak in 2022 following the outbreak of war in ukraine. terrorism is also roughly back to the average of previous years. the same applies to organised crime. expulsion orders20192020202120222023terrorism23224organised crime20014total43238enforced31123not enforced \/ yet12115 fedpol issued eight expulsion orders in 2023, four of which were issued against suspected terrorists. this is 5 more than in 2022. in its statistics, fedpol draws a distinction between enforced and non-enforced expulsions. this is because not every expulsion order can be implemented immediately. there are many reasons for this, such as the non-refoulement principle or because the person concerned is serving a prison sentence or in an appeal process. from fantasy to real life: radicalisation in the making a close look at state denying groups ingenious, highly organised, quick and ruthless ugly, dangerous, and a threat to democracy entry bans and expulsion orders in order to protect internal and external security, fedpol can issue entry bans against foreign nationals."},{"id":1430,"permalink":"\/en\/report-2023\/fedpol-in-figures\/ensuring-the-police-know-what-they-know\/","breadcrumbs":[{"title":"Report 2023","permalink":"\/en\/"},{"title":"fedpol in figures","permalink":"\/en\/report-2023\/fedpol-in-figures\/"}],"title":"Ensuring the police know what they know","lead":"fedpol is the hub for police cooperation – in Switzerland with other countries. Information is the police’s greatest asset in the fight against crime. The success of fedpol’s work hinges both on its employees and on reliable information systems.","content":"fedpol is the hub for police cooperation – in switzerland with other countries. information is the police’s greatest asset in the fight against crime. the success of fedpol’s work hinges both on its employees and on reliable information systems. the exchange of information between the various national and international authorities is crucial in the fight against crime. the combined dna index system (codis), the automated fingerprint identification system (afis), the national computerised police search system (ripol) and the schengen information system (sis) are essential instruments in the fight against crime – for all swiss law enforcement and security agencies, as well as for the migration and border control authorities. as in previous years, the number of incoming reports in 2023 rose again, this time totalling 423,115. national and international tasks to support the police20192020202120222023incoming communications for cea fedpol \/ sirene \/ europol \/ interpol303 182339 715381 487394 266423 115incoming communications for ccpd* and police attaches**30 78727 46329 94533 73435 519processed communications europol20 26222 09726 16227 20830 194incoming communications for interpol224 291157 529186 502161 925167 254outgoing communications for interpol183 802180 378183 743196 600196 527* police and customs cooperation centres in geneva and chiasso** police attaches (admin.ch) afis-codis processing mandate20192020202120222023quick requests (2 fingers)142 660107 161133 740263 781341 509requests from identity screening (10 fingers)54 96147 79050 47562 18263 651finger and palm prints9 02110 27510 59511 05312 241dna profiles of people13 35911 69410 30410 1199 353dna profiles of traces11 58011 59811 70112 65515 555total identification requests231 581188 518216 815359 790442 309 the war in ukraine and other conflict hotspots around the world have influenced migration and refugee movements. as a result, rapid checks in particular remain at a high level. when asylum seekers arrive in switzerland, the state secretariat for migration (sem) examines their asylum application and takes fingerprints for identification purposes. the national computerised police search system ripol ripol data20192020202120222023people285 785273 731243 039239 633238 847vehicles (including bicycles and motorcycles)572 661592 579569 295552 894542 509vehicle registrations434 253441 854409 384374 025342 764unsolved offences2 770 5442 818 5952 801 0552 796 4462 803 712objects3 138 4672 943 8462 837 3202 807 1922 803 317reports (descriptions)80 98181 63581 94782 50184 982 data entered concerning searches for persons (ripol)20192020202120222023arrest warrants68 90668 84263 03375 02978 092searches for whereabouts43 11833 18929 18237 69445 266police measures against terrorism54expulsions – fedpol514expulsion measures3 3812 9973 5994 6386 092pre-trial detention13 96913 62113 82115 16417 040serving sentences and undergoing measures418411421333363missing persons4 7643 3183 6574 3284 547child abductions prevented262271267382550bans on travel to a given country (hoogan)200460covert surveillance140118312186130covert surveillance – state security455435447320333targeted checks81281622targeted checks – state security153114717288 data entered concerning searches for property (ripol)20192020202120222023cases170 969137 761152 933182 002198 122reports (descriptions)5 6925 5735 1805 7076 392items139 645104 887117 851146 884161 697 data entered concerning searches for vehicles (ripol)20192020202120222023vehicles4 8113 9994 1405 1486 272bicycles, motorcycles and stolen vehicle identification numbers (vins)26 11024 55724 42228 39732 292vehicle number plates35 57031 95132 62335 33139 108bicycle and motorcycle number plates2 2512 0622 1472 3942 330 data entered concerning active searches (ripol)20192020202120222023urgent messages regarding persons17 73317 14917 86219 37520 914 positive responses in the schengen information system (sis) in 2023switzerlandresults abroad on swiss dataarrests for extradition purposes337244entry bans5 4454 725disappearances1 249218searches on behalf of judicial authorities (e.g. for witnesses)1 788469covert recording of movements*4 861727property (vehicles, documents, weapons, etc.)2 5211 250total18 18714 832* covert recording in the sis allows the movement of persons suspected of being involved in terrorist activities to be traced. using dna to track down a suspect ensuring the police know what they know fedpol is the hub for police cooperation – in switzerland with other countries. information is the police’s greatest asset in the fight against crime. the success of fedpol’s work hinges both on its employees and on reliable information systems."},{"id":1094,"permalink":"\/en\/report-2023\/fedpol-in-figures\/number-of-threats-down-but-content-is-worrying\/","breadcrumbs":[{"title":"Report 2023","permalink":"\/en\/"},{"title":"fedpol in figures","permalink":"\/en\/report-2023\/fedpol-in-figures\/"}],"title":"Number of threats down, but content is worrying ","lead":"With the lifting of anti-Covid measures, fedpol is currently recording fewer reports of threats than at the height of the health crisis in 2020 and 2021. However, the number of reports remains high compared with the time leading up to the pandemic.","content":"with the lifting of anti-covid measures, fedpol is currently recording fewer reports of threats than at the height of the health crisis in 2020 and 2021. however, the number of reports remains high compared with the time leading up to the pandemic. in 2023, fedpol received 290 reports, 238 less than in 2022. this was still a high number. the content of the threats is still a concern, and the tone is particularly virulent. polarising themes linked to the current political situation in switzerland and around the world give rise to lively discussions, particularly on social networks. users debate without restraint, and the topics under discussion reflect the concerns of a section of the population. this can lead to emotional reactions, which regularly result in threats against senior members of the federal government and other officials. number of reports in 2023reportsactual threats \/ potential danger to others20232906220225286820211 215120202088564201924618 note on statistics: if someone sends several reports on the same day, they are recorded as one report. fedpol, however, evaluates and analyses all reports separately. since autumn 2022, members of parliament, government ministers and senior judges have also been able to submit reports using an app created by fedpol, ensuring quick and direct transmission of information to the federal security service. in all cases, fedpol conducts a detailed analysis of the situation. in 2023, fedpol spoke to potential offenders, issued warnings and filed criminal charges in 62 cases. these measures are taken in the case of insulting or aggressive communications, in order to make the individuals concerned aware that they are potentially committing a criminal offence. security police tasks20192020202120222023security assessments for government ministers and senior judges*769519465646731security measures for foreign diplomatic representations370141259420435number of crises dealt with**1820161614* detailed assessments of specific individuals** special or extraordinary events dealt with by fedpol’s special police intervention groups foreign visitors entitled to protection under international law20192020202120222023number of visitors1 3185255061 057884number of personal protection measures466241137229234number of permits to carry weapons issued to foreign security officers1 305662780658644 the number of visitors entitled to protection is primarily a political issue. the level of protection depends on the risk assessment for each of these people. in other words, an individual person considered to be at high risk may receive a higher level of protection than a group considered to be at low risk. risk analyses20192020202120222023threat assessments for visitors protected under international law445335210304273threat assessments for the protection of government ministers, senior judges and foreign representations128288325368422situation assessments for federal buildings in switzerland and abroad***712181525*** situation assessments are carried out according to the circumstances or at the request of embassies and international organisations. on this basis, fedpol draws up an analysis of weaknesses and proposes improvements. the federal palace and other federal buildings are at the heart of power in switzerland, which is why these buildings are regularly targeted. fedpol produces situation and threat assessments for buildings under federal jurisdiction, so that appropriate protective measures can be taken. the heart of democracy ugly, dangerous, and a threat to democracy number of threats down, but content is worrying with the lifting of anti-covid measures, fedpol is currently recording fewer reports of threats than at the height of the health crisis in 2020 and 2021. however, the number of reports remains high compared with the time leading up to the pandemic."},{"id":1097,"permalink":"\/en\/report-2023\/fedpol-in-figures\/fedpol-in-figures\/","breadcrumbs":[{"title":"Report 2023","permalink":"\/en\/"},{"title":"fedpol in figures","permalink":"\/en\/report-2023\/fedpol-in-figures\/"}],"title":"fedpol in figures","lead":"1055 employees were working 24\/7 for the security of Switzerland in 2023.","content":"1055 employees were working 24\/7 for the security of switzerland in 2023. staffwomen36,3 %men63,7 % languagesgerman73,6 %french19,9 %italian6,2 %romansh0,3 % in trainingapprentices31university interns29 own expenditurechf (millions)in %total281100personnel costs17562it costs6022other costs*4616* included are non-it capital expenditures (1 million), depreciation (6 million), real estate costs and rent (24 million), and operation of police and customs cooperation centres, equipment, transport, office supplies, services, and expenses (15 million). fedpol in figures 1055 employees were working 24\/7 for the security of switzerland in 2023."},{"id":1100,"permalink":"\/en\/report-2023\/fedpol-in-figures\/paedophile-criminals-on-the-lookout\/","breadcrumbs":[{"title":"Report 2023","permalink":"\/en\/"},{"title":"fedpol in figures","permalink":"\/en\/report-2023\/fedpol-in-figures\/"}],"title":"Paedophile criminals on the lookout","lead":"The lives of children and young people are increasingly being lived in the digital space. And wherever they are, paedophiles are not far away. This is confirmed by the figures.","content":"the lives of children and young people are increasingly being lived in the digital space. and wherever they are, paedophiles are not far away. this is confirmed by the figures. the national center for missing & exploited children (ncmec) in the usa is one of fedpol's most important non-police partners in the fight against paedophile crime. internet platforms and social media such as google, facebook, instagram, snapchat and many more have a duty to report prohibited pornographic content to the non-profit us organisation. if there is a link with switzerland, the ncmec forwards the suspicious activity reports to fedpol. in 2023, fedpol received 14,420 ncmec reports. as has been the case since 2021, the figures have risen again compared to the previous year. on the one hand, more suspicious activity reports mean that the algorithms of internet platforms and social media are becoming ever more precise and discovering more material. on the other, the amount of illegal pornographic material on the internet is undeniably increasing. for example, there are more and more pictures and videos in circulation that children and young people produce and post of themselves. this age group is often unaware that they may potentially be committing a crime, nor of the potential for abuse. a decrease in ncmec reports is not expected for 2024. after receiving the reports, fedpol checks whether the content suggests any criminal conduct under swiss law and, if necessary, carries out further enquiries. if there is evidence that a crime has been committed, fedpol reports the matter to relevant cantonal authorities. in 2023, fedpol filed 1895 such reports. a report can contain several images and videos and is used by the cantonal police as the basis for further investigations and for deciding whether to open criminal proceedings against the perpetrators. international child abduction paedophile criminals on the lookout the lives of children and young people are increasingly being lived in the digital space. and wherever they are, paedophiles are not far away. this is confirmed by the figures."},{"id":1103,"permalink":"\/en\/report-2023\/fedpol-in-figures\/money-laundering-more-reports\/","breadcrumbs":[{"title":"Report 2023","permalink":"\/en\/"},{"title":"fedpol in figures","permalink":"\/en\/report-2023\/fedpol-in-figures\/"}],"title":"Money laundering: more reports","lead":"The number of reports received by the Money Laundering Reporting Office Switzerland (MROS) each year is constantly increasing. They are almost exclusively received electronically.","content":"the number of reports received by the money laundering reporting office switzerland (mros) each year is constantly increasing. they are almost exclusively received electronically. in one year, the money laundering reporting office switzerland (mros) has recorded a 55.5% increase in the number of suspicious activity reports (sars) related to money laundering. 98% of these reports were made electronically via goaml. mros analyses the sars and, where appropriate, refers cases to the prosecuting authorities. the mros annual report presents a summary of mros’s activities and provides an in-depth look at money laundering, supported by statistics and additional information. seek and you shall find money laundering: more reports the number of reports received by the money laundering reporting office switzerland (mros) each year is constantly increasing. they are almost exclusively received electronically."},{"id":1275,"permalink":"\/en\/report-2023\/fedpol-in-figures\/authorisations-and-purchases-involving-precursors-for-explosive-substances\/","breadcrumbs":[{"title":"Report 2023","permalink":"\/en\/"},{"title":"fedpol in figures","permalink":"\/en\/report-2023\/fedpol-in-figures\/"}],"title":"Authorisations and purchases involving precursors for explosive substances","lead":"Guaranteeing greater public safety: since 1 January 2023, every acquisition or transaction involving precursors by private individuals is registered by the points of sale in the fedpol information system.","content":"guaranteeing greater public safety: since 1 january 2023, every acquisition or transaction involving precursors by private individuals is registered by the points of sale in the fedpol information system. number of transactions in the reporting period (total)2 953number of authorisations granted in the reporting period2 449 precursors are chemical substances found in a multitude of everyday products, such as hydrogen peroxide used to disinfect swimming pools, or ammonium nitrate used as fertiliser. so, on the face of it, aren’t these substances harmless? on the contrary, in a certain concentration and dose, these substances can be used in the manufacture of explosives. when explosives are manufactured in an improvised laboratory, i.e. non-industrial production, we speak of homemade explosives (hmes). terrorists and members of criminal gangs use them to carry out atm attacks, for example. however, the instability of hmes makes manufacturing them risky business for amateurs and professionals alike. these substances also pose a threat to the environment close to the production site, and to the emergency services who have to secure the area and dispose of any explosive material left behind. numerous incidents in switzerland have already highlighted this danger. in order to prevent serious accidents involving explosive substances, parliament passed the federal act on precursors for explosive substances, which came into force on 1 january 2023. this requires private individuals to obtain federal authorisation when buying precursors. authorisation is valid for three years. every acquisition or transaction by private individuals involving precursors is registered by the points of sale in the fedpol information system. this allows precursors and precursor purchases to be monitored more closely, and is an important step towards guaranteeing greater public safety. it is important to be vigilant with regard to transactions involving precursors for explosives. members of the public and people working in the industries concerned can report any concerns (relating to the purchase, theft, loss or disappearance of explosives precursors) at any time to fedpol by telephone (+41 58 460 52 10) or by using this contact form (available in german, french and italian). video of new law on precursors for explosive substances (available in german, french and italian): was bedeutet das fur den kauf? was bedeutet das fur den verkauf? authorisations and purchases involving precursors for explosive substances guaranteeing greater public safety: since 1 january 2023, every acquisition or transaction involving precursors by private individuals is registered by the points of sale in the fedpol information system."},{"id":1341,"permalink":"\/en\/report-2023\/fedpol-in-figures\/counterterrorism-measures\/","breadcrumbs":[{"title":"Report 2023","permalink":"\/en\/"},{"title":"fedpol in figures","permalink":"\/en\/report-2023\/fedpol-in-figures\/"}],"title":"Counterterrorism measures","lead":"The Federal Act on Police Counterterrorism Measures (PCTA) of 25 September 2020 came into force in June 2022. Since then, six requests have been made by the Federal Intelligence Service (FIS) and the cantonal authorities.","content":"the federal act on police counterterrorism measures (pcta) of 25 september 2020 came into force in june 2022. since then, six requests have been made by the federal intelligence service (fis) and the cantonal authorities. the pct measures can be taken prior to criminal proceedings, after a sentence has been served and, in certain circumstances, during criminal proceedings as a complement to coercive measures, or even while a sentence is being served. fedpol can impose reporting and interview requirements, a ban on contact, a geographical ban, a ban on leaving the country, house arrest, electronic surveillance and cell phone tracking. the aim of these police measures is to protect the population from potential terrorists. fedpol can order measures at the request of the cantons or the federal intelligence service (fis). implementation is the responsibility of the cantons. the following statistics first appeared in the 2022 annual report. requests number of casesrequested by the federal intelligence service (fis)requested by thecantonal authorities20235142022110last year, the very first measure was requested by the federal intelligence service (fis). this year, four requests came from the cantons and one from the fis. isa counterterrorism measures* in 2023 requests in 2023requests rejected in 2023measures ordered in 2023requirement to report and undergo counselling (art. 23k isa)600contact ban (art. 23l isa)400ban on entering or leaving an area (art. 23m isa)400ban on leaving switzerland (art. 23n isa)400house arrest (art. 23o isa; art. 23p isa)000electronic tagging and mobile radio surveillance (art. 23q isa)600 * in each case several measures are possible. these figures reflect the situation on 31 december 2023. not all requests had been dealt with by then, either because: the decision was under review and the measure had not yet been authorised by fedpol; the decision had been taken but had not yet come into force (as an appeal was still possible or was ongoing); or the authority concerned had withdrawn its request. implementation appealsprosecutions for breaches of measures202310202200 terrorist activitiesthe act defines terrorist activities as ‘efforts to influence or change the institutional framework that are to be achieved or facilitated by committing or threatening to commit serious criminal offences or by spreading fear and terror’. measures applicable to minorschildren and young people can also be susceptible to radical ideologies and can become involved in terrorist activities. fedpol has become aware of this from experience in switzerland and abroad. counterterrorism measures can be ordered against children aged twelve and older, and thus also serve to protect children and young adults. the prevention measures in the second national action plan to prevent and counter radicalisation and violent extremism are intended to stop radicalisation and allow the authorities to intervene before young people commit an offence. requirements for measuresfighting terrorism is a complex task that involves a combination of intelligence gathering, preventive policing and law enforcement, as well as social measures to prevent radicalisation. when it comes to prevention, other cantonal measures, whether social, integrative or therapeutic, always take precedence – as do cantonal measures for the general prevention of threats and measures based on the criminal procedure code. in the case of minors, educational or child protection measures must always be taken before pcta measures. only if these measures have been exhausted or have had no effect can pcta measures be ordered. ingenious, highly organised, quick and ruthless entry bans and expulsion orders counterterrorism measures the federal act on police counterterrorism measures (pcta) of 25 september 2020 came into force in june 2022. since then, six requests have been made by the federal intelligence service (fis) and the cantonal authorities."},{"id":1359,"permalink":"\/en\/report-2023\/fedpol-in-figures\/hoogan\/","breadcrumbs":[{"title":"Report 2023","permalink":"\/en\/"},{"title":"fedpol in figures","permalink":"\/en\/report-2023\/fedpol-in-figures\/"}],"title":"Violence: back to pre-pandemic levels","lead":"Ice hockey and football matches are often punctuated by crowd violence. To assist the cantons, fedpol operates the HOOGAN system, which, for example, records the number of people banned from matches.","content":"ice hockey and football matches are often punctuated by crowd violence. to assist the cantons, fedpol operates the hoogan system, which, for example, records the number of people banned from matches. the hoogan database contains information on spectators who have engaged in violence at sporting events either in switzerland or abroad. the figures for persons and measures imposed by the authorities entered in this database are updated on the fedpol website every year at the beginning of july. individuals remain registered for three years after the expiry of the last measure imposed. entries are then deleted. hoogan also serves as the basis for the ‘electronic presentation of the swiss sporting situation’ (epsss reporting), which enables matches to be evaluated on the basis of events that have occurred. active measures and number of people registered in hoogan20192020202120222023active measures964995645469519number of people registered with active measures668622431315332number of new entries9321668115183number of deleted entries106270250338286total number of persons registered1 5791 5251 3431 1201 017 since 2019, the number of people subject to active measures has decreased. the measures imposed by the authorities, such as an exclusion order or a stadium ban, have also fallen. this is due in particular to the covid pandemic, during which matches took place with few or no spectators. as a result, there were few or no violent incidents. electronic presentation of the swiss sporting situation (epsss)after each match day, the partners involved (police, sports federations and sbb) provide fedpol with information on violent incidents. this provides a sport policing coordination database which the police use to evaluate each match and draw up the epsss report once a year. this report enables a match-by-match review to be made, based on the incidents that have occurred. key to the graph: during the 2022\/2023 season, a total of 1,153 soccer and ice hockey matches were evaluated in the epsss reporting system. of these, 94 matches were classified as ‘red’ with violent events of particular gravity. the epesss report figures show that, since the 2021\/2022 season, violence has returned to pre-pandemic levels. this is also reflected in the number of people newly registered in hoogan, which increased again in july 2023 compared with the previous year. the implications of the data recorded is not always immediately obvious, as it often takes time to identify those responsible for violent incidents, and action is not always taken immediately after an incident. from fantasy to real life: radicalisation in the making ugly, dangerous, and a threat to democracy violence: back to pre-pandemic levels ice hockey and football matches are often punctuated by crowd violence. to assist the cantons, fedpol operates the hoogan system, which, for example, records the number of people banned from matches."}]