[{"id":4939,"permalink":"https:\/\/fedpol.report\/en\/report-2025\/editorial\/","breadcrumbs":[{"title":"Report 2025","permalink":"https:\/\/fedpol.report\/en\/"}],"title":"Editorial","lead":"Dear Reader","content":"dear reader organised crime is highly visible \u2013 and yet it is elusive, and not just to law enforcement agencies. it is like the proverbial iceberg: individual offences, arrests and seizures are the part that can be seen protruding above the water. however, the bulk of it remains below the surface: networks, money flows and structures that are hidden from direct and public view. according to europol, there are more than 800 criminal networks active across europe, many of which also operate in switzerland. these include italian mafia groups, albanian organised crime groups, nigerian confraternities, turkish criminal networks, and the netherlands-based mocro maffia. each of these specialises in specific areas of crime, such as drug trafficking, people trafficking or illegal gambling. however, they also work together as partners in crime, strengthening each other and using shared infrastructure. they all share one goal: financial gain. this is where switzerland comes into play: as an economically strong and politically stable location at the heart of europe, it is attractive to criminals as a transit country, a hub and a target market. in a sense, switzerland has become a haven specifically targeted by criminal networks to generate profit. and they stop at nothing to achieve this, posing a risk to our economy, the rule of law and, ultimately, our democracy. some selected cases from 2025 offer a glimpse beneath the surface. the federal office of police (fedpol) joined forces with partner authorities in canada and 17 other countries to dismantle a network responsible for countless cyberattacks. thanks to a tip-off from the money laundering reporting office switzerland (mros), fedpol and its foreign partners uncovered one of europe\u2019s largest money laundering cases. we are also working with cantonal police and our french counterparts to combat the sharp rise in luxury car thefts, which are being carried out by young people recruited via social media. to tackle this phenomenon in a coordinated manner across cantonal and national borders, we will set up a nationwide task force led by fedpol in early april 2026. what does this mean for our efforts to deal with the \u2018iceberg\u2019? we don\u2019t just want to chip away at the tip of the iceberg. we want to heat up the water so that the whole iceberg melts. we will achieve this by taking a society-wide approach and creating an environment in which criminal networks cannot flourish. this is precisely the aim of the national strategy to combat organised crime, which was developed jointly by the federal government and the cantons in 2025. it pursues three objectives: identifying, preventing and combating organised crime. \u201cwe are taking a society-wide approach and creating an environment in which criminal networks cannot flourish.\u201d in 2026, we will focus on developing a national action plan (nap). working with our national partners, we will implement concrete measures to enhance information sharing, raise awareness among non-police entities such as land registers and migration offices, and intensify our cooperation with foreign police authorities. we also plan to submit a package of legislative amendments for consultation by the end of the 2027, giving swiss law enforcement agencies access to even more effective tools for tackling organised crime. switzerland\u2019s strategy to combat organised crime at its meeting on 19 december 2025, the federal council approved switzerland\u2019s strategy to combat organised crime. the conference of cantonal justice and police directors (ccjpd) adopted the strategy on 27 november 2025. it is the first strategy of its kind and has been incorporated into switzerland\u2019s security policy strategy, providing a framework for agencies to collaborate across all levels of government to effectively tackle the growing threat posed by criminal networks. the strategy sets out areas of action for identifying, preventing and combating organised crime. at federal level, a range of legal amendments will be incorporated into a legislative package to combat organised crime. further details can be found in the federal council press release on switzerland\u2019s strategy to combat organised crime (available in german, french and italian). organised crime can take many forms. find out more about the world of organised crime in switzerland (available in german, french and italian). ii am confident that we are on the right track. and i am proud of and grateful for all we have achieved with our partner authorities over the past year. we combated serious crime and protected our judicial officials and federal institutions. we maintained security at major events, continued developing the biometric identity card, and analysed and took action to combat terrorism and cybercrime. we also intensified our police cooperation within switzerland and abroad. we worked as investigators, financial analysts, lawyers, police security officers, experts in explosives and weapons, police attaches and much more. and now i hope you enjoy reading this report! editorial dear reader"},{"id":4942,"permalink":"https:\/\/fedpol.report\/en\/report-2025\/serious-crime\/","breadcrumbs":[{"title":"Report 2025","permalink":"https:\/\/fedpol.report\/en\/"}],"title":"Serious crime","lead":"","content":" serious crime "},{"id":5547,"permalink":"https:\/\/fedpol.report\/en\/report-2025\/serious-crime\/when-servers-go-silent\/","breadcrumbs":[{"title":"Report 2025","permalink":"https:\/\/fedpol.report\/en\/"},{"title":"Serious crime","permalink":"https:\/\/fedpol.report\/en\/report-2025\/serious-crime\/"}],"title":"When servers go silent","lead":"In July 2025, an international task force of cyber investigators succeeded in identifying three suspected criminals. The case highlights the importance of international police cooperation, particularly in the fight against cybercriminals who are closely networked across national borders.","content":"in july 2025, an international task force of cyber investigators succeeded in identifying three suspected criminals. the case highlights the importance of international police cooperation, particularly in the fight against cybercriminals who are closely networked across national borders. targeted, coordinated and carrying a political message \u2013 this is how investigators describe the wave of ddos attacks that hit over 200 swiss websites in june 2023. ddos stands for distributed denial of service and refers to a method in which servers are overloaded with huge volumes of requests, causing them to crash. the aim is to block or disrupt digital services. parliament\u2019s platform was particularly affected in 2023. the pro-russian hacker group noname057(16) has claimed responsibility for the attacks, thereby openly acknowledging its intention to destabilise western democracies. even as the attacks were underway, fedpol realised that these were not isolated technical glitches, but rather coordinated cyberattacks on a global scale. together with the office of the attorney general of the swiss confederation and the national cyber security centre (ncsc), fedpol launched a comprehensive investigation. an international response to an international network fedpol brought the case to the european level as early as 2023, launching operation eastwood in collaboration with canada. it grew into an operation involving 19 countries, coordinated by europol and the joint cybercrime action taskforce (j-cat). from 2023 to 2025, hundreds of ddos attacks occurred worldwide, claimed by noname057(16). thanks to a detailed analysis of the attacks, fedpol succeeded in identifying patterns. clues about the structure of the criminal group, combined with further investigative findings, led to the identification of those responsible, namely three suspected key members of the hacking group, and to the issuance of warrants for their arrest in spring 2025. on 15 july 2025, authorities gained access to the botnet \u2013 a network that connects hundreds or even thousands of computers via installed files and uses these connected machines to perform specific actions on command from a remote computer. in several countries, law enforcement officers searched homes, seized computers and took servers offline. over 100 systems were disabled worldwide, including the core infrastructure of the group noname057(16). ten arrest warrants were issued, two of which were executed immediately. over 1,000 individuals who supported the network were informed of their potential criminal liability for installing the network connection on their computers. no searches were required in switzerland \u2013 as far as is known, swiss computers were not connected to the network. hidden online \u2013 but not untouchable the hacker group always deliberately chose the timing of its attacks for their strong symbolic significance, including ukrainian president volodymyr zelenskyy\u2019s speech at the federal palace in june 2023, the world economic forum in january 2024, and the eurovision song contest in basel in may 2025. the hacker group aims to provoke, cause a public stir and create uncertainty. yet operation eastwood makes it clear that even in the digital realm, perpetrators cannot hide behind the anonymity of the virtual world if law enforcement agencies act decisively and in coordination. the noname057(16) case illustrates what is required to successfully combat cybercrime today. this includes cross-border thinking and action, technological expertise and extensive coordination. fedpol assumes this role as a national hub. \u201ci am proud that fedpol, together with canada, was able to launch an operation of this scale, involving so many countries. our success was down to excellent teamwork from our j-cat delegation at europol, through it forensics and operational criminal analysis, right down to the investigators.\u201d andreas, federal cybercrime investigator no police work without shared information when servers go silent in july 2025, an international task force of cyber investigators succeeded in identifying three suspected criminals. the case highlights the importance of international police cooperation, particularly in the fight against cybercriminals who are closely networked across national borders."},{"id":5549,"permalink":"https:\/\/fedpol.report\/en\/report-2025\/serious-crime\/inaction-becomes-a-weapon\/","breadcrumbs":[{"title":"Report 2025","permalink":"https:\/\/fedpol.report\/en\/"},{"title":"Serious crime","permalink":"https:\/\/fedpol.report\/en\/report-2025\/serious-crime\/"}],"title":"Inaction becomes a weapon","lead":"One click, a wrong password or an open security vulnerability can be enough to bring a company to a standstill. Ransomware attacks are among the greatest threats to companies today. As several cantons and dozens of Swiss companies are affected, the Office of the Attorney General of the Swiss Confederation is taking over the proceedings. fedpol is investigating.","content":"one click, a wrong password or an open security vulnerability can be enough to bring a company to a standstill. ransomware attacks are among the greatest threats to companies today. as several cantons and dozens of swiss companies are affected, the office of the attorney general of the swiss confederation is taking over the proceedings. fedpol is investigating. an employee of an accounting services firm in the swiss plateau was the first to arrive at the office in the morning and switched on his computer. when he tried to open a file, a message appeared on his screen instead of his client\u2019s income statement. the message read: \u201call files belonging to the company and its clients have been encrypted. they will be published unless the demanded ransom is paid within 24 hours.\u201d similar scenarios have happened to numerous companies. the sender of the ransom demand is the ransomware group 8base, one of the largest criminal groups, which makes millions of francs every year through such extortion schemes. they encrypt data, cripple it systems and cause significant financial damage. for many victims, the ransom payments are less of a problem than the costs incurred by the disruption of their services. production processes come to a standstill, invoices pile up, and deadlines must be postponed. criminal groups have long since shifted their focus from large corporations to small and medium-sized businesses as well. fedpol and the office of the attorney general of the swiss confederation, together with international partners, are helping to curb this threat. the aim is to identify the ransomware group 8base, which is causing damage to hundreds of companies and organisations worldwide, including several dozen in switzerland. agile collaboration close and flexible collaboration among the participating authorities plays a central role. instead of a linear large-scale investigation, the partner countries rely on short, coordinated investigative phases. during these sprints, findings are consolidated, leads are combined, and the perpetrators are gradually identified. investigative teams identify early signs of planned attacks. this information enables the affected countries to take preventive measures: companies are warned, systems are checked and access points are secured. through their international partners, fedpol\u2019s cyber investigators can issue early warnings to more than 300 potential corporate victims worldwide. this has prevented extortion before it even began \u2013 including in switzerland, where several suspected members have been identified, located and arrested. coordinated action one visible result of international cooperation is what is known as a take-down. this involves taking the cybercriminals\u2019 technical infrastructure offline, including the platforms on which they publish the stolen data. in place of the previous content, a notice page from law enforcement agencies appears. this makes it clear that the authorities have taken control of the infrastructure \u2013 and that criminal activities do not go unnoticed (more on this in the europol press release). encrypted data becomes readable again another tangible result of the operation is the assistance provided to companies that have already been victimised. japanese investigators have successfully developed a decryption tool for encrypted files. this tool is published on the no more ransom platform, provided by europol and the dutch police. for victims who have not paid a ransom, this is a major breakthrough: their data becomes accessible again. ultimately, the 8base case demonstrates one thing above all else: cybercriminals operate globally \u2013 and so does effective law enforcement. \u201ccybercrime is a field that is changing particularly rapidly. an investigative success on this scale can only be achieved thanks to effective national and international cooperation.\u201d lukas, federal cybercrime investigator no police work without shared information inaction becomes a weapon one click, a wrong password or an open security vulnerability can be enough to bring a company to a standstill. ransomware attacks are among the greatest threats to companies today. as several cantons and dozens of swiss companies are affected, the office of the attorney general of the swiss confederation is taking over the proceedings. fedpol is investigating."},{"id":5551,"permalink":"https:\/\/fedpol.report\/en\/report-2025\/serious-crime\/a-luxury-car-heist-that-ended-in-a-spin-out\/","breadcrumbs":[{"title":"Report 2025","permalink":"https:\/\/fedpol.report\/en\/"},{"title":"Serious crime","permalink":"https:\/\/fedpol.report\/en\/report-2025\/serious-crime\/"}],"title":"A luxury car heist that ended in a spin-out","lead":"Three young men were arrested in October 2025 following an attempted burglary at a Zurich garage. This foiled heist was part of a wider trend, to which fedpol was already responding with operational coordination measures.","content":"surveillance camera footage shows the perpetrators, some of whom are teenagers, breaking into various garages. three young men were arrested in october 2025 following an attempted burglary at a zurich garage. this foiled heist was part of a wider trend, to which fedpol was already responding with operational coordination measures. seated on a train speeding from lausanne towards zurich on that late october afternoon in 2025, a teenager and several young men were frantically tapping away on their mobile phones. using a popular instant messaging and video-sharing app, their exchanges were, however, out of the ordinary: the original chat in french can be seen here. for the past few hours, they had all been receiving instructions from a coordinator via the app. shortly after a chat channel was created, the coordinator told them, which train departing from lausanne to board. a little while later, the coordinator provided them with more information about their target for the day, a garage located in the zurich oberland: the original chat in french can be seen here. however, the criminals\u2019 plan to steal luxury cars was thwarted. three of them \u2013 a 14-year-old boy and two men aged 22 and 28 \u2013 were arrested shortly after 10pm by the zurich cantonal police. the police had been alerted by an alarm system that a burglary was in progress in the garage. recruited via social media this foiled theft is part of a wider trend that is on the rise. some 180 burglaries or attempted burglaries in garages were recorded across switzerland in 2025. the criminal gangs behind these acts are most often based in the suburbs of major french cities. in switzerland, perpetrators often have no connection with the organiser of a heist or with one another. they accept their \u2018assignments\u2019 via social media or chat channels. this is a form of crime as a service (see box below). it involves numerous risks, as illustrated by the case presented in this article: the original chat in french can be seen here. luxury car thefts, just like break-ins at gun shops, seem to be largely the work of the same groups. these acts should be considered a form of organised crime. task forces in place the incidents reported to date in switzerland, such as the case described in this article, fall under the jurisdiction of the cantons. the cantonal police forces are responsible for managing operations and all other investigative measures. however, fedpol investigators provide support and are working tirelessly to combat these crimes. task forces were therefore set up during 2025 within fedpol and the cantonal police forces to tackle these thefts. their aim is to facilitate coordination with the cantons, particularly with regard to information sharing, and to provide them with support. the repressive and preventive measures put in place are ultimately bearing fruit in the medium term. the current decline observed in another area \u2013 atm explosions \u2013 confirms this. crime as a service: when social media leads to crime young people who have only just entered their teens are selling drugs, committing fraud and cybercrime, or even theft and burglary. across europe, teenagers are being recruited via social media by criminal groups. this phenomenon, known as \u2018crime as a service\u2019, is no exception in switzerland; in fact, it is being observed with increasing frequency. this is a worrying trend that calls for a comprehensive approach from society as a whole. in practical terms, this means that prevention must begin in childhood. this is precisely where the national action plan against radicalisation and violent extremism (web page available in german, french and italian) comes into play: it strengthens young people\u2019s digital skills and improves their protection online. fedpol also supports several projects (available in german, french and italian) that contribute to the implementation of the action plan. these include the mind-hack project by the thurgau cantonal police, which creates virtual learning spaces to prevent radicalisation. another is the academic support provided by the zhaw school of management and law, which is planning several publications addressing the legal aspects of radicalisation and violence among young people. \u201cone of fedpol\u2019s tasks is to facilitate coordination and provide support to the cantonal police forces based on their needs and available resources. in the case of luxury car thefts, we stepped in at the request of a canton to provide targeted and tailored support through a task force.\u201d jan, police station chief money laundering: number of reports rises by more than a third a luxury car heist that ended in a spin-out three young men were arrested in october 2025 following an attempted burglary at a zurich garage. this foiled heist was part of a wider trend, to which fedpol was already responding with operational coordination measures."},{"id":5553,"permalink":"https:\/\/fedpol.report\/en\/report-2025\/serious-crime\/the-end-of-the-line-for-the-mastermind-behind-a-drug-trafficking-ring\/","breadcrumbs":[{"title":"Report 2025","permalink":"https:\/\/fedpol.report\/en\/"},{"title":"Serious crime","permalink":"https:\/\/fedpol.report\/en\/report-2025\/serious-crime\/"}],"title":"The end of the line for the mastermind behind a drug-trafficking ring","lead":"Spring 2024: fedpol was informed by international partners of possible drug shipments to Switzerland. Nearly a year later, following a lengthy investigation, a network operating between Switzerland, France and Germany was dismantled.","content":"spring 2024: fedpol was informed by international partners of possible drug shipments to switzerland. nearly a year later, following a lengthy investigation, a network operating between switzerland, france and germany was dismantled. it all began in the spring of 2024, when fedpol was contacted by its french counterparts at the office for the fight against stupefacients (ofast). they were investigating a criminal network suspected of importing large quantities of narcotics into europe via shipping containers. cocaine from south america and hashish from morocco passed through spanish ports before being transported to and distributed in switzerland. at the centre of the case was a man in his thirties, whom we will refer to as frank*, described as a key intermediary. the foj quickly launched a preliminary investigation. its aim was to assist the french authorities and determine the extent of trafficking on swiss territory, as well as the cantons affected, with a view to incorporating them into the investigation. in august 2024, an initial surveillance operation by the federal criminal police at fedpol confirmed frank\u2019s activities. during that operation, he met briefly with richard*. this german national would soon reveal that the network\u2019s activities did not stop at the swiss border but extended as far as southern germany. close cooperation between the authorities as part of this initial surveillance conducted by fedpol investigators, clandestine meetings were confirmed to have taken place between frank, richard and individuals in the zurich area. several addresses were identified, along with one or two potential drug storage locations. on the basis of this evidence, the office of the attorney general of switzerland opened federal proceedings against frank in september 2024 for alleged drug trafficking. the following weeks saw a series of transactions in the zurich region, including deliveries of \u2018moroccan suitcases\u2019 (slabs of cannabis resin bundled together and wrapped in burlap for ease of transport), cocaine, and repeated visits to a currency exchange bureau following the deliveries. the roles of the authorities became more clearly defined. in particular, the cantons took charge of monitoring the semi-wholesalers. these individuals purchase drugs and may supply them to street dealers, while also selling drugs themselves. for its part, fedpol remained responsible for the investigations against frank and his german accomplice, as well as for coordinating the operation internationally. in late november 2024, one of frank\u2019s clients was arrested in zurich. law enforcement officers seized over a kilo of hashish from him. the story doesn\u2019t end there. searches of his home led to the seizure of nearly 55kg of hashish, 9kg of marijuana and around 200,000 francs in cash. the drugs seized matched the moroccan suitcase that frank had previously delivered to his client, a delivery documented by the investigators handling the case. raids in three countries five days later, a check at the austrian-german border led to the seizure of 1.2kg of cocaine from a vehicle linked to the network run by frank and his accomplice richard. this confirmed the existence of shipments to germany. after several months of close collaboration, france, germany, spain and switzerland succeeded in obtaining a clear picture of the entire network and decided to move to the next phase: making arrests. in february 2025, following the arrival of approximately 10kg of cocaine in lyon, frank was arrested by ofast, after the french authorities took over this phase of the investigation. richard was arrested in germany a few hours later. other members of the network were arrested in the weeks that followed. on the fedpol side, a report was prepared so that the affected cantons could continue their investigations or even launch new ones. this international and cantonal collaboration, coordinated by fedpol, brought to light a network sourcing its goods primarily from spain. the drugs were then stored near lyon, after which a certain quantity was transported to switzerland, where part of the supply went to the local market and another part to the german market. at the heart of this network, frank organised the transport, storage, distribution and withdrawal of cash. a true mastermind, who ultimately landed in jail. * name changed \u201cas soon as we receive information from a foreign partner regarding potential drug trafficking, the key is to act swiftly to thwart this threat and identify the individuals involved. close collaboration with the cantons is crucial during this phase.\u201d jan, federal investigator money laundering: number of reports rises by more than a third the end of the line for the mastermind behind a drug-trafficking ring spring 2024: fedpol was informed by international partners of possible drug shipments to switzerland. nearly a year later, following a lengthy investigation, a network operating between switzerland, france and germany was dismantled."},{"id":5555,"permalink":"https:\/\/fedpol.report\/en\/report-2025\/serious-crime\/operation-global-chain-against-human-trafficking-focus-on-romania-yields-results\/","breadcrumbs":[{"title":"Report 2025","permalink":"https:\/\/fedpol.report\/en\/"},{"title":"Serious crime","permalink":"https:\/\/fedpol.report\/en\/report-2025\/serious-crime\/"}],"title":"Operation GLOBAL CHAIN against human trafficking: Focus on Romania yields results","lead":"In 2025, Switzerland once again took part in Europol\u2019s Joint Action Days, an international initiative aimed at combating human trafficking. For the first time, fedpol focused its efforts primarily on victims and perpetrators from Romania.","content":"in 2025, switzerland once again took part in europol\u2019s joint action days, an international initiative aimed at combating human trafficking. for the first time, fedpol focused its efforts primarily on victims and perpetrators from romania. romania stays one of the hotspots of human trafficking in europe \u2013 the majority of both victims and perpetrators come from the eastern european country. this was one of the reasons why fedpol deployed a police attache to romania in summer 2025. the attache ensures that information is shared between law enforcement agencies in switzerland and romania, reflecting the country\u2019s growing importance in the fight against crime. \u201cit seemed natural to focus on romania for operation global chain 2025,\u201d explains kuno, deputy head of his fedpol division. and fedpol went a step further: it asked europol for two police officers from romania to support the swiss investigative authorities in their operation for two days. on 3 and 4 june, two romanian officers joined officers from fedpol and local police forces on patrol around red-light districts in four cantons: bern, basel-landschaft, basel-stadt and ticino. building trust through a compatriot kuno went to bern and ticino as part of the patrol, which inspected several establishments and specifically approached romanian sex workers. the women were interviewed individually and quickly came to trust the officers, as kuno explains: \u201cthanks to our romanian colleague, who could communicate with the women in their own language, we managed to break the ice quickly and have some very open conversations.\u201d they even exchanged contact details. the police officer from romania encouraged her compatriots to get in touch with her if they feared repercussions in their home country, where sex work is illegal. she was struck by how openly the subject is approached in switzerland. \u201cin many other countries, sex work is hidden away in the backstreets,\u201d says kuno. the romanian investigator was also impressed by the security measures: rooms are fitted with steel doors that cannot easily be forced open from the outside, and security staff are on hand to protect the women. even so, sex work can be dangerous in switzerland. during the two-day operation, fedpol and its partners identified 130 potential victims of human trafficking for sexual exploitation. these cases have now been handed over to the cantons for further investigation. kuno describes the operation global chain 2025 joint action days as a win-win situation: the sex workers were able to speak openly about their situation, without language and cultural barriers, and the police gained a great deal of valuable insight as a result. cooperation with romania in the fight against human trafficking has since been stepped up. operation global chain 2025 joint action days \u2013 results in switzerland number of participants in the inspections255premises inspected148individuals checked457documents examined498potential victims130police arrests32vehicles inspected16 operation global chain joint action days \u2013 combating human trafficking together the operation global chain joint action days are an annual initiative led by europol and dedicated to combating human trafficking. in 2025, they took place from 1 to 6 june. swiss police forces participated on 3 and 4 june, carrying out inspections primarily in red-light districts. these were coordinated by fedpol\u2019s central office for human trafficking and human smuggling, which operated a back office in bern and was represented throughout the joint action days by a staff member deployed to the coordination centre of the european border and coast guard agency (frontex) in warsaw. liaison officers from a total of around 40 countries gathered there, ensuring that information could be shared immediately between different police forces. in switzerland, the cantons of bern, basel-landschaft, basel-stadt, fribourg, geneva, graubunden, neuchatel, ticino, valais and zurich and the city of bern immigration authorities took part in the joint efforts. \u201csince the operation global chain 2025 joint action days, we have received far more enquiries from our romanian colleagues. cooperation between our two countries has become much closer.\u201d kuno, deputy head of the central office for human trafficking and human smuggling no police work without shared information operation global chain against human trafficking: focus on romania yields results in 2025, switzerland once again took part in europol\u2019s joint action days, an international initiative aimed at combating human trafficking. for the first time, fedpol focused its efforts primarily on victims and perpetrators from romania."},{"id":5557,"permalink":"https:\/\/fedpol.report\/en\/report-2025\/serious-crime\/fedpol-and-the-geneva-police-join-forces-to-investigate-parcel-bombs-bomb-attacks-and-extorsion-letters\/","breadcrumbs":[{"title":"Report 2025","permalink":"https:\/\/fedpol.report\/en\/"},{"title":"Serious crime","permalink":"https:\/\/fedpol.report\/en\/report-2025\/serious-crime\/"}],"title":"fedpol and the Geneva Police join forces to investigate parcel bombs, bomb attacks and extorsion letters","lead":"In the spring of 2025, Geneva was hit by a series of threats and attacks. The incidents ranged from extorsion letters and ransom demands to an explosion in a letterbox, and an explosion in a residential area. A child and a man were injured.","content":"in the spring of 2025, geneva was hit by a series of threats and attacks. the incidents ranged from extorsion letters and ransom demands to an explosion in a letterbox, and an explosion in a residential area. a child and a man were injured. the threats and attacks that rocked geneva between august 2024 and march 2025 appear to share a common pattern. they were meticulously planned, carefully prepared, executed with considerable technical expertise, and designed to instil fear. when an explosive device detonated in the grange-canal residential neighbourhood of geneva in august 2024, the case became a matter for the federal authorities due to the fact that the suspected offence involved explosives. under the direction of the office of the attorney general of the swiss confederation, fedpol led the investigation in cooperation with the geneva cantonal police. the federal criminal police (fedpol) put together a task force. a joint investigative unit was set up in geneva, comprising specialists from the cantonal criminal investigation departments. the task force scrutinised every detail, analysing and examining thousands of leads from every angle. some information led to a dead end; other times, the connections became clear. every new detail \u2013 a recurring phrase in a threatening letter or materials used to build the explosive device \u2013 added another piece to the investigative puzzle. the investigation was in full swing. due to the ransom demands, experts who analyse digital payment methods were also part of the task force. in this crypto-tracing process, specialists from europol and fedpol worked closely together. specialists in negotiation, forensic investigations and digital analysis were also involved. the public and media professionals were eagerly awaiting answers. major police operation leads to arrest a profile of the perpetrator began to take shape. on 12 march, a 61-year-old swiss man was arrested. in light of the recent bomb attacks, fedpol\u2019s operational command had to assume the worst. the arrest was made during a large-scale operation, for which several areas had to be evacuated. the operation was successful. during the subsequent searches, the officers found numerous items that corroborated the suspicions against the suspect. the suspected perpetrator was put in pre-trial detention. for fedpol and the office of the attorney general of the swiss confederation, however, the work was not done. they still needed to look at the motive, personal circumstances and any other possible links, which were all part of the ongoing investigation. the presumption of innocence applies until a final judgment has been handed down. for six months, fedpol, the geneva cantonal police and the office of the attorney general of the swiss confederation worked side by side. they succeeded in creating a complete picture from the many individual pieces of the puzzle. for the public, this collaboration means one thing above all: greater safety. for the investigating partners, it is proof that close cooperation pays off. \u201cfortunately, even with decades of experience, this case is an exception \u2013 investigating an active, dangerous serial offender brings with it a great deal of pressure. around a hundred police officers were deployed during the operation. an investigation like this can only succeed if the federal government and the canton combine their strengths.\u201d fabio, head of operations no police work without shared information fedpol and the geneva police join forces to investigate parcel bombs, bomb attacks and extorsion letters in the spring of 2025, geneva was hit by a series of threats and attacks. the incidents ranged from extorsion letters and ransom demands to an explosion in a letterbox, and an explosion in a residential area. a child and a man were injured."},{"id":5583,"permalink":"https:\/\/fedpol.report\/en\/report-2025\/serious-crime\/kidflix-in-switzerland\/","breadcrumbs":[{"title":"Report 2025","permalink":"https:\/\/fedpol.report\/en\/"},{"title":"Serious crime","permalink":"https:\/\/fedpol.report\/en\/report-2025\/serious-crime\/"}],"title":"\u2018KidFlix\u2019 in Switzerland","lead":"Years of investigation have led to one of the greatest successes in the fight against the distribution of child sexual abuse material. With the support of several countries, including Switzerland, the Bavarian State Criminal Police Office (BLKA) has dealt a significant blow to the darknet platform KidFlix.","content":"years of investigation have led to one of the greatest successes in the fight against the distribution of child sexual abuse material. with the support of several countries, including switzerland, the bavarian state criminal police office (blka) has dealt a significant blow to the darknet platform kidflix. more than 91,000 videos, 6,288 hours of content and an average of three new videos made available every hour \u2013 these aren\u2019t figures from the streaming platform netflix, but from kidflix, a dark web platform that hosts videos depicting, in some cases, severe sexual abuse of children, including toddlers. the kidflix platform is accessible only via the tor network, which allows anonymous browsing. on the darknet, it is impossible to trace who is accessing this streaming platform. most of the video files are available for free. those interested in high-quality video files are charged a fee of usd 180, payable exclusively via cryptocurrency. the fee grants users lifetime access to the entire platform. start of the investigation the blka first came across kidflix in 2022 through darknet monitoring. it faced the major challenge of identifying users on the anonymous darknet. even though users remain anonymous, their cryptocurrency transactions leave traces and provide blka investigators with initial clues for identifying potential users. specific findings of the investigation were published in 2024. the german partner agencies then informed europol and the countries concerned about the streaming platform and its suspected users. the aim was to arrest the identified users at the same time across the globe. under the code name stream, fedpol took over cases with a link to switzerland from blka. in doing so, fedpol identified ten individuals as so-called premium users. to take action against the suspects, fedpol brought the relevant partners on board, including the cantonal police forces of aargau, bern, thurgau, vaud and zurich, as well as the basel-landschaft police and the zurich city police. in march 2025, the raids took place simultaneously in switzerland and other countries. they were coordinated to prevent the suspects from warning one another and deleting potential evidence. further raids followed later in the united states. a total of 1,400 premium users were identified worldwide: in 32 european countries, as well as in the u.s., australia, canada, colombia and new zealand. of the 1,400 identified premium users, 79 suspects were arrested. the analysis of the data storage devices seized during the arrests took months. \u201cmany paedophiles are hunters and gatherers. consequently, very large amounts of data are seized during arrests. the analysis work is time-consuming, resource-intensive, and psychologically taxing.\u201d yves, deputy head of the cybercrime central office although operation stream represents one of the greatest successes in the fight against the distribution of child sexual abuse material, not all users of the kidflix platform have yet been identified. the sad reality is that perpetrators, particularly in the area of child sexual abuse, are very well connected worldwide. they share tips with one another and use forums with instructions on how to avoid detection. there are even manuals on the subject. this makes joint cross-border investigations and innovative, state-of-the-art tools all the more important. this is the only way to identify both perpetrators and victims and ensure safety. online boundaries? \u2018kidflix\u2019 in switzerland years of investigation have led to one of the greatest successes in the fight against the distribution of child sexual abuse material. with the support of several countries, including switzerland, the bavarian state criminal police office (blka) has dealt a significant blow to the darknet platform kidflix."},{"id":4945,"permalink":"https:\/\/fedpol.report\/en\/report-2025\/protection\/","breadcrumbs":[{"title":"Report 2025","permalink":"https:\/\/fedpol.report\/en\/"}],"title":"Protection","lead":"","content":" protection "},{"id":5559,"permalink":"https:\/\/fedpol.report\/en\/report-2025\/protection\/a-distinguished-visitor-from-south-africa\/","breadcrumbs":[{"title":"Report 2025","permalink":"https:\/\/fedpol.report\/en\/"},{"title":"Protection","permalink":"https:\/\/fedpol.report\/en\/report-2025\/protection\/"}],"title":"A distinguished visitor from South Africa","lead":"South African president Cyril Ramaphosa made a two-day state visit to Switzerland at the end of October 2025. fedpol accompanied the president from his arrival in Zurich until the moment of his departure \u2013 under the code name Operation RAINBOW.","content":"south african president cyril ramaphosa made a two-day state visit to switzerland at the end of october 2025. fedpol accompanied the president from his arrival in zurich until the moment of his departure \u2013 under the code name operation rainbow. the sun was peeking over the tops of the bernese alps as south african president cyril ramaphosa was met at hotel bellevue early in the morning of 29 october. accompanying him was bruno, who was responsible for coordinating security with all partners on fedpol\u2019s behalf and had prepared the security arrangements meticulously. the two-day state visit held no surprises for the fedpol officer. he carried the programme with him at all times, neatly folded, even though he knew it like the back of his hand. the first preparatory session had been held in late august, with further meetings to follow. a week before the visit, bruno met with all partners from both countries to discuss the agenda and all operational details. nothing was left to chance. along with his partners from south africa, he reconnoitred all the places cyril ramaphosa was scheduled to visit. keeping all parties informed and maintaining open, clear communication are just as important as the risk analysis, as bruno well knows. diplomatic skill is also essential for a smooth operation. the cantonal police forces in bern, zurich, st gallen and thurgau played a particularly important role in operation rainbow, as they were responsible for implementing the security measures. the military police, air force and sbb transport police were also involved. present every step of the way bruno accompanied the delegation every step of the way and knew exactly what to look out for. he was particularly vigilant as the south african president arrived at bern\u2019s parliament square in an armoured vehicle shortly after 3pm. this was the most critical stage of the visit: the entire square was cordoned off, and a small crowd of onlookers had gathered around the edge. a few people were waving small south african flags and hoping to shake president ramaphosa\u2019s hand. but everything remained calm. parliament square had been prepared for the reception and was looking its best: the red carpet had been rolled out, the south african and swiss flags were fluttering in the wind, and the military band was ready to begin its fanfare. federal president karin keller-sutter greeted ramaphosa and introduced him to her colleagues on the federal council. this was followed by military honours, and both countries\u2019 national anthems were played. the atmosphere remained festive and peaceful. the visit then continued to the parliament building and the bernerhof, where the federal and south african presidents signed a memorandum of understanding to strengthen relations between their two countries. from the lobby to the meeting room, fedpol\u2019s security personnel \u2013 some of whom were armed \u2013 watched closely to ensure everything went according to plan. they were prepared for any eventuality, but fortunately, their services were not required. the next day, the delegation travelled to eastern switzerland, the home of federal president keller-sutter. from there, they headed straight to zurich airport, where the south african delegation boarded their plane to johannesburg and bruno climbed into his car for the drive back to bern. the tension slowly ebbed away: operation rainbow had been a success. \u201cit is essential to liaise with all our partners, particularly our foreign colleagues, to discuss operational details. specifically, this involves deciding how the motorcade will be organised and where the security officers will be stationed.\u201d bruno, officer in the protective security division security measures on the rise due to global political conflicts a distinguished visitor from south africa south african president cyril ramaphosa made a two-day state visit to switzerland at the end of october 2025. fedpol accompanied the president from his arrival in zurich until the moment of his departure \u2013 under the code name operation rainbow."},{"id":5561,"permalink":"https:\/\/fedpol.report\/en\/report-2025\/protection\/focused-on-the-mission-despite-the-emotions\/","breadcrumbs":[{"title":"Report 2025","permalink":"https:\/\/fedpol.report\/en\/"},{"title":"Protection","permalink":"https:\/\/fedpol.report\/en\/report-2025\/protection\/"}],"title":"Focused on the mission, despite the emotions","lead":"Federal Councillors Elisabeth Baume-Schneider and Beat Jans both paid an official visit to Egypt in November 2025. On each occasion, they were provided with close protection by fedpol, under conditions that were at times gruelling.","content":"federal councillors elisabeth baume-schneider and beat jans both paid an official visit to egypt in november 2025. on each occasion, they were provided with close protection by fedpol, under conditions that were at times gruelling. a sprawling capital city, cairo is as well known for being home to the pyramids of giza as it is for its massive traffic jams. this was the backdrop to the sometimes chaotic daily routine that two officers from the federal security service (fss) had the opportunity to experience firsthand in november 2025, while accompanying two official visits to egypt. for vanessa and cedric, it all began on site a few days before elisabeth baume-schneider\u2019s arrival in cairo on 1 and 2 november. the two officers also conducted reconnaissance in preparation for beat jans\u2019s visit to the same country two weeks later. two visits by government officials to the same country within a few weeks of each other are unusual, to say the least. this has advantages for both close protection specialists, allowing them to streamline their reconnaissance programme. these reconnaissance visits are an opportunity to liaise with the local swiss embassy and authorities, and to inspect the locations that the federal councillors will be visiting. a slight sense of apprehension at the start cedric, for whom this was his first trip abroad in this capacity, made no secret of the fact that he felt a little apprehensive. \u201cit is possible to be familiar with a country from having spent beach vacations there, but to know nothing about the security situation on the ground. we had many questions about how relations with our partners would work,\u201d he explains. \u201cit is possible to be familiar with a country from having spent beach vacations there, but to know nothing about the security situation on the ground. we had many questions about how relations with our partners would work. \u201d cedric, officer fedpol is responsible for the security of swiss government officials during their trips abroad, but it is the host country that is in charge of implementing the security measures. \u201cwe submit a request for security arrangements to the local authorities based on our analysis, but the measures ultimately put in place sometimes hold surprises for us. negotiations are then necessary to reach an agreement,\u201d explains vanessa. traffic uncertainties in the case of these two visits to egypt, the concerns of the two officers were quickly put to rest. initial communications with the swiss embassy went well, as did the coordination with the egyptian authorities. traffic, however, unsurprisingly lived up to its reputation and required various adjustments to the schedules of the two federal councillors. during her two days in egypt, elisabeth baume-schneider first visited an archaeological site in cairo, then attended the inauguration of the grand egyptian museum, before travelling to luxor for discussions with swiss archaeologists. highlights two weeks later, beat jans\u2019s official programme in cairo began with a meeting with the minister of foreign affairs. this was followed, among other things, by several visits to reception centres for refugees, particularly those fleeing conflicts in sudan and gaza. even though they were following a very specific mission plan, vanessa and cedric admitted that certain moments left a particularly deep impression on them. \u201cthese visits had a greater emotional impact than we had anticipated, especially when we visited the un refugee registration centre in cairo with beat jans,\u201d says cedric. despite this, both officers \u201calways stayed focused on the mission,\u201d adds vanessa. the two officers also worked long hours, sometimes approaching twenty hours a day. \u201cwe conducted reconnaissance alongside the visits, and then sometimes we still had to negotiate with the local authorities,\" says vanessa. but the two officers agree: they are now ready to undertake new missions of this kind. security measures on the rise due to global political conflicts focused on the mission, despite the emotions federal councillors elisabeth baume-schneider and beat jans both paid an official visit to egypt in november 2025. on each occasion, they were provided with close protection by fedpol, under conditions that were at times gruelling."},{"id":5563,"permalink":"https:\/\/fedpol.report\/en\/report-2025\/protection\/a-safety-operation-running-smoothly\/","breadcrumbs":[{"title":"Report 2025","permalink":"https:\/\/fedpol.report\/en\/"},{"title":"Protection","permalink":"https:\/\/fedpol.report\/en\/report-2025\/protection\/"}],"title":"A safety operation running smoothly","lead":"It was 15 May 2025, and the Federal Supreme Court was celebrating its 150th anniversary in Lausanne with fedpol on hand to ensure the security of this event and its guests.","content":"it was 15 may 2025, and the federal supreme court was celebrating its 150th anniversary in lausanne with fedpol on hand to ensure the security of this event and its guests. the official ceremony marking the 150th anniversary of the federal supreme court (fsc) in lausanne was about to begin at 6.15pm, as that warm day of 15 may 2025 drew to a close. the moment represented the culmination of several weeks of intense preparation for fedpol. pascal, the head of operations deployed on site with around fifteen of his colleagues from the federal security service (fss), was not, however, focussed on the celebrations. concentration is essential to ensure the security of this high-level event. close collaboration required flashback. two months before the day of the event, an official request from the federal supreme court reached fedpol. the judicial authority, which was preparing to celebrate its jubilee in its imposing mon-repos building, wanted fedpol to take charge of implementing the fsc\u2019s internal security during this anniversary ceremony. some 200 swiss and foreign dignitaries were expected to attend. although there was sufficient time to carry out this mandate, the challenges were numerous for pascal and his colleagues, who were usually responsible for the security of buildings in the heart of federal bern. nevertheless, in the event of a formal request, other federal buildings can benefit from fedpol protection (see box below). the main challenge was to develop a plan capable of ensuring the protection and surveillance of a building they were unfamiliar with. in addition, close cooperation had to be established with various partners, such as, in this case, the vaud cantonal police or the federal supreme court\u2019s security service. added to these unknowns, was the protection of the judges attending this event, which also falls within the remit of the sfs. over the weeks, through meetings and discussions, the internal security system finally took shape. the importance of details this long-term effort involved, in particular, a detailed review of the ceremony programme and the identification of what pascal calls potential \u2018points of concern\u2019. in short, the goal was to leave nothing to chance in order to avoid any unpleasant surprises when the time came. this coordination work also required the establishment of a chain of command in the event of an accident or major incident, including a terrorist attack. all possible scenarios were then reviewed. there were many questions: should we search the staff responsible for food deliveries, the children in the choir, or even the instruments of the marching band that will be performing during the celebrations? every decision had to be weighed up. a delicate balance had to be struck between the need to ensure the security of a protected site and the smooth running of the event. when the big day arrived, all that preparation finally paid off. with the exception of one person suffering from heatstroke, there were no disruptions to the ceremony. shortly before midnight, pascal and his colleagues wrapped up a very long day of work, tired, but with a sense of accomplishment. federal buildings under tight security you can\u2019t miss them if you\u2019re walking near the parliament building in bern. fedpol\u2019s armed police security personnel wear blue uniforms, a clearly visible badge on the left arm and the words \u2018police fedpol\u2019 on their back. this protection mission at the heart of swiss democracy is a top priority for fedpol. other buildings in the federal capital of bern, including the federal palace west, east, north, and inselgasse wings, as well as the bernerhof, the seat of the federal council, and the federal palace media centre, are also protected by fedpol. upon formal request, other federal buildings may be provided with protection, as was the case in may 2025 during the official ceremony at the federal supreme court in lausanne. in all cases, this protection is provided by fedpol in close cooperation with the cantonal and municipal police forces. as part of its mandate, fedpol is also responsible for ensuring the security of foreign diplomatic missions in switzerland. \u201cwhat i take away from this commitment is the importance of preparation, as well as the quality of cooperation between the partners involved. in a project like this, it is crucial to listen to their wishes and needs.\u201d pascal, project manager security measures on the rise due to global political conflicts a safety operation running smoothly it was 15 may 2025, and the federal supreme court was celebrating its 150th anniversary in lausanne with fedpol on hand to ensure the security of this event and its guests."},{"id":4948,"permalink":"https:\/\/fedpol.report\/en\/report-2025\/information-systems\/","breadcrumbs":[{"title":"Report 2025","permalink":"https:\/\/fedpol.report\/en\/"}],"title":"Information systems","lead":"","content":" information systems "},{"id":5565,"permalink":"https:\/\/fedpol.report\/en\/report-2025\/information-systems\/a-biometric-id-card-in-the-pipeline\/","breadcrumbs":[{"title":"Report 2025","permalink":"https:\/\/fedpol.report\/en\/"},{"title":"Information systems","permalink":"https:\/\/fedpol.report\/en\/report-2025\/information-systems\/"}],"title":"A biometric ID card in the pipeline","lead":"Knock, knock, bang, zip zip zip: At the facilities where Swiss identity documents are produced, the machines are running at full capacity. With just a few months to go before the introduction of the Swiss biometric identity card, preparations are intensifying.","content":"preparations are well underway at the identity document production site. knock, knock, bang, zip zip zip: at the facilities where swiss identity documents are produced, the machines are running at full capacity. with just a few months to go before the introduction of the swiss biometric identity card, preparations are intensifying. there are sounds of clicking, buzzing, whirring in the workshops where the identity card moves from one stage to the next like a little train on its tracks, at a perfectly regulated speed. lights flash, mechanical arms spring into action, and specialists check every detail with precision. we are at one of the sites where the new swiss id card is being produced. today, olivia, a project manager, is meeting with colleagues from the federal office for buildings and logistics (fobl) for a follow-up meeting. the goal is to finalise all the details before the future swiss biometric id card goes into circulation, scheduled for 2 november 2026. what is a biometric id card? for many years now, swiss passports have contained an electronic chip embedded in the cover. the principle will be similar for the new id card; however, the chip will not be visible, as it will be embedded between the document\u2019s laminated layers. chip-enabled cards differ from non-chip cards by the can (card access number), which provides secure access to the facial photograph and personal data, as well as the international \u2018chip inside\u2019 symbol, indicating the presence of a chip. a dual option the introduction of the new biometric id card is scheduled for 2 november 2026. this card will contain a chip with two fingerprints and the holder\u2019s photograph, just like the current passport. it will be issued alongside the non-chip id card, which will remain available for those who wish to keep a non-biometric document. the details of this dual option are explained in this video. precision at the heart of the process producing an identity document requires meticulous preparation and advance coordination to ensure that everything is ready on the day it is put into circulation. the project manager works out the details with the production sites and consults with legal experts to ensure that the legal framework aligns with the technical realities. she also coordinates preparatory work for the rollout with the relevant issuing authorities cantonal authorities in the cantons and at swiss diplomatic missions abroad. everything must be planned down to the last detail so that, when the time comes, the cards can be issued to citizens without a hitch. schweizer know-how at the production facility, which manufactures both swiss identity cards and passports, an expert points out an almost imperceptible flaw to olivia: the machine responsible for sewing the passport\u2019s security thread missed its final stitch. to the naked eye, the difference is almost imperceptible. but not to these trained eyes that check quality at every stage. this standard is no trivial matter: the more precise the manufacturing, the harder it is to forge. rigorous quality control directly enhances the security of identity documents \u2013 and, consequently, the safety of their holders. biometric id cards versus e-id the two products are distinct and independent, but they are sometimes confused. the biometric id card is a physical document. it is used for day-to-day identification and also allows travel within the schengen area.the e-id is a free supplement to the physical id card and is also expected to be introduced by the end of 2026. this is an electronic identity that allows you to identify users to identify themselves in the digital world and is available via the swiyu wallet app on their mobile phone. the e-id is not a travel document. the e-id website contains a wealth of other useful information about this project run by the federal office of justice (foj). fedpol is participating as the issuer of the future e-id. here too, preparations are well under way. \u201cthe security of the new smart id card and the responsible use of the data it contains are, for my team and me, the top priority. sensitive information is protected and may only be accessed for clearly defined and legally authorised purposes. that is how we create a trustworthy form of identification.\u201d olivia, project manager for the biometric id card no police work without shared information a biometric id card in the pipeline knock, knock, bang, zip zip zip: at the facilities where swiss identity documents are produced, the machines are running at full capacity. with just a few months to go before the introduction of the swiss biometric identity card, preparations are intensifying."},{"id":5567,"permalink":"https:\/\/fedpol.report\/en\/report-2025\/information-systems\/fake-documents-real-signatures\/","breadcrumbs":[{"title":"Report 2025","permalink":"https:\/\/fedpol.report\/en\/"},{"title":"Information systems","permalink":"https:\/\/fedpol.report\/en\/report-2025\/information-systems\/"}],"title":"Fake documents, real signatures","lead":"fedpol specialists trace the trail of counterfeit documents and identify series of forgeries using forensic profiling. From Morocco to Italy, via Switzerland, they found the same recurring traces on various documents. This caught the attention of our experts. ","content":"fedpol specialists trace the trail of counterfeit documents and identify series of forgeries using forensic profiling. from morocco to italy, via switzerland, they found the same recurring traces on various documents. this caught the attention of our experts. when the telephone rang in tunis, frederic, fedpol\u2019s attache in morocco and tunisia, picked up the receiver. on the other end of the line was his italian counterpart, a police attache in morocco. he wanted to discuss a case involving a couple of italian nationals who were stopped in casablanca, and were found to be carrying what appeared to be false swiss passports. after running a few checks,\u00a0confirmed to his counterpart that the passport numbers provided did not match the names listed in the register. he immediately entered the forged documents into national and international databases, then notified the royal moroccan gendarmerie, which was handling the case. it turned out that the fugitives were none other than two italian mobsters at the head of the aprilla clan. thanks to the detection of false passports, it was possible to trace their true identities and arrest them under the italian international warrant issued by interpol. they were likely be extradited to their country. frederic was not satisfied with this initial information, and sent a copy of the fake swiss passports to his colleagues at headquarters in bern. this is where specialists in forged documents, particularly swiss ones, are based. solene began analysing the two documents, first comparing them with each other. numerous easily recognisable elements indicated that they were forgeries, including misalignment, spelling and typographical errors, and misplaced security features. the documents mimicked the latest series of passports, and several clues pointed to a forgery. but only the eye of an expert like solene can identify common profiling characteristics, allowing her to link these two forgeries to each other and potentially to other counterfeits. when forgeries leave traces, the intercantonal database of fraudulent identity documents connects the dots based on findings from the analysis of the two forged passports, the specialist searched the intercantonal database of fraudulent identity documents. bingo: she found a forged passport with the same characteristics, confirming that these three documents shared a common feature. these characteristics, specific to the forger, constitute a form of signature or trademark. they suggest that the documents may have a common origin and belong to the same series. if other clues are added to this, it then becomes possible to establish a link to a specific criminal network. what is forensic profiling? forensic profiling links series of forged documents by identifying \u2018signatures\u2019 typical of a forger. the international database, profid-series and the database of fraudulent identity documents (its swiss version), centralises and shares this information in order to compare cases between countries, detect series of forgeries, strengthen police cooperation and, where applicable, substantiate the existence of a criminal network. circumstantial information related to the cases can also sometimes provide evidence. some clues are already provided in the database of fraudulent identity documents. fedpol contacted the canton where the third forged document was discovered. the holder of this false identity was caught red-handed while attempting to open a bank account. the trail led to france, and more specifically to paris. a name even emerged from this search... from switzerland to morocco, italy and france, counterfeiters and their operations know no borders. yet, taken individually, each case seems to have its own unique story. when compared side by side using forensic profiling, however, connections between cases become clear, including the same flaws, clues, and \u2018signatures\u2019. these cross-references may be the first crack in the facade of a larger network. the scale of the phenomenon remains to be determined, but when the same source reappears, it is no longer a coincidence; it is a lead. \u201cat some point, everything comes together \u2013 what was just a trace finally makes sense and becomes a complete picture. thanks to the information gathered, we can then guide the investigation, steer it in the right direction and follow the clues left behind by the criminals.\u201d solene, forged documents specialist no police work without shared information fake documents, real signatures fedpol specialists trace the trail of counterfeit documents and identify series of forgeries using forensic profiling. from morocco to italy, via switzerland, they found the same recurring traces on various documents. this caught the attention of our experts. "},{"id":5569,"permalink":"https:\/\/fedpol.report\/en\/report-2025\/information-systems\/testing-strengthening-coordinating-2025-a-pivotal-year-ahead-of-the-introduction-of-e-id\/","breadcrumbs":[{"title":"Report 2025","permalink":"https:\/\/fedpol.report\/en\/"},{"title":"Information systems","permalink":"https:\/\/fedpol.report\/en\/report-2025\/information-systems\/"}],"title":"Testing, strengthening, coordinating: 2025, a pivotal year ahead of the introduction of e-ID\u00a0\u00a0","lead":"In 2025, preparations for e-ID \u2013 electronic identity \u2013 at fedpol reached a milestone: a beta version allowed the infrastructure to be tested under real-world conditions, while fedpol established the National Identity Service, responsible for issuing the e-ID. A coordinated collective effort, ahead of the launch scheduled for late 2026.","content":"in 2025, preparations for e-id \u2013 electronic identity \u2013 at fedpol reached a milestone: a beta version allowed the infrastructure to be tested under real-world conditions, while fedpol established the national identity service, responsible for issuing the e-id. a coordinated collective effort, ahead of the launch scheduled for late 2026. who hasn\u2019t, at least for a brief moment, wanted to invent a new identity or borrow an existing one? this was possible for a few months \u2013 and perfectly legal. with the beta-id, the swiss confederation allowed the general public to create a fictitious identity to test the environment of the future electronic identity. for the development teams, this phase served as a full-scale test. for fedpol, it was part of a broader initiative. in 2025, preparations for the introduction of the e-id, scheduled for 1 december 2026, had made significant progress, both technically and organisationally. fedpol\u2019s role in the e-id process fedpol will verify the identity of applicants and issue the e-id based on data from the identity and civil status register records. in the swiyu wallet app, the user scans their id document and uploads their details (surname, first name, date of birth, document number), then records a short video (liveness check) to verify that the applicant is a real person. a reference photo is extracted and compared with the image in the identity register. if everything matches, the e-id is issued to the user\u2019s smartphone in a matter of minutes. an alternative option will remain available: applicants can have their identity verified on-site, for example at the passport office or with the relevant identification authority. beta-id: a public test to evaluate the infrastructure the beta-id, launched in spring 2025, served as a large-scale \u2018testing ground\u2019. by simulating real-world usage, it allowed for the observation of system behaviour, the testing of features, and the identification of necessary adjustments. for fedpol, the agency responsible for issuing the future e-id, this phase served to adapt and optimise the relevant systems, as well as the it infrastructure. the main challenge is to run the test environment while simultaneously developing the final version, through successive improvements carried out in sprints, following the agile methodology. what is a sprint? in the field of it, a sprint according to the agile methodology is a short, defined period of work during which a team focuses its resources on a specific objective. this makes it possible to quickly develop, test and improve a feature, fix a specific issue and achieve tangible results in a short space of time, for example, for implementing the user interface during on-site verification. at the end of a sprint, a functional or improved version of the product is usually available. the national identity service: a new structure at the heart of the system in addition to the technical aspects, fedpol also began setting up the national identity service in 2025. the roll-out of the national identity service is to continue in 2026. specialists from this service will oversee the issuance and management of e-ids throughout their entire lifecycle. they will handle cases that require manual verification when automation is insufficient. this service will also contribute to supporting and monitoring the proper functioning of online verifications. random checks or checks based on suspicion will complement the system. leveraging synergies the national identity service will be able to draw on existing expertise, particularly within fedpol\u2019s biometric identification division. some of this expertise, particularly regarding identity verification using facial images, overlaps with that employed in the afis2026 project. preparations are also taking place beyond fedpol. more than 100 people from various federal offices are involved in the e-id programme. fedpol is working closely with the federal office of justice (foj), which coordinates the programme, to ensure compatible and consistent developments. the same approach applies to support: the federal office of information technology and telecommunications (foitt) will handle access issues and user problems, while fedpol will step in at the second level for more complex cases related to e-id issuance or situations that cannot be resolved with standard responses. \u201ci am very pleased with the progress of the work related to the implementation of the national identity service. however, one key and particularly formative step remains: the internal testing phase within the confederation, scheduled to begin in july 2026. this phase will be crucial to ensuring we are ready for the launch, scheduled for 1 december 2026.\u201d isaline, project manager for the implementation of the national identity service testing, strengthening, coordinating: 2025, a pivotal year ahead of the introduction of e-id\u00a0\u00a0 in 2025, preparations for e-id \u2013 electronic identity \u2013 at fedpol reached a milestone: a beta version allowed the infrastructure to be tested under real-world conditions, while fedpol established the national identity service, responsible for issuing the e-id. a coordinated collective effort, ahead of the launch scheduled for late 2026."},{"id":4951,"permalink":"https:\/\/fedpol.report\/en\/report-2025\/cooperation\/","breadcrumbs":[{"title":"Report 2025","permalink":"https:\/\/fedpol.report\/en\/"}],"title":"Cooperation","lead":"","content":" cooperation "},{"id":5571,"permalink":"https:\/\/fedpol.report\/en\/report-2025\/cooperation\/in-search-of-russian-funds\/","breadcrumbs":[{"title":"Report 2025","permalink":"https:\/\/fedpol.report\/en\/"},{"title":"Cooperation","permalink":"https:\/\/fedpol.report\/en\/report-2025\/cooperation\/"}],"title":"In search of Russian funds","lead":"A spontaneous report from the Money Laundering Reporting Office led to a promising case. Several European countries are involved. The focus is on money laundering, possibly in connection with sanctions evasion.","content":"a spontaneous report from the money laundering reporting office led to a promising case. several european countries are involved. the focus is on money laundering, possibly in connection with sanctions evasion. when, in 2024, the authorities of a foreign country seized assets worth millions linked to russian businessmen, the international media interest was widespread. the focus was on the sanctioned russian oligarch aleksandr*, who was suspected of having close ties to the kremlin. but oleg* and dimitri*, whose names appeared in the panama papers back in 2021, were also under scrutiny because they were suspected of acting as front men for aleksandr. the two were said to have acquired numerous properties, mainly through loans from private companies based in cyprus and the british virgin islands. follow the money the international media coverage had reached switzerland: the money laundering reporting office (mros) had received numerous suspicious activity reports, particularly from swiss private banks, relating to oleg and dimitri. mros analysed the reports it received and sent what is known as a spontaneous report to the relevant financial intelligence unit (fiu). spontaneous reports from mros a spontaneous report from mros is a notification sent to law enforcement agencies, foreign financial intelligence units (fius) or the relevant national authorities where there are indications of money laundering, predicate offences or terrorist financing. depending on the case, a spontaneous report may involve suspicious transactions, specific individuals or companies, as well as possible links to investigations that have received media attention. it is usually sent without a request from an authority, instead being generated independently by the fiu. in 2025, mros sent 223 spontaneous reports to foreign fius. the spontaneous report led to an exchange of information between the relevant foreign law enforcement authority and fedpol. it became clear that far more countries were affected by the seizure of russian funds. additional european countries were drawn into this operation. suspicions were growing that oleg and dimitri had established an opaque and complex network of shell companies across multiple countries. the front men used their assets, including real estate, for both personal and business purposes. they laundered the money through their bank accounts, potentially circumventing sanctions. russian money also held in switzerland the investigation revealed that oleg and dimitri owned assets in several cantons. the competent foreign criminal prosecution authority submitted a request for mutual legal assistance to the federal office of justice with the aim of searching the premises and seizing the assets of oleg and dimitri, in particular bank accounts and real estate. a cantonal public prosecutor\u2019s office was responsible for processing the request for mutual legal assistance. fedpol coordinated the case in switzerland and abroad. by the end of 2025, the operation was underway, with more than 50 swiss investigators and prosecutors from several cantons involved. the seizures would first take place in switzerland, with further actions in other european countries scheduled to follow. to this day, this remains one of the largest cases involving money laundering for the purpose of evading sanctions. \u201cmedia reports relating to money laundering, particularly in the context of geopolitical conflicts, are an important source of information for financial intermediaries and law enforcement agencies. they can expedite the submission of suspicious activity reports and criminal proceedings.\u201d raffaele, liaison officer abroad *name changed money laundering: number of reports rises by more than a third no police work without shared information in search of russian funds a spontaneous report from the money laundering reporting office led to a promising case. several european countries are involved. the focus is on money laundering, possibly in connection with sanctions evasion."},{"id":5573,"permalink":"https:\/\/fedpol.report\/en\/report-2025\/cooperation\/identified\/","breadcrumbs":[{"title":"Report 2025","permalink":"https:\/\/fedpol.report\/en\/"},{"title":"Cooperation","permalink":"https:\/\/fedpol.report\/en\/report-2025\/cooperation\/"}],"title":"Identified!","lead":"Khalil*\u2019s trail led from Turkey to Greece and all the way to Switzerland \u2013 he was on the run. In Turkey, he was accused of unlawful detention, blackmail and murder. Thanks to fingerprints and an INTERPOL Red Notice, he was identified in Switzerland.","content":"khalil*\u2019s trail led from turkey to greece and all the way to switzerland \u2013 he was on the run. in turkey, he was accused of unlawful detention, blackmail and murder. thanks to fingerprints and an interpol red notice, he was identified in switzerland. in september 2025, khalil was extradited from switzerland to turkey. there, he was a defendant in a criminal trial. he was accused of having locked a woman in his flat in the beyoglu district of istanbul in 2021. he was then alleged to have blackmailed her family and murdered the woman. the turkish authorities\u2019 investigation was in full swing. however, after committing the crime, khalil fled to greece and assumed a false identity there, going by the name of illias. despite his escape and new identity, he was tracked down in greece and questioned by the greek police on behalf of the turkish authorities. he claimed to the greek authorities that he was already in greece at the time of the crime. after the questioning, khalil went into hiding. in october 2024, the turkish authorities issued an international red notice for khalil through interpol. red notice through interpol, police authorities from 196 member countries around the world exchange wanted and alert information. a red notice is used for the international search for a person with the aim of their provisional arrest and possible extradition, however, it is not an international arrest warrant. other interpol notices include: yellow for missing or unidentified persons blue to establish a person\u2019s identity or whereabouts green to warn of potentially dangerous individuals black to identify of unidentified deceased persons purple for the exchange of information on investigative methods and procedures orange for specific security alerts identification in switzerland about a week after the interpol alert was issued, the jura cantonal police stopped a person on suspicion of theft. what the cantonal police did not yet know was that this person was khalil, who was living in switzerland under another alias. a few days later, khalil came to the police\u2019s attention again. this time, the jura cantonal police took his fingerprints and ran them through the automated fingerprint identification system (afis) operated by fedpol. a match was found with the fingerprints contained in the red notice. fedpol informed the jura cantonal police and, at the same time, the federal office of justice (foj), which is responsible for extradition matters, of the match, known as a \u2018hit\u2019. the foj ordered detention pending extradition and informed the turkish authorities of the arrest. they, in turn, submitted an extradition request to the foj, and the fedpol police attache in turkey assisted with the preparations for the extradition. further investigations revealed that khalil had adopted at least five additional aliases. to avoid detection, he even altered his appearance and had a large tattoo inked on the back of his neck. this allowed him to travel unhindered in greece, austria and switzerland for a long time. the extradition proceedings against khalil went all the way to the federal supreme court. in september 2025, following an extradition order by the foj, khalil was extradited to turkey. this closed the case for fedpol. the importance of biometric data biometric features are particularly well suited for identification \u2013 especially fingerprints, because they do not change. the fine lines on the fingertips, known as papillary ridges, form before birth and regenerate completely even after minor injuries. and they are unique \u2013 even identical twins have different fingerprints. \u201cthis case is a prime example of modern criminal investigations involving cross-border teamwork. local, national and international authorities work hand in hand \u2013 supported by clear identification using biometric data.\u201d koray, police attache in turkey *name changed no police work without shared information identified! khalil*\u2019s trail led from turkey to greece and all the way to switzerland \u2013 he was on the run. in turkey, he was accused of unlawful detention, blackmail and murder. thanks to fingerprints and an interpol red notice, he was identified in switzerland."},{"id":5575,"permalink":"https:\/\/fedpol.report\/en\/report-2025\/cooperation\/the-eurovision-song-contest-comes-to-basel\/","breadcrumbs":[{"title":"Report 2025","permalink":"https:\/\/fedpol.report\/en\/"},{"title":"Cooperation","permalink":"https:\/\/fedpol.report\/en\/report-2025\/cooperation\/"}],"title":"The Eurovision Song Contest comes to Basel","lead":"Security for the Eurovision Song Contest posed a challenge for fedpol. The competition took place amid numerous geopolitical tensions and an elevated terrorist threat level.","content":"security for the eurovision song contest posed a challenge for fedpol. the competition took place amid numerous geopolitical tensions and an elevated terrorist threat level. from the congress center to the banks of the rhine, music fans flocked to basel in the second week of may 2025. the 69th eurovision song contest (esc), the warm spring days and the wide range of activities, including a karaoke tram and street concerts, drew more than half a million people to the city. thirty-seven foreign artist delegations attended, while 1,500 media professionals reported live from the venue and around 160 million viewers followed the event on television. the basel-stadt and basel-landschaft cantonal police forces were stretched to the limit \u2013 so fedpol agents were on duty to provide assistance. fedpol at the eurovision song contest for the first time fedpol employees supported the bicantonal operational command on the ground for ten days, right at the heart of the action. they produced situation analyses, assisted with investigations involving cross-border criminal activity, coordinated international police cooperation and determined which personal protection measures were to be used. working alongside the basel operational command and the event organiser, fedpol also led a security briefing: around 35 representatives of foreign embassies and consulates in switzerland were updated on potential crisis scenarios ahead of the event and received all the essential information on the security measures. geopolitical flashpoints the impact of geopolitical tensions \u2013 such as the israel-palestine conflict in the middle east \u2013 was also evident at the esc. during the event, there were several distributed denial of service (ddos) attacks, in which various swiss websites were inundated with enormous numbers of requests and crashed as a result. the disruption is believed to have been carried out by a foreign group opposing the ban on hamas, which came into effect in switzerland on the day of the second semi-final. although the esc delegations were not protected under international law, some of them required greater protection than others, including the artist representing israel. the bicantonal operational command was responsible for these delegations\u2019 safety, while fedpol facilitated continuous communications with police attaches from the relevant countries and the federal department of foreign affairs. cooperation with europol the location of the event \u2013 right on the border with germany and france \u2013 required exceptionally efficient cross-border police cooperation. at fedpol\u2019s request, europol deployed two staff members to basel to support the police forces, mainly with preliminary investigations and situation analysis. in one instance, a french national was checked when entering switzerland during the esc and was found to be listed in the schengen information system. following consultation with europol and other relevant authorities abroad, it was determined that the man had previously been sentenced to imprisonment in france due to his involvement in planning a suspected terror attack. fedpol shared this information with national partner authorities, who ensured that he did not gain entry to switzerland. after around ten days in basel, it was time for the fedpol employees to wrap up their operation. the pilot project was a success, opening the door to similar initiatives in future. \u201cthe location of the event, the geopolitical tensions and the enormous media focus posed a number of challenges for security authorities. that made the planning, coordination and smooth implementation of the security measures all the more important.\u201d benedikt, deputy head of the international police cooperation division no police work without shared information the eurovision song contest comes to basel security for the eurovision song contest posed a challenge for fedpol. the competition took place amid numerous geopolitical tensions and an elevated terrorist threat level."},{"id":4954,"permalink":"https:\/\/fedpol.report\/en\/report-2025\/fedpol-in-figures\/","breadcrumbs":[{"title":"Report 2025","permalink":"https:\/\/fedpol.report\/en\/"}],"title":"fedpol in figures","lead":"","content":" fedpol in figures "},{"id":5215,"permalink":"https:\/\/fedpol.report\/en\/report-2025\/fedpol-in-figures\/who-works-at-fedpol\/","breadcrumbs":[{"title":"Report 2025","permalink":"https:\/\/fedpol.report\/en\/"},{"title":"fedpol in figures","permalink":"https:\/\/fedpol.report\/en\/report-2025\/fedpol-in-figures\/"}],"title":"Who works at fedpol?","lead":"1 095 employees worked to protect Switzerland\u2019s security in 2025.","content":"1 095 employees worked to protect switzerland\u2019s security in 2025. staffwomen35,4 %men64,6 % languagesgerman72,8 %french20,7 %italian6,0 %romansh0,5 % in trainingapprentices and interns from commercial schools30university interns22 operating expenditurechf millionin %payroll and associated expenditure18360it expenditure7224other expenditure*4916amount304100* this figure includes non-it capital expenditure (2 million), depreciation (16 million), real estate costs and rent (19 million), and operation of police and customs cooperation centres, equipment, transport, office supplies, services and expenses (11 million). who works at fedpol? 1 095 employees worked to protect switzerland\u2019s security in 2025."},{"id":5309,"permalink":"https:\/\/fedpol.report\/en\/report-2025\/fedpol-in-figures\/no-police-work-without-shared-information\/","breadcrumbs":[{"title":"Report 2025","permalink":"https:\/\/fedpol.report\/en\/"},{"title":"fedpol in figures","permalink":"https:\/\/fedpol.report\/en\/report-2025\/fedpol-in-figures\/"}],"title":"No police work without shared information","lead":"The fight against crime can only function properly if information is shared between different national and international authorities. The central hub of police cooperation at fedpol is the Operations and Alarm Centre, which receives reports from partner institutions.","content":"the fight against crime can only function properly if information is shared between different national and international authorities. the central hub of police cooperation at fedpol is the operations and alarm centre, which receives reports from partner institutions. in 2025, fedpol\u2019s operations and alarm centre received a total of 407,178 reports from partner authorities in switzerland and abroad, including europol and interpol. the police and customs cooperation centres (ccpd) in geneva and chiasso play a key role in combating cross-border crime between switzerland and its neighbours france and italy. these centres are staffed by joint teams made up of employees from fedpol, the geneva and ticino cantonal police forces, the state secretariat for migration and the federal office for customs and border security. altogether, the ccpd teams processed 33,903 reports in 2025. in countries where police cooperation is complex, fedpol may deploy attaches. these officials ensure that criminal intelligence is shared between switzerland and their host country and support organisations such as the cantonal police forces, the federal office of justice and the office of the attorney general of switzerland in the fight against transnational crime. in 2025, the police attaches handled 5,210 cases. these included criminal proceedings and requests for mutual assistance, mostly relating to threats to life and physical integrity, drug trafficking, terrorism, child sexual offences and kidnappings. police cooperation tools an important tool in the fight against cross-border crime is the schengen information system. the national contact point for sharing supplementary information on wanted individuals and objects \u2013 known as the sirene office switzerland \u2013 is part of fedpol. schengen information system (sis) search hits in 2025switzerlandresults abroad based on swiss dataarrests for extradition415289entry bans3 8452 548missing persons1 160281persons sought by the courts (e.g. witnesses)1 950851covert registrations*6 1671 168objects (vehicles, identity cards, weapons, etc.)2 7581 383return decisions5 22311 060total21 51817 580* covert registration in the sis enables the movements of persons suspected of being involved in terrorist activities to be tracked. along with the sis, the dna profile database (codis), the fingerprint database (afis) and the national automated police search system (ripol) are indispensable tools in the fight against crime for all swiss law enforcement and security authorities, as well as for the migration and border control authorities. processing orders in afis and codis20212022202320242025automated fingerprint identification system (afis) quick requests (fps*)133 740263 781341 509 315 875 291 474requests for police investigations (cps**)50 47562 18263 651 60 402 59 192database of people (cps) as at 31.12.2025 1 108 284fingerprints\/palmprints10 59511 05312 241 14 038 13 750combined dna index system (codis) dna profiles of people10 30410 1199353 7272 6 848dna profiles from trace evidence11 70112 65515 555 16 595 16 709total identification requests (afis and codis)216 815359 790442 309 414 182 387 973* fps = fast print submission (formerly 2-finger requests)** cps = common print submission (formerly 10-finger requests) national computerised police search system (ripol) ripol database202120222023 20242025persons243 039239 633238 847257 057205 037vehicles (incl. bicycles\/motorcycles)569 295552 894542 509536 914526 747vehicle registration nos409 384374 025342 764312 437282 993unsolved crimes2 801 0552 796 4462 803 7122 846 8792 867 775objects2 837 3202 807 1922 803 3172 825 4472 836 941descriptions of persons81 94782 50184 98287 36388 966 data recorded on searches for people (ripol)20212022202320242025arrest warrants63 03375 02978 09287 06397 333address enquiries29 18237 69445 26651 429 67 652restraining orders3 5994 6386 0926 7455 597detentions13 82115 16417 04017 64718 287serving sentences and undergoing measures421333363387 417missing persons3 6574 3284 5476 744 5 134prevention of child abductions267382550609734bans on travel to a given country (hoogan)046021 2covert surveillance312186130190224covert surveillance \u2013 state security447320333698274targeted checks816224738targeted checks \u2013 state security71728851191 data recorded on searches for property (ripol)20212022202320242025cases152 933182 002198 122209 900200 419descriptions of persons51805707639262936 156objects117 851146 884161 697182 682160 493 data recorded on vehicle searches (ripol)20212022202320242025vehicles41405148627266957 289bicycles, motorcycles and stolen vehicle identification numbers (vins)24 42228 39732 29234 63030 781number plates32 62335 33139 10841 67543 845bicycle, motorcycle licence plates2147239423302363 2 188 data recorded on active searches (ripol)20212022202320242025urgent messages regarding persons17 86219 37520 91421 61722 492 outlook on 1 january 2026, fedpol updated the options for describing wanted persons in the ripol search system. two descriptive elements \u2013 \u2018skin colour\u2019 and \u2018type\u2019 \u2013 were replaced, having become outdated. the aim is to ensure that the police in switzerland have access to the most accurate search systems possible. at the start of 2027, fedpol will analyse the practical viability of the new descriptive elements and assess them in cooperation with cantonal police forces. further information can be found in the press release on this subject. no police work without shared information the fight against crime can only function properly if information is shared between different national and international authorities. the central hub of police cooperation at fedpol is the operations and alarm centre, which receives reports from partner institutions."},{"id":5288,"permalink":"https:\/\/fedpol.report\/en\/report-2025\/fedpol-in-figures\/almost-four-times-as-many-entry-bans-due-to-terrorism\/","breadcrumbs":[{"title":"Report 2025","permalink":"https:\/\/fedpol.report\/en\/"},{"title":"fedpol in figures","permalink":"https:\/\/fedpol.report\/en\/report-2025\/fedpol-in-figures\/"}],"title":"Almost four times as many entry bans due to terrorism\u00a0","lead":"In order to protect internal and external security, fedpol has the power to issue entry bans and expulsion orders against foreign nationals. The number of entry bans quadrupled in 2025 because of a database provided by Europol.","content":"in order to protect internal and external security, fedpol has the power to issue entry bans and expulsion orders against foreign nationals. the number of entry bans quadrupled in 2025 because of a database provided by europol. in accordance with the federal act on foreign nationals and integration, fedpol is authorised to impose entry bans and expulsions on foreign nationals when switzerland\u2019s internal or external security is under threat. fedpol bases such decisions on its own intelligence, as well as information provided by other authorities, most notably the federal intelligence service (fis). entry bans20212022202320242025terrorism921981126512violent extremism021354organised crime2515164345espionage70276753452nuclear proliferation00001total187312173238614 the number of entry bans rose sharply in 2025 compared with the previous year; the majority of cases related to terrorism. court-admissible information from foreign partners was a key factor in imposing entry bans in more than 500 cases; for example, europol provided its member states with a database of individuals linked to the islamic state who reside abroad. the number of espionage cases in 2025 was slightly above the average for recent years \u2013 with the exception of 2022, when the outbreak of war in ukraine and the associated espionage activities had a significant impact on figures. for the first time, fedpol imposed an entry ban on the grounds of nuclear proliferation, i.e. the spread of nuclear weapons or the means for manufacturing them. expulsions20212022202320242025terrorism22432violent extremism00001organised crime01402war crimes00010total23845enforced12335not\/not yet enforced11510 a total of five expulsions were ordered in 2025. fedpol issued expulsion orders against two suspected terrorists and two individuals involved in organised crime. for the first time, fedpol ordered an expulsion on the grounds of violent extremism. fedpol\u2019s statistics differentiate between enforced and unenforced expulsion orders, as not every expulsion can be carried out immediately. reasons for this include the non-refoulement principle* and ongoing appeals or criminal proceedings. * no person may be deported to a state in which they face the threat of torture or any other form of cruel or inhumane treatment or punishment (sr\u00a0101 \u2013 federal constitution of the swiss confederation of 18 april 1999 | fedlex). almost four times as many entry bans due to terrorism\u00a0 in order to protect internal and external security, fedpol has the power to issue entry bans and expulsion orders against foreign nationals. the number of entry bans quadrupled in 2025 because of a database provided by europol."},{"id":5318,"permalink":"https:\/\/fedpol.report\/en\/report-2025\/fedpol-in-figures\/counterterrorism\/","breadcrumbs":[{"title":"Report 2025","permalink":"https:\/\/fedpol.report\/en\/"},{"title":"fedpol in figures","permalink":"https:\/\/fedpol.report\/en\/report-2025\/fedpol-in-figures\/"}],"title":"Counterterrorism","lead":"Since the Federal Act on Police Counterterrorism Measures came into force in 2022, the Federal Intelligence Service (FIS) and the cantons have made 15 requests for measures to be carried out, five of which were submitted in 2025.","content":"since the federal act on police counterterrorism measures came into force in 2022, the federal intelligence service (fis) and the cantons have made 15 requests for measures to be carried out, five of which were submitted in 2025. police counterterrorism measures (ctms) enable the police to take earlier, preventative action against terrorist threats. measures can be requested from fedpol by both the cantons and the fis, with the cantons responsible for implementation. potential measures include reporting and interview requirements, bans on contact, orders restricting movement to or from a particular area, bans on leaving the country, house arrest orders, electronic surveillance and mobile phone tracking. ctms can be applied before criminal proceedings, after a custodial sentence has been served, during criminal proceedings (but only under certain circumstances and as a supplement to coercive measures involving deprivation of liberty) and while a custodial sentence is being served. these statistics were first published in the 2022 annual report. requests from the cantons and the fis2022202320242025requests from the fis1101requests from cantonal authorities0444number of cases1545 ctms* in 2025 in accordance with the internal security act (isa) requestsmeasures ordered20222023202420252022202320242025obligation to report and participate in interviews(art. 23k isa)16341012contact ban(art. 23 isa)**0424200060inclusion and exclusion(art. 23m isa)14231010ban on leaving switzerland(art. 23n isa)04110011house arrest(art. 23o and 23p isa)00000000electronic surveillance and mobile phone tracking(art. 23q isa)16321010there were no rejected requests between 2022 and 2025. * multiple measures may be applied in any individual case. these figures reflect the situation as at 31 december 2025. if any requests had not been dealt with by that date, this may be due to various factors: the decision was still under review; the decision had been taken, but was not yet legally binding (as an appeal was still possible or was ongoing); the issuing authority had withdrawn its request; the ordered measure was challenged with an appeal. ** in 2024 and 2025, the number of contact bans was higher than in previous years. this is because multiple contact bans were requested for some cases. the aim of these measures is to restrict relationships that could encourage or facilitate radicalisation to the greatest extent possible. implementation of measures2022202320242025appeals0112prosecutions for breaches of measures0010 terrorist activities the law defines terrorist activity as \u2018efforts to influence or change the institutional framework that are to be achieved or facilitated by committing or threatening to commit serious criminal offences or by spreading fear and terror\u2019 (available in german, french and italian). measures for minors children and young people can also be susceptible to radical ideologies and become involved in terrorist activities. figures from switzerland and abroad show that the number of radicalised minors is growing. ctms can be issued to children aged 12 and older, thereby also helping to protect young people. the prevention measures in the second national action plan to prevent and counter radicalisation and violent extremism provide a means of stopping radicalisation and intervening before young people commit an offence. conditions for measures when it comes to prevention, other cantonal measures, whether social, integrative or therapeutic, always take precedence \u2013 as do cantonal measures for the general prevention of threats and measures based on the criminal procedure code. in the case of minors, educational or child protection measures must always be taken before ctms, which may only be ordered once these other options have been exhausted or have proven ineffective. counterterrorism since the federal act on police counterterrorism measures came into force in 2022, the federal intelligence service (fis) and the cantons have made 15 requests for measures to be carried out, five of which were submitted in 2025."},{"id":5322,"permalink":"https:\/\/fedpol.report\/en\/report-2025\/fedpol-in-figures\/online-boundaries\/","breadcrumbs":[{"title":"Report 2025","permalink":"https:\/\/fedpol.report\/en\/"},{"title":"fedpol in figures","permalink":"https:\/\/fedpol.report\/en\/report-2025\/fedpol-in-figures\/"}],"title":"Online boundaries?","lead":"In Switzerland, at least a quarter of young people today have been asked to send erotic images of themselves. The number of suspicious activity reports (SARs) sent to fedpol continued to rise in 2025.","content":"in switzerland, at least a quarter of young people today have been asked to send erotic images of themselves. the number of suspicious activity reports (sars) sent to fedpol continued to rise in 2025. the national center for missing & exploited children (ncmec) in the usa is one of fedpol\u2019s most important non-police partners in the fight against child sexual offences. online and social media platforms such as google, facebook, instagram, snapchat and many others are required to report illegal pornographic content to this non-profit us organisation. if an sar has a link to switzerland, the ncmec forwards it to fedpol. in 2025, fedpol received 16,750 ncmec reports, around 1,000 more than in the previous year. the number of sars has been rising steadily since 2021 \u2013 partly because the algorithms used by online and social media platforms are becoming increasingly accurate and detecting more material, and partly because the volume of illegal pornographic material online is growing all the time. as an example, there are more and more images and videos of children and young people circulating online that they have taken and sent themselves. individuals in this age group are often unaware that they may be committing a crime, or that they and their images could be exploited. in addition, child sexual offenders are increasingly using artificial intelligence (ai) to produce child sexual abuse material (csam). the more accessible ai image and video generators become, the greater the potential danger. two further figures illustrate that a growing volume of csam is circulating online. in 2025, fedpol received 863 reports via the online form on its website. in addition, the organisation kinderschutz schweiz (available in german, french and italian) forwarded 2,432 reports to fedpol during the same period. after receiving the reports, fedpol checks whether the content indicates any criminal conduct under swiss law and, if necessary, carries out further enquiries. if a crime appears to have been committed and a possible perpetrator can be identified, fedpol forwards the case to the relevant cantonal authorities. a report can contain several images and videos and is used by the cantonal police as the basis for further investigations and for deciding whether to open criminal proceedings against the perpetrators. in 2025, fedpol filed 1,992 reports. online boundaries? in switzerland, at least a quarter of young people today have been asked to send erotic images of themselves. the number of suspicious activity reports (sars) sent to fedpol continued to rise in 2025."},{"id":5326,"permalink":"https:\/\/fedpol.report\/en\/report-2025\/fedpol-in-figures\/security-measures-on-the-rise-due-to-global-political-conflicts\/","breadcrumbs":[{"title":"Report 2025","permalink":"https:\/\/fedpol.report\/en\/"},{"title":"fedpol in figures","permalink":"https:\/\/fedpol.report\/en\/report-2025\/fedpol-in-figures\/"}],"title":"Security measures on the rise due to global political conflicts","lead":"In 2025, a clear trend emerged towards additional and enhanced security measures for people protected under international law, primarily due to global geopolitical conflicts. The number of threats against senior judges remained stable, however.","content":"in 2025, a clear trend emerged towards additional and enhanced security measures for people protected under international law, primarily due to global geopolitical conflicts. the number of threats against senior judges remained stable, however. politics in switzerland and around the world has been growing increasingly polarised and contentious for a number of years. public concerns and fears are widely aired on social media, frequently in the form of simplistic debates. this charged climate repeatedly provokes emotional reactions, which all too often translate into threats against individuals under the federal government\u2019s protection. the content of these threats is alarming, and the tone aggressive. in 2025, fedpol recorded and assessed 645 threat reports directed at members of parliament, government ministers and federal government employees. a concrete risk was identified in around 300 instances, prompting a detailed analysis; the resulting in-depth risk and threat assessments led, in some cases, to the imposition of appropriate security measures. in 2025, the analysis revealed an elevated risk potential in 76 of these approximately 300 cases \u2013 around 12 per cent of the total 645 reports. the cases related not only to threats, but also to other potential criminal offences, including damage to property, anonymous defamatory communications and various forms of harassment, up to and including stalking. if there is concrete suspicion of a possible criminal offence against a building or a person requiring protection, fedpol can take protective measures such as speaking directly to the suspect, issuing a formal written warning or initiating criminal proceedings. where necessary, structural measures such as alarm systems or personal protection arrangements may also be put in place. number of threat reports in 202520212022202320242025reports1215528593689645of which criminally relevant\/potential threat---311293actual threats\/potential danger to others12068627176 note on the statistics: if an individual sends several reports on the same day, they are recorded as one report. however, fedpol assesses and analyses all reports separately. in criminal proceedings, even anonymous senders can be identified by analysing forensic evidence . this encompasses all forensically usable evidence that could be found on an object, document or digital medium (e.g. dna, fingerprints, physical traces and digital footprints). since autumn 2022, members of parliament have been able to submit reports via an app. this tool was developed by fedpol as a direct and rapid way of obtaining the information required to protect individuals under threat. fedpol carries out a detailed situation analysis for each report. an update to the app was launched in 2025, making it even more user-friendly. security police tasks20212022202320242025security assessments for individuals requiring protection*465646731843977security measures for foreign diplomatic missions259420435580714number of cases processed**1616 1446* details of individual persons assessed.** special or extraordinary events by fedpol\u2019s special police intervention groups. foreign visitors entitled to protection under international law20212022202320242025number of visitors506105788411691305number of personal protection measures137229234340389number of permits to bear weapons for foreign security staff780658644793938 fluctuations in the figures for visitors protected under international law are due to the current political situation. in 2025, several conferences and meetings involving individuals protected under international law were held in switzerland owing to international conflicts. this led to a rise in security measures. overall, there is a clear trend towards a growing need for additional and enhanced security measures to protect individuals and property. protective measures are based on the individual risk assessment for each of these people. in other words, an individual classified as high risk may require more protective measures than a group classified as low risk. risk analyses20212022202320242025risk assessments for visitors protected under international law210304273303331risk assessments for the protection of protected individuals and foreign missions325368422465471situation assessments for federal property in switzerland and abroad*1815252936* situation assessments are carried out based on the circumstances or at the request of the property owner\/manager. fedpol uses the results to analyse vulnerabilities and propose improvements. the ongoing challenges posed by the global security situation and volatile political developments have had an impact on risk analyses. the number of assessments for visitors protected under international law rose slightly in 2025 compared to the previous year. this is presumably due to a slight increase in the number of conferences in 2025. the number of assessments required for diplomats and diplomatic missions has been rising steadily for several years. security measures on the rise due to global political conflicts in 2025, a clear trend emerged towards additional and enhanced security measures for people protected under international law, primarily due to global geopolitical conflicts. the number of threats against senior judges remained stable, however."},{"id":5330,"permalink":"https:\/\/fedpol.report\/en\/report-2025\/fedpol-in-figures\/money-laundering-number-of-reports-rises-by-more-than-a-third\/","breadcrumbs":[{"title":"Report 2025","permalink":"https:\/\/fedpol.report\/en\/"},{"title":"fedpol in figures","permalink":"https:\/\/fedpol.report\/en\/report-2025\/fedpol-in-figures\/"}],"title":"Money laundering: Number of reports rises by more than a third","lead":"The number of suspicious activity reports (SARs) submitted to the Money Laundering Reporting Office Switzerland (MROS) has been rising exponentially for years, quadrupling since 2020.","content":"the number of suspicious activity reports (sars) submitted to the money laundering reporting office switzerland (mros) has been rising exponentially for years, quadrupling since 2020. the number of sars submitted to mros has been climbing sharply for years, particularly since 2020. this is due in part to stricter supervisory practices and reporting requirements, and in part to greater awareness among financial intermediaries. as the chart shows, the increase between 2024 and 2025 is one of the most significant of the past five years. compared to the previous year, mros recorded a 39 per cent rise in suspicious activity reports relating to money laundering and terrorist financing. mros decides on a case-by-case basis whether or not to report offences to a law enforcement agency, following thorough analysis and drawing on its own additional information. in its annual report (link to 2024 edition; 2025 edition to be published on 1 may 2026), mros offers detailed insight into its tasks and activities in the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing. money laundering: number of reports rises by more than a third the number of suspicious activity reports (sars) submitted to the money laundering reporting office switzerland (mros) has been rising exponentially for years, quadrupling since 2020."},{"id":5334,"permalink":"https:\/\/fedpol.report\/en\/report-2025\/fedpol-in-figures\/when-everyday-products-gain-explosive-power\/","breadcrumbs":[{"title":"Report 2025","permalink":"https:\/\/fedpol.report\/en\/"},{"title":"fedpol in figures","permalink":"https:\/\/fedpol.report\/en\/report-2025\/fedpol-in-figures\/"}],"title":"When everyday products gain explosive power","lead":"In 2023, fedpol began recording every purchase of precursors by private individuals, thereby improving traceability and enhancing public safety. The number of transactions has remained stable and, as expected, fewer acquisition licences are being issued.","content":"in 2023, fedpol began recording every purchase of precursors by private individuals, thereby improving traceability and enhancing public safety. the number of transactions has remained stable and, as expected, fewer acquisition licences are being issued. what do swimming pools and maize fields have in common? hydrogen peroxide is used to disinfect swimming pools, and the fertiliser used for maize fields is made with ammonium nitrate. both of these substances contain precursors that, in certain concentrations and doses, can be misused to manufacture explosives. the term \u2018homemade explosives\u2019 (hmes) is used to describe substances manufactured in an improvised laboratory outside of industrial production. the manufacturing process alone poses a high risk of explosion \u2013 which would also pollute the surrounding environment and endanger the emergency service workers tasked with removing the explosive residue. hmes are often used by terrorists and members of criminal organisations to carry out attacks on atms. transactions and licences202320242025number of transactions (total)295330232811number of acquisition licences issued2449719504 to prevent misuse of precursors and avert the associated risks, private individuals are required to apply for a federal licence in order to purchase precursors in certain concentrations. this regulation came into effect in 2023, when the new federal act on precursors for explosive substances (pesa) (available in german, french and italian) entered into force. as expected, the number of acquisition licences issued fell slightly in 2025, dropping from 719 to 504. fedpol introduced the licences in 2023, and each had a validity period of three years. this explains the high number issued in 2023. in addition to the licences, retailers log each transaction by private individuals involving precursors in fedpol\u2019s information system, enabling better traceability of products and purchases. this is a crucial step towards greater public safety. in 2025, nine administrative criminal proceedings were initiated for breaches of the pesa. some of these instances involved individuals who ordered precursors abroad and were reported to fedpol by foreign partner authorities. in other cases, individuals attempted to import the prohibited precursors into switzerland, but they were intercepted by the federal office for customs and border security. when everyday products gain explosive power in 2023, fedpol began recording every purchase of precursors by private individuals, thereby improving traceability and enhancing public safety. the number of transactions has remained stable and, as expected, fewer acquisition licences are being issued."},{"id":5338,"permalink":"https:\/\/fedpol.report\/en\/report-2025\/fedpol-in-figures\/more-individuals-recorded-for-violent-behaviour-at-sporting-events\/","breadcrumbs":[{"title":"Report 2025","permalink":"https:\/\/fedpol.report\/en\/"},{"title":"fedpol in figures","permalink":"https:\/\/fedpol.report\/en\/report-2025\/fedpol-in-figures\/"}],"title":"More individuals recorded for violent behaviour at sporting events","lead":"fedpol operates the HOOGAN information system, which records individuals who have behaved violently at sporting events in Switzerland or abroad. In 2025, there was another slight rise in the number of individuals recorded.","content":"fedpol operates the hoogan information system, which records individuals who have behaved violently at sporting events in switzerland or abroad. in 2025, there was another slight rise in the number of individuals recorded. every year, fedpol publishes the latest figures on individuals and measures recorded in hoogan. data on a specific person remains stored for three years after the last measure against that person has expired. after that date, it is deleted. in 2025, the total number of persons recorded in hoogan rose by 10 per cent, having dipped slightly in the previous year. number of persons and active measures in hoogan20212022202320242025active measures645469519533749persons subject to active measures431315332357488persons newly recorded68115183171315persons deleted250338286270221total persons recorded1343112010179181012detailed analyses, published in july each year: current figures from the hoogan information system. swiss sports situation report (gsls) after each match day, the partners involved (police, sports associations and sbb) provide fedpol with information on violent incidents. fedpol analyses the data on incidents at every football or ice hockey match and publishes the gsls report annually. data from the hoogan information system serves as the basis for this. in the 2024\/2025 season, a total of 1,265 matches were assessed. particularly serious violent incidents occurred at 88 of these matches. the statistics in the gsls report show that violence has risen since the 2020\/2021 season, returning to pre-pandemic levels. the uefa women\u2019s euro 2025 in switzerland was largely peaceful: seven people were recorded in hoogan in connection with incidents at the matches. more individuals recorded for violent behaviour at sporting events fedpol operates the hoogan information system, which records individuals who have behaved violently at sporting events in switzerland or abroad. in 2025, there was another slight rise in the number of individuals recorded."}]
