1073 employees were working for the security of Switzerland in 2024.
Staff
Women
34,8 %
Men
65,2 %
Languages
German
73,4 %
French
20,3 %
Italian
5,9 %
Romansh
0,4 %
In training
Apprentices and interns from commercial schools
30
University interns
29
Own expenditure
CHF (millions)
In %
Staff costs
177
62
IT costs
62
22
Other costs*
47
16
Amount
286
100
* Included are non-IT capital expenditures (2 million), depreciation (7 million), real estate costs and rent (26 million) and operation of police and customs cooperation centres, equipment, transport, office supplies, services and expenses (12 million).
[{"id":2801,"permalink":"\/en\/report-2024-en\/editorial\/","breadcrumbs":[{"title":"Report 2024","permalink":"\/en\/"}],"title":"Editorial","lead":"2 March 2024, Zurich: A teenager stabs a Jewish man in the street in Zurich, critically wounding him. The Islamic State, which had called for attacks in Europe at the end of 2023, immediately claims responsibility for the attack. The investigation shows that the young man had become radicalised online within a very short period of time – a worrying phenomenon that we and our partners are increasingly observing among young people across Europe.","content":"the most serious crime don't stop at the border - our cooperation should be no different 2 march 2024, zurich: a teenager stabs a jewish man in the street in zurich, critically wounding him. the islamic state, which had called for attacks in europe at the end of 2023, immediately claims responsibility for the attack. the investigation shows that the young man had become radicalised online within a very short period of time – a worrying phenomenon that we and our partners are increasingly observing among young people across europe. radicalisation can take weeks or a few months, driven by social networks and digital echo chambers. the response requires not only criminal investigation work but, first and foremost, prevention. the national action plan (nap) against radicalisation, for example, was launched in 2017 for this purpose. the current third version of the plan focuses on preventing radicalisation among young people. the digital domain: a hotbed of radicalisation and a toolbox for criminals. new cybercrime phenomena such as real-time phishing or the criminal misuse of cryptocurrencies to finance terrorism place great strain on the police. when perpetrators access data in real time and misdirect financial transactions into their own pockets or use cryptocurrencies to finance criminal networks, their actions occur in the virtual realm. however, the consequences of these actions are felt in the real world: the victims are not bits and pixels, but people. fedpol responds not only by investigating such incidents, but also by taking preventive action, working with partners internationally and exchanging information and knowledge. fedpol still has to fight crime in the real world, but it needs the right tools to track it down in the virtual world. organised crime today is networked, flexible and relies on the division of labour. with the help of data from the encrypted messenger service sky ecc, fedpol is uncovering extensive fraud and money laundering networks that operate across borders. these findings directly inform large-scale investigations – leading to arrests in the real world. security and freedom: two sides of the same coin. without security, there is no freedom, and without freedom, there is no security. this balancing act requires a clear strategy, combining knowledge, cooperation and trust. the most dangerous criminals operate as global networks connected, and the police must do the same. more now than ever. ‘the most dangerous criminals operate as global networks, and the police must do the same.’ in early 2025, director nicoletta della valle bade farewell to fedpol and made way for her successor, eva wildi-cortes. ‘it has been my privilege to lead fedpol and serve switzerland for over ten years. during this time, fedpol has undergone fundamental changes. once seen as plodding, fedpol has evolved into a key hub for national and international efforts to fight crime and ensure security. cooperation with the cantons and international partners has intensified, digitalisation has brought new opportunities and specialised teams exchange knowledge worldwide. this transformation is not always easy and demands a great deal of commitment from everyone. however, the process has brought fedpol to where it is today: a modern, networked federal police force that greatly contributes to our country's security.’ now it is up to the new director, eva wildi-cortes, to forge ahead along this path. nicoletta della valle: ‘i wish her every success and the strength to make the decisions that a fedpol director has to make. the challenges for fedpol have not diminished. i am convinced that eva wildi-cortes and fedpol will overcome them, relying on a solid foundation, a committed team and strong partners – with courage, foresight and a clear view of what lies ahead.’ and what about 2024? you can read about it in our annual report: the arrest of atm bombers. the proscription of hamas. the relative of a person in switzerland is abducted on a migration route and held for ransom. the global operation jackal against nigerian organised crime. chechen people smugglers running operations through switzerland. an international crackdown on paedophile rings. the ukraine conference on the burgenstock. the olympic games in paris. or a key feature that enables forged documents to be detected. these and many other cases from 2024 can be found in our annual report. we wish you an exciting read! what does fedpol do? fedpol combats the most serious forms of crime in switzerland and abroad, including international terrorism and violent extremism, criminal organisations and white-collar crime. fedpol protects people, authorities and federal buildings. fedpol develops and operates national databases and carries out supervisory tasks, authorisation procedures and enforcement duties associated with weap-ons and explosives. in addition, fedpol ensures national and international police cooperation and the exchange of information. in this way, fedpol contributes to safeguarding internal security and protecting democracy and the rule of law. invia fedpol 2024–2027 strategy editorial 2 march 2024, zurich: a teenager stabs a jewish man in the street in zurich, critically wounding him. the islamic state, which had called for attacks in europe at the end of 2023, immediately claims responsibility for the attack. the investigation shows that the young man had become radicalised online within a very short period of time – a worrying phenomenon that we and our partners are increasingly observing among young people across europe."},{"id":2804,"permalink":"\/en\/report-2024-en\/serious-crime\/","breadcrumbs":[{"title":"Report 2024","permalink":"\/en\/"}],"title":"Serious crime","lead":"","content":" serious crime "},{"id":3228,"permalink":"\/en\/report-2024-en\/serious-crime\/radicalisation-clicks-that-lead-to-action\/","breadcrumbs":[{"title":"Report 2024","permalink":"\/en\/"},{"title":"Serious crime","permalink":"\/en\/report-2024-en\/serious-crime\/"}],"title":"Radicalisation: clicks that lead to action","lead":"Davide* and Blerim* met online and chatted for months in various chat rooms. Gradually, they formed a virtual bond, united by the same extremist ideology and a shared obsession: to punish those whom they consider to be infidels. Together, they harbour the fantasy of mounting terrorist attacks.","content":"davide* and blerim* met online and chatted for months in various chat rooms. gradually, they formed a virtual bond, united by the same extremist ideology and a shared obsession: to punish those whom they consider to be infidels. together, they harbour the fantasy of mounting terrorist attacks. according to information from fedpol and its partners, davide became radicalised at lightning speed. the police observe a similar pattern in many cases: young people are drawn into a spiral of online radicalisation, fuelled by social media content that reinforces their initial convictions. lost in this spiral, davide consumed massive amounts of online propaganda and even began to produce it himself. without a job or qualifications, he spent his days immersed in this virtual world, fixated on jihadist themes. the content on his cell phone and the keywords he typed into search engines indicate that his obsessions were now leaning towards tangible action. blerim has also brought his dark intentions into the real world and openly expresses his hatred of infidels. for several weeks, he went to various churches in his region and disrupted services. convinced that islam is the only true religion, he tried to impose his convictions in these places of worship. he even tried to preach his doctrine to a fedpol investigator. ‘it is troubling to see how convinced these young people are that they are on the right path, that they are ‘doing the right thing’. for some, radicalisation is deeply ingrained.’ florian*, fedpol investigator so far, police counter-terrorism measures have been taken against one of these two young men, who is now undergoing a deradicalisation programme following his release from pre-trial detention. the other has been sent to a juvenile detention facility. in such cases, the authorities always try to prioritise reintegration measures. without adequate support, these young people run the risk of continuing their radical trajectory. for them, the transition to adulthood means that they could face much more severe penalties. radicalisation of young people - an alarming trend in 2024 in 2024, jihadist radicalisation of teenagers and young adults became a major concern for the police and intelligence services. according to the federal intelligence service (fis), the phenomenon affects switzerland to a greater extent than it does other european countries. this is confirmed in a number of cases. a few weeks after the stabbing incident in zurich, three radicalised young people were arrested in the cantons of geneva and vaud as they attempted to put their plan into action. in the spring, two teenagers were arrested in schaffhausen for similar reasons. in the summer, two teenagers were apprehended after threatening to carry out a lorry attack during the pride festival in zurich. at the end of 2024, two minors were arrested in southern switzerland. one of them was just eleven years old. both showed worrying signs of radicalisation. building bridges with partners fedpol investigates terrorism cases, which fall under the jurisdiction of the office of the attorney general of switzerland (oag). in addition to cases against young people, its investigations include those against adults and as yet unidentified suspects. fedpol analyses police data at tactical and strategic levels, lends support to smaller cantons and facilitates cooperation with cantonal and international police forces. it also provides expertise on jihadist terrorism, particularly in cases involving young people. knowledge of this field is often limited in some cantons. following the events of 2024, fedpol set up a special working group to handle cases of radicalisation among young adults and teenagers, which liaised with the various authorities over a period. the main objective was to pool the results of investigations conducted by the various cantonal police forces, cantonal public prosecutors, the fis, fedpol and the oag. emphasis was placed on sharing information from analyses, interviews and other investigations in order to identify links and connections between the people involved, particularly those active online, including in other countries. thanks to these coordination efforts, the working group facilitated a standardised exchange of information among all parties concerned and ensured that the most suitable action could be taken. * first name altered entry bans and expulsions counter-terrorism radicalisation: clicks that lead to action davide* and blerim* met online and chatted for months in various chat rooms. gradually, they formed a virtual bond, united by the same extremist ideology and a shared obsession: to punish those whom they consider to be infidels. together, they harbour the fantasy of mounting terrorist attacks."},{"id":2979,"permalink":"\/en\/report-2024-en\/serious-crime\/unantastbar-nein\/","breadcrumbs":[{"title":"Report 2024","permalink":"\/en\/"},{"title":"Serious crime","permalink":"\/en\/report-2024-en\/serious-crime\/"}],"title":"Untouchable? Think again!","lead":"A small, unassuming shop on a busy downtown street in central Switzerland. For several months, a number of men have been coming and going, unremarkable and routine. What initially appears to be ordinary business activity turns out may be hub for a drug and money laundering network.","content":"a small, unassuming shop on a busy downtown street in central switzerland. for several months, a number of men have been coming and going, unremarkable and routine. what initially appears to be ordinary business activity turns out may be hub for a drug and money laundering network. under the direction of the office of the attorney general of switzerland, fedpol has been working with the lucerne police to investigate an alleged criminal organisation linked to ethnic albanians. the suspicion is that criminals are systematically laundering drug money through a travel agency. between march 2022 and february 2023, investigators logged over 750 visits by persons believed to be money couriers – a clear indication of active operations. investigations suggest that the travel agency is being used as a financial hub. the operators are suspected of having channelled several million francs out of the country, a large proportion to albania and kosovo via informal financial channels. international ties and covert operations the travel agency's operators appear to be part of a larger criminal network that extends across switzerland, the balkans and other european countries. at its core are ringleaders involved in various criminal activities. the suspects feel safe. in wiretapped phone calls, it becomes clear that they believe they are leaving no tracks and can trust the reliability of their network. a mistake: in september 2024, fedpol and the lucerne police, backed by the basel-stadt cantonal police and the federal office for customs and border security, move in. on action day, six people are taken into custody, houses are raided across switzerland, and evidence is seized. it is a long and challenging day for all the police officers involved. the simultaneous coordination of the authorities at the various locations requires meticulous preparation and maximum concentration. the investigations continue the suspects have now been detained pending trial, and the investigation continues. interagency cooperation is essential in the fight against organised crime, as this case clearly shows. fedpol will continue its efforts, because anyone who thinks they are above the law underestimates the reach of law enforcement. the presumption of innocence applies to all persons mentioned. ‘this joint operation by fedpol and the lucerne police is a prime example of how close cooperation between police forces and a common strategy can bring decisive wins in the fight against organised crime.’ marie, federal investigator money laundering: twice as many reports as two years ago untouchable? think again! a small, unassuming shop on a busy downtown street in central switzerland. for several months, a number of men have been coming and going, unremarkable and routine. what initially appears to be ordinary business activity turns out may be hub for a drug and money laundering network."},{"id":3220,"permalink":"\/en\/report-2024-en\/serious-crime\/phishing-scam-by-an-international-network-uncovered\/","breadcrumbs":[{"title":"Report 2024","permalink":"\/en\/"},{"title":"Serious crime","permalink":"\/en\/report-2024-en\/serious-crime\/"}],"title":"Phishing scam by an international network uncovered","lead":"A bank client in Switzerland googles the address of the e-banking portal, clicks on one of the search results, enters her login details, and becomes a victim. The website turns out to be a perfect copy, created by criminals who can now access and use her data in real time.","content":"a bank client in switzerland googles the address of the e-banking portal, clicks on one of the search results, enters her login details, and becomes a victim. the website turns out to be a perfect copy, created by criminals who can now access and use her data in real time. criminals register deceptively genuine-looking internet domain names and use google ads to prominently display these links in google search results. bank customers log in as usual using their username and password, and their login details are immediately transmitted to the scammers, who then log in to the genuine bank websites. two-factor authentication (2fa) is ineffective in such cases. within seconds, customers become victims. unsuspectingly, they enter their 2fa security code on the fake bank website, which the scammers then receive immediately. they then log into the bank accounts as authorised users and take control, often transferring large sums of money to the accounts of money mules – people hired as payment agents whose bank accounts the scammers use to transfer the stolen money, when they are not channelling the funds through crypto exchanges. fedpol opens investigations in july 2022, the office of the attorney general of switzerland launched proceedings following an initial police investigation and instructed fedpol to take the matter further. everything pointed to an international group of cybercriminals that targeted clients of swiss banks between may and october 2022. fedpol's it forensic experts and investigators identified a developer based in england who is thought to be behind the entire phishing kit – the software used by the criminals. he is already being investigated by the uk authorities. working closely with fedpol, the office of the attorney general of switzerland, europol and eurojust – the european union's agency for judicial cooperation in criminal matters – the authorities pool their information together. the uk authorities confirm the identity of the suspected it developer, who is then arrested in england on 26 october 2023. ‘cybercriminals are well organised, efficient and operate across national borders. although our resources are very limited and international cooperation is not always easy, this case shows that we are quite capable of bringing the perpetrators to justice, even if they are located abroad.’ andreas, federal investigator international cooperation as the key to success close cooperation between fedpol and international law enforcement resulted in the uk authorities taking over the proceedings. the suspect is currently facing trial in england for his actions. cybercriminals are extremely agile; international investigative work is essential to stop them. criminals know no borders, particularly in cyberspace – law enforcement must be just as well networked and dynamic. stay safe online: how to protect yourself from phishing type in the bank's url or save it: always type in your bank's web address yourself or save it in your web browser's favourites. do not use a search engine to find the address. verify links und email senders: do not open any links or attachments from unknown senders. banks never request sensitive data by email or text message. be careful with two-factor authentication (2fa): if you receive an unsolicited 2fa request, cancel the process and contact your bank directly. regularly check account activity: check your transactions and immediately report any suspicious entries. make sure that the latest version of your software is installed: keep your operating system, apps and antivirus software up-to-date. remain vigilant – cybercriminals exploit every opportunity! exchanging information: a crucial part of police work phishing scam by an international network uncovered a bank client in switzerland googles the address of the e-banking portal, clicks on one of the search results, enters her login details, and becomes a victim. the website turns out to be a perfect copy, created by criminals who can now access and use her data in real time."},{"id":2974,"permalink":"\/en\/report-2024-en\/serious-crime\/successful-strike-against-international-people-smuggling-ring\/","breadcrumbs":[{"title":"Report 2024","permalink":"\/en\/"},{"title":"Serious crime","permalink":"\/en\/report-2024-en\/serious-crime\/"}],"title":"Successful strike against international people smuggling ring","lead":"Combating organised crime, particularly international people smuggling, is one of fedpol's top priorities. In cooperation with the French law enforcement agencies and the Office of the Attorney General of Switzerland, fedpol investigators have brought down a well-organised people smuggling ring that was illegally bringing people from the Russian North Caucasus to Western Europe. The case demonstrates the efficiency and the necessity of international cooperation.","content":"combating organised crime, particularly international people smuggling, is one of fedpol's top priorities. in cooperation with the french law enforcement agencies and the office of the attorney general of switzerland, fedpol investigators have brought down a well-organised people smuggling ring that was illegally bringing people from the russian north caucasus to western europe. the case demonstrates the efficiency and the necessity of international cooperation. in june 2023, french investigative teams uncovered a network smuggling people from the russian republic of chechnya, enabling them to enter europe illegally. meanwhile, russian nationals in switzerland have been repeatedly found without valid travel documents. europol has been coordinating ongoing investigations and fedpol is intensifying its own enquiries. the office of the attorney general of switzerland initiated criminal proceedings against four individuals suspected of organising illegal entry and transit through switzerland. the swiss and french authorities have since been working together in a joint investigation team (jit) to expose the structures of this people-smuggling ring. the federal office for customs and border security (focbs) provided key findings from border checks. on 28 may 2024, french special police units, including the groupe d'intervention de la gendarmerie nationale and the recherche assistance intervention dissuasion, arrested eleven suspects in and around reims (france). fedpol investigators assisted the french authorities on the ground. house searches yielded credible indications that the arrested persons could be involved in further offences such as terrorism and arms trafficking. international cooperation as the key to success the people smugglers in this case change their routes skilfully and are often lawfully resident in various eu countries. they accompany migrants from slovakia on their way to italy and switzerland and further on to france, charging large sums of money for their services. close cooperation between law enforcement agencies in france and switzerland has proven decisive. the jit enables evidence to be secured quickly across borders, thus enabling coordinated legal action to be taken against suspects. smooth communication between public prosecutors has led to swift arrests. looking ahead there do not seem to be any indications so far of any members or infrastructure in switzerland. in this case, the criminals appear to have used switzerland mainly as a transit country. the operation shows the importance of early cooperation and information sharing between national and international partners. it is a significant blow to international people smuggling and shows how effective concerted action by the police and judicial authorities can be in combating cross-border crime. the findings from this case will help to detect and prevent future people-smuggling operations at an early stage. ‘the operation clearly showed that switzerland needs to think outside the box in order to combat people smuggling. this is the only way to send a clear signal to criminals that switzerland is not a place where they can act with impunity.’ kuno, deputy police commissioner entry bans and expulsions successful strike against international people smuggling ring combating organised crime, particularly international people smuggling, is one of fedpol's top priorities. in cooperation with the french law enforcement agencies and the office of the attorney general of switzerland, fedpol investigators have brought down a well-organised people smuggling ring that was illegally bringing people from the russian north caucasus to western europe. the case demonstrates the efficiency and the necessity of international cooperation."},{"id":2984,"permalink":"\/en\/report-2024-en\/serious-crime\/in-the-eye-of-the-storm\/","breadcrumbs":[{"title":"Report 2024","permalink":"\/en\/"},{"title":"Serious crime","permalink":"\/en\/report-2024-en\/serious-crime\/"}],"title":"In the eye of the storm","lead":"What on the surface appeared to be a local raid was actually part of a global operation against Nigerian brotherhoods, which engage in drug trafficking, fraud and money laundering across entire continents. Their victims lose everything: money, trust and freedom.","content":"nigerian brotherhoods: international criminal syndicates. what on the surface appeared to be a local raid was actually part of a global operation against nigerian brotherhoods, which engage in drug trafficking, fraud and money laundering across entire continents. their victims lose everything: money, trust and freedom. ‘go! go!’ the crack of dawn, 6am on 14 may 2024, operation jackal begins on rue de geneve, lausanne. officers from fedpol, the vaud cantonal police, the lausanne city police, the canton of vaud public prosecutor's office and interpol agents gain access to an apartment building. as soon as the first police officer enters through the front door, bags of white powder – presumably cocaine – are thrown out of the windows. the suspects frantically try to destroy evidence, but the police are quicker. 57 police officers systematically comb through apartments that had been used as hideouts and storage depots for drug traffickers. 22 individuals without legal residence status in switzerland are apprehended. two receive short prison sentences the same day, four are placed in pre-trial detention, and three others are transferred to other cantons. over a kilogram of cocaine and chf 48,000 in cash are seized. nigerian brotherhoods the brotherhoods trace their origins back to the 1950s, when they emerged in nigeria from student fraternities, initially pursuing social aims. over the years, groups such as black axe, vikings, maphites and the supreme eiye confraternity have become fronts for international criminal syndicates. they are characterised by their strict hierarchies and are highly adaptable. a global mastermind calls the shots, and regional chapters carry out his orders. flashback. in 2021, foreign partners alerted fedpol that nigerians from switzerland had been spotted at a black axe european brotherhood meeting in brussels. fedpol investigated and identified around 200 members in switzerland who were assigned to various brotherhoods. their victims often lose their entire life savings. women are lured into prostitution with promises of a better life. others fall victim to scams in their search for romance and end up losing their money and trust in social contacts. retirees fall for elaborately concocted stories and are exploited as cash or drug mules. a number of swiss pensioners are currently serving time in foreign prisons as a result. money from switzerland flows into international networks and finances crime in europe, africa and south america. the analysis shows that nearly all swiss cantons are affected, with lausanne, geneva and zurich serving as major hubs for activities such as money laundering and drug distribution. rival gangs settle their differences violently – in 2024 alone, fedpol reported ten violent clashes in switzerland. operation jackal yields impressive results: interpol freezes over eur 1.2 million in illicit funds, 75 suspects are arrested and a number of key figures are identified. intelligence gained from the lausanne operation is fed into the analysis and shared with partner agencies. bit by bit, the pieces of the puzzle fall into place. the swiss police have shown that they can act decisively and send a clear signal: switzerland is no safe haven for criminal networks, which will be relentlessly pursued. operation jackal interpol has been conducting a global operation dubbed jackal, targeting west african crime syndicates. the focus is on nigerian brotherhoods, in particular black axe, which has gained influence through drug trafficking, online fraud, human trafficking and money laundering. around 30 suspected members have been identified in switzerland, mainly in lausanne, geneva and zurich. the networks operate transnationally and move funds to finance criminal activities worldwide. ‘we must act decisively in switzerland to prevent nigerian brotherhoods from gaining a foothold and expanding their activities. to do that, we first need to understand how they operate, what their values are and how their members think.’ michael, federal investigator money laundering: twice as many reports as two years ago in the eye of the storm what on the surface appeared to be a local raid was actually part of a global operation against nigerian brotherhoods, which engage in drug trafficking, fraud and money laundering across entire continents. their victims lose everything: money, trust and freedom."},{"id":3206,"permalink":"\/en\/report-2024-en\/serious-crime\/ai-for-child-pornography-can-it-be-morally-acceptable\/","breadcrumbs":[{"title":"Report 2024","permalink":"\/en\/"},{"title":"Serious crime","permalink":"\/en\/report-2024-en\/serious-crime\/"}],"title":"AI for child pornography: can it be morally acceptable?","lead":"The website of 28-year-old Rasmus* from Denmark contains thousands and thousands of images of children, mainly girls. Yet, there may not be any victims, because Rasmus produced all the images himself using artificial intelligence (AI). An international case that has also led investigators to Switzerland.","content":"the website of 28-year-old rasmus* from denmark contains thousands and thousands of images of children, mainly girls. yet, there may not be any victims, because rasmus produced all the images himself using artificial intelligence (ai). an international case that has also led investigators to switzerland. rasmus* looks at the pictures on his computer with satisfaction. there are many, now well over 300,000. he has had to practise, but now rasmus has mastered the ai program, most of which works for free, so much so that no one can tell whether the photos of the girls and boys in provocative poses are real or not. a win-win situation for him: there are no victims, and yet he is able to offer thousands of images for sale. in june 2024, the annual meeting of paedophile crime experts is held at europol's headquarters in the hague. the uk and denmark make a joint presentation of the case of the young dane who distributes adverts for explicit pornographic content via tiktok, youtube, x, discord and his own website. most of the publicly viewable content is not illegal: although the girls in the photos look young, the content is not explicitly pornographic. for five euros a month, though, rasmus is offering premium content, up to a thousand images per month. the uk national crime agency, which came across it during its undercover investigations, pays to join up. the exclusive content turns out to be explicit child pornography. thanks to the purchase, the police are able to identify the perpetrator: rasmus is arrested at his home in denmark. an international case that also leads investigators to switzerland the police seize over 300,000 images, all ai-generated; around 30,000 of them are child pornography. the customers, almost 300 of them, live in over 30 countries worldwide. in autumn, europol notifies fedpol that three live in switzerland, and in turn fedpol informs the local cantonal police. the first house search takes place in the canton of basellandschaft, followed by lucerne and the city of zurich. one person arrested argues that he did not know that the possession of ai-generated child pornography was a criminal offence. are the perpetrators really exploiting a loophole in the law? not according to the swiss criminal code: its article 197 clearly states that the production and possession of pornographic material that does not contain images of real people is a criminal offence. it doesn’t matter whether it's a drawing, photo or ai-generated image; in every case this is a criminal offence. ai distracts from the real victims ai-generated child pornography poses major challenges for the police. the amount of material has been increasing exponentially for years and ai programs are becoming more accessible and user-friendly. even if no one is exploited to produce ai-generated child pornography, it distracts from the genuine victims of sexual abuse and makes the work of the police more difficult, because there are still many images that are real, and the effort required to differentiate between real and ai-generated images is becoming increasingly complex and time-consuming. behind every real picture is a victim, an abused child who needs to be found. this makes cooperation and the rapid exchange of information all the more important, whether between fedpol and international partners such as europol, or at national level. because the victims have top priority – at all times. ‘in the case of child pornography, identifying the victims is particularly important, because the victims usually lead us to other perpetrators. the circle gets wider and wider. with ai-generated material, however, we often don't even know whether there is a victim at all. that makes our work more difficult.’ marcel, federal investigator * name changed united against paedophile crime ai for child pornography: can it be morally acceptable? the website of 28-year-old rasmus* from denmark contains thousands and thousands of images of children, mainly girls. yet, there may not be any victims, because rasmus produced all the images himself using artificial intelligence (ai). an international case that has also led investigators to switzerland."},{"id":2967,"permalink":"\/en\/report-2024-en\/serious-crime\/a-difficult-year-for-the-plofkraker\/","breadcrumbs":[{"title":"Report 2024","permalink":"\/en\/"},{"title":"Serious crime","permalink":"\/en\/report-2024-en\/serious-crime\/"}],"title":"A difficult year for the Plofkraker","lead":"In 2024, there was a record number of cases of ATMs being blown up. At the same time, there were also several major successes. Handcuffs clicked round one pair of wrists after another as months of investigations led to arrests in France and Switzerland.","content":"an atm is blown up in a controlled explosion; the scene resembles the set of an action film: devastation, destruction. in 2024, there was a record number of cases of atms being blown up. at the same time, there were also several major successes. handcuffs clicked round one pair of wrists after another as months of investigations led to arrests in france and switzerland. after subsiding somewhat in 2023, the number of attacks on atms in switzerland begin climbing again in early 2024. in particular, attacks involving the use of explosives become more frequent, first in southern germany, then in the swiss jura and finally in france, the number of attacks reaching an all-time high. the perpetrators? a group of disturbingly young dutchmen. another group known to fedpol, with closer links to the moroccan mafia, is also emerging from the shadows. the group had already gained notoriety in switzerland's northwestern region in 2020 and 2021, when it blew up several atms. in late 2021, individual members were arrested in france. one thing the two groups have in common is that they are both highly professional and well prepared. the dutch group, also known as the plofkraker (a combination of the words plof which means explosion and krak which means break-in or robbery), spend a long time in the target area before making their move, checking escape routes and scouting out the atms. they rent apartments and hotel rooms on popular websites to use as safe houses, leaving nothing to chance. and they strike at night. it is more than 700 kilometres from switzerland to the netherlands, an 8.5-hour trip if all goes well. the perpetrators prepare well for this long escape route: as a rule, they flee directly from the scene of the crime on an electric scooter or kick scooter. they then transfer to a much more powerful vehicle, stowing petrol cans in the boot so that they can make a straight getaway to the netherlands without stopping. they usually rent the vehicles used for their crimes from shady firms abroad or in switzerland, and they usually pay in cash. however, not everything always goes to plan: some gang members have had accidents in both germany and switzerland. in such cases, the getaway vehicle is left behind, along with potentially useful clues for investigators. investigation, observation and capture! thanks to intensive information sharing between fedpol and the french, german and dutch authorities, the noose began to tighten around the first group, which focuses on the border region where germany, france and switzerland meet. between 6 and 9 september, the french authorities arrested 13 people, including logisticians, scouts, drivers and blast operators. three months later, the noose tightened around the second group as well: thanks to highly resource-intensive investigations and cooperation with the office of the attorney general of switzerland, the federal office for customs and border security, the basel-stadt public prosecutor's office and the bern cantonal police, the group had been under observation as they went about their activities. on 13 december, four suspects were arrested in the lucerne area. packages of explosives and cobra 6 firecrackers were also found in a rented apartment in the bernese oberland. by 2024, the party was over for some of the plofkraker. important lessons for future arrests have been learned from successful operations like these. the story continues… ‘while successful investigations are important, experience from abroad shows that atm attacks cannot be countered with law enforcement measures alone. we have to work with the banks to ensure that there is no point in attempting these attacks to begin with...’ cristian*, federal investigator * name changed a difficult year for the plofkraker in 2024, there was a record number of cases of atms being blown up. at the same time, there were also several major successes. handcuffs clicked round one pair of wrists after another as months of investigations led to arrests in france and switzerland."},{"id":3236,"permalink":"\/en\/report-2024-en\/serious-crime\/catturato-dalla-giustizia-internazionale\/","breadcrumbs":[{"title":"Report 2024","permalink":"\/en\/"},{"title":"Serious crime","permalink":"\/en\/report-2024-en\/serious-crime\/"}],"title":"International justice served","lead":"Ousman Sonko, the former Gambian Minister of the Interior, thought he would find refuge in Switzerland having served under his country's authoritarian regime. Accused of crimes against humanity, he was arrested in 2017 and sentenced to 20 years in prison in 2024. A complex investigation conducted by fedpol on behalf of Office of the Attorney General of Switzerland enabled the authorities to piece together the repressive system that he had been part of.","content":"ousman sonko, the former gambian minister of the interior, thought he would find refuge in switzerland having served under his country's authoritarian regime. accused of crimes against humanity, he was arrested in 2017 and sentenced to 20 years in prison in 2024. a complex investigation conducted by fedpol on behalf of office of the attorney general of switzerland enabled the authorities to piece together the repressive system that he had been part of. between 2000 and 2016, ousman sonko terrorised the population of the gambia. a minister under the authoritarian regime of former president yahya jammeh, he planned to keep his secrets safe in switzerland, where he applied for asylum. things took a turn for the worse for him when the swiss authorities arrested him in january 2017. the charges against him were serious – crimes against humanity. sonko was suspected of being a key player in the jammeh regime's repression of journalists, political opponents and any military personnel suspected of plotting against the government. under the regime's orders, a chilling reality reared its head: arbitrary detention, torture, disappearances and extrajudicial killings. a puzzle to be pieced together for years, the junglers – jammeh's death squad – would regularly meet at traffic light, a strategic crossroads in banjul. aboard white pick-up trucks, these men wearing baclava masks would hunt down and capture political opponents, who would first be detained in the government prison, before being transferred by the junglers to the headquarters of the national intelligence agency (nia). there, they were subjected to brutal interrogation and torture. few emerged unscathed. a number of junglers testified before the gambian truth, reconciliation and reparations commission (trrc). filmed hearings, entitled establishing the truth, allowed investigators to piece together certain facts. the office of the attorney general of switzerland (oag), with the support of fedpol, also interviewed several junglers. one of them admitted to having killed about ten people, without showing any apparent remorse. caught up in a spiral of violence, these executioners carried out orders in cold blood. any disobedience on their part could also put their own lives in danger. criminal analysis yields a clear picture crimes against humanity pose major challenges, requiring a meticulous reconstruction of often remote past events. the sonko case exemplifies this complexity: the investigation required in-depth analysis of the historical and political context and power dynamics in the gambia at the time the events took place. by combining criminal analyses and investigations, it was possible to establish a detailed picture of the regime's inner workings. in addition, witness accounts could be verified, thus building the case for the prosecution. all of these elements shed light on sonko's purported role as a key player in the planning and implementation of the atrocities. ‘until a few years ago, investigating this type of crime was unheard of. nowadays, such cases are becoming increasingly common. the investigations are fascinating and involve complex political and historical dimensions. they shed light on conflicts and periods of world history that are not always well known in switzerland.’ jacques, crime analyst, specialist on africa a strong message against impunity switzerland refuses to be a refuge for war criminals and actively takes action against impunity. sentenced to 20 years, sonko is the most senior official to be tried in europe under universal jurisdiction. this historic verdict is a reminder that status affords no immunity from international justice. however, an appeal is still pending and the defendant continues to benefit from the presumption of innocence. further international criminal law investigations are also underway. through rigorous investigations and international cooperation, justice is progressing and demonstrating that those who commit atrocities must know that they can be brought to justice, no matter where they are. witness accounts from wartime victims: a web portal for several years, switzerland has been collecting statements from victims and witnesses of war crimes and other violations of international criminal law. in 2022, fedpol, together with the office of the attorney general of switzerland (oag) and the state secretariat for migration (sem), upgraded this process by launching a web portal for ukrainian refugees, thus facilitating investigations. since october 2024, this portal has been available in 13 languages. the process remains simple and efficient: sem distributes cards with a qr code to refugees and asylum seekers, which link to the website where they can make an initial statement. fedpol analyses this information and contacts witnesses to collect their detailed accounts. these accounts are used in criminal investigations and international requests for mutual legal assistance. europol filters and organises these data for targeted actions. preserving this evidence today means guaranteeing justice tomorrow. since 2022, essential information has been passed on to europol, bolstering the fight against impunity. switzerland thus affirms its commitment to international justice. international justice served ousman sonko, the former gambian minister of the interior, thought he would find refuge in switzerland having served under his country's authoritarian regime. accused of crimes against humanity, he was arrested in 2017 and sentenced to 20 years in prison in 2024. a complex investigation conducted by fedpol on behalf of office of the attorney general of switzerland enabled the authorities to piece together the repressive system that he had been part of."},{"id":3242,"permalink":"\/en\/report-2024-en\/serious-crime\/hamas-code\/","breadcrumbs":[{"title":"Report 2024","permalink":"\/en\/"},{"title":"Serious crime","permalink":"\/en\/report-2024-en\/serious-crime\/"}],"title":"Hamas code","lead":"The Hamas attack on Israel on 7 October 2023 prompted the introduction of a law that would change Switzerland. Four days after the attack, the Federal Council quickly reclassified Hamas as a terrorist organisation. On 22 October 2023, fedpol was instructed to draft a law proscribing Hamas. This legislation is expected to come into effect in May 2025.","content":"the hamas attack on israel on 7 october 2023 prompted the introduction of a law that would change switzerland. four days after the attack, the federal council quickly reclassified hamas as a terrorist organisation. on 22 october 2023, fedpol was instructed to draft a law proscribing hamas. this legislation is expected to come into effect in may 2025. fedpol faced the task of formulating precisely worded, effective and legally watertight legislation to ban hamas in switzerland. the political implications were huge and fedpol only had three months to do the job. it was a difficult challenge. complex questions arose as early as the preliminary drafting stage: should the ban apply to the entire hamas organisation or only to its military wing? hamas is a complex network of organisations, financial channels and propaganda outlets. it is difficult to establish a legal definition of what belongs to this network. what legislation should the new law be based on? since there is no un resolution, the intelligence service act was out of the question. emergency powers were not an option either. after intense discussions, the decision was made to draft a stand-alone act modelled on the law proscribing al-qaida and is. this approach has already proven effective, provides clear guidelines and meets requirements. the preliminary draft was ready within a week: the basic structure was clear and the first explanatory reports were issued. this was an important step, but the bulk of the work still lay ahead. ‘behind every piece of legislation are not only words, but also decisions that have far-reaching consequences. legislation is a commitment, a shield, a promise. the fight against terrorism requires more than just good intentions. it demands clarity, foresight and courage.’ philippe, jurist after this came internal consultations, preliminary consultations and consultations with federal offices. each response brought new perspectives and necessitated adjustments, and gradually the draft became more precise and clear. at the same time, translations were prepared and each word was carefully checked. the draft was then ready to be submitted for final consultation. initial feedback was positive: the political parties were in agreement, and virtually all the cantons backed the bill. however, criticisms were raised regarding the impact that the bill would have on the rule of law, swiss neutrality and switzerland's role. fedpol analysed the situation, adapted the draft and provided more details in its dispatch – the bill's explanatory report. consultations with the relevant federal offices did not yield any significant changes; the preparatory work proved effective. fedpol made a few minor adjustments and then finalised the draft, which was then adopted by the federal council on 4 september. parliamentary committees then began their analysis of the bill, raising their own questions: why does the proscription only apply to hamas? when exactly will the legislation come into effect? what happens if people indirectly support hamas? fedpol provided clear answers to each of these questions. parliament then debated the issue. even after extensive discussion, it became clear that the proscription of hamas enjoyed broad political support. the bill was adopted without amendment. federal act on the proscription of hamas and associated organisations the new federal act outlaws hamas, its front and successor organisations, and groups acting on their behalf in switzerland. in addition, the federal council is empowered to outlaw organisations if they endorse the leadership, objectives or methods of hamas. the proscription of hamas strengthens legal certainty, particularly with regard to combating terrorist financing. at the same time, it facilitates and accelerates preventive policing measures and the presentation of evidence in criminal proceedings. anyone who commits an offence under the new act faces up to 20 years imprisonment or a monetary penalty. entry bans and expulsions counter-terrorism hamas code the hamas attack on israel on 7 october 2023 prompted the introduction of a law that would change switzerland. four days after the attack, the federal council quickly reclassified hamas as a terrorist organisation. on 22 october 2023, fedpol was instructed to draft a law proscribing hamas. this legislation is expected to come into effect in may 2025."},{"id":2807,"permalink":"\/en\/report-2024-en\/protection\/","breadcrumbs":[{"title":"Report 2024","permalink":"\/en\/"}],"title":"Protection","lead":"","content":" protection "},{"id":3247,"permalink":"\/en\/report-2024-en\/protection\/buergenstock-a-high-risk-conference\/","breadcrumbs":[{"title":"Report 2024","permalink":"\/en\/"},{"title":"Protection","permalink":"\/en\/report-2024-en\/protection\/"}],"title":"Bürgenstock: a high-risk conference","lead":"A large number of heads of state and ministers, rigorous security measures, a dash of compromise and a generous dose of diplomacy: the perfect score for orchestrating a successful Ukraine peace summit.","content":"a large number of heads of state and ministers, rigorous security measures, a dash of compromise and a generous dose of diplomacy: the perfect score for orchestrating a successful ukraine peace summit. organising an international event like the one on the burgenstock is a challenge. a summit involves juggling shifting constraints and high expectations. for fedpol and its partners, adaptability and endurance are key. predicting the unpredictable from the outset, the operation requires management under high pressure. backstage, all the actors are busy, including mike*. despite the excitement, everyone knows their role. mike cancels the holiday he has planned, and his colleagues cancel theirs. human resources are already limited, but the situation is particularly critical when it comes to police officers trained in personal protection, as there are very few of them in switzerland. in order to fulfil the mandate given to it by fedpol, the canton of nidwalden relies on other cantonal police forces as well as on swiss military personnel. how many people need to be protected? no one knows yet, it’s still being planned. one constant guides every decision: ensure that participants never notice the complexity of organising such an event. their security and comfort come first. ‘security is the basis of freedom and peace; without it, they are mere illusions. all the more so at a summit like this. protection and order provide the best environment for a productive dialogue.’ mike, commissioner managing departures and arrivals is a puzzle to be solved. whether they come by land or by air, you need to ensure that slots are both respected and flexible, to allow for unforeseen circumstances. the swiss armed forces supply helicopters to provide rapid links between the airports and the burgenstock. using a temporary helipad set up in a nearby field, the team make every effort to keep up the pace. providing convoy transport as an alternative in the event of bad weather ensures that there is a plan b for every flight. communication: the key ingredient organisation means communication. on the big day, the dialogue between fedpol, the canton of nidwalden and the delegations continues. mike is on site, directing proceedings, his phone ringing constantly. everyone knows their job, but at one point the next shift fails to arrive. no problem, a colleague can help out for a few hours. cars are checked, and only vehicles with a special badge are allowed through. a showcase for switzerland beyond the technical and logistical challenges, this event is also an opportunity to showcase swiss expertise. every detail counts, from the rigorous organisation of convoys to the discreet but effective management of security measures. and what could be nicer than a prime minister exclaiming on arrival at the burgenstock that \"this really is switzerland!\". or another who stops to admire the lush green landscape and take a few snapshots. this is the way in which switzerland fulfils its duty to protect 55 heads of government, 32 ministers, 5 representatives and 8 delegations and ensure that they can focus on the purpose of their meeting. another security commitment to ukraine on 17 and 18 october 2024, lausanne hosted the ukraine mine action conference umac2024. fedpol, working with the vaud cantonal police, carried out a threat analysis and decided on security measures. at the venue, senior officers from the federal security service and the local authorities looked after the foreign delegations. armed security agents guarded the entry points. around 80 delegations, including the ukrainian prime minister, the swiss president, viola amherd, and federal councillor ignazio cassis, took part in the event. * name changed exchanging information: a crucial part of police work threat reports on the rise burgenstock: a high-risk conference a large number of heads of state and ministers, rigorous security measures, a dash of compromise and a generous dose of diplomacy: the perfect score for orchestrating a successful ukraine peace summit."},{"id":3254,"permalink":"\/en\/report-2024-en\/protection\/a-commitment-a-culture\/","breadcrumbs":[{"title":"Report 2024","permalink":"\/en\/"},{"title":"Protection","permalink":"\/en\/report-2024-en\/protection\/"}],"title":"A commitment, a culture","lead":"When Federal Councillor Beat Jans travelled to Tunisia, fedpol accompanied him. Discreetly, fedpol employees provided close protection for the head of the Federal Department of Justice and Police (FDJP) and coordinated their measures with the local authorities: politics and security go hand in hand.","content":"when federal councillor beat jans travelled to tunisia, fedpol accompanied him. discreetly, fedpol employees provided close protection for the head of the federal department of justice and police (fdjp) and coordinated their measures with the local authorities: politics and security go hand in hand. on 23 may 2024, a delegation from the federal department of justice and police travels to tunis for a two-day working visit. after weeks of intense preparation, the safety measures are taking shape. a mission that combines precision, flexibility and coordination. this phase is greatly facilitated by the local fedpol police attache. he has the advantage of knowing the country, how it works and, above all, has a good network, which is essential for navigating the reality on site and laying the foundations for effective cooperation. this ensures the smooth running of a visit in a complex and unfamiliar environment. preparatory phase as with every commitment, a risk assessment is carried out. in this case, the police attache shares information on the geopolitical situation, crime, terrorism and demonstrations. what would motivate someone to target a swiss minister? everything is scrutinised, and no detail is left to chance. each location is visited during the reconnaissance phase. is the head of department too exposed on a stroll through the medina? can he travel down to the sea, which is just a few kilometres from the tunisian capital? security measures are adapted to each stage of the programme. from communication tools to logistical coordination, nothing is left to chance. operational phase let’s go! it all starts on arrival at the airport: reception, convoy, escort. one event after another, with the personal security officer and the police attache taking part. the host country decides to make an impromptu stop-off? this comes as no surprise to fedpol's bodyguards. the usual reception venues for foreign vips are well known, and fedpol has them on its radar. every stage is anticipated, every detail fine-tuned. traffic in tunis is unpredictable and dense. the team adapts to the hubbub and masters the art of avoidance. the programme is on track. between the medina, the souk and the mosque, the federal councillor is out among the public. the tunisian military police provide the official vehicles and the direction generale de la surete nationale is carrying out the established security measures, redoubling its vigilance. each decision reflects a careful weighing of the interests at stake: security needs, the expectations of the federal councillor and his delegation, and the requirements of the local authorities. speaking the same language makes this complex equation easier. this protection mission turns out to be a success, based on a combination of flexibility, skills and coordination between all the parties involved. this learning experience underlines the importance of teamwork in demanding environments. \"as a bodyguard, it's much more than just being vigilant - it's knowing how to build respect and trust, across cultures. this approach made all the difference during this visit to tunisia. adapting, unifying, protecting: mission accomplished.” levi*, commissioner * name changed threat reports on the rise a commitment, a culture when federal councillor beat jans travelled to tunisia, fedpol accompanied him. discreetly, fedpol employees provided close protection for the head of the federal department of justice and police (fdjp) and coordinated their measures with the local authorities: politics and security go hand in hand."},{"id":3260,"permalink":"\/en\/report-2024-en\/protection\/a-colourful-event\/","breadcrumbs":[{"title":"Report 2024","permalink":"\/en\/"},{"title":"Protection","permalink":"\/en\/report-2024-en\/protection\/"}],"title":"A colourful event","lead":"On Thursday 31 October 2024, Federal Councillor Elisabeth Baume-Schneider attended the meeting of G20 health ministers in Rio de Janeiro, also making a working visit to the country. Ensuring security during a visit of this type is a demanding task for fedpol.","content":"on thursday 31 october 2024, federal councillor elisabeth baume-schneider attended the meeting of g20 health ministers in rio de janeiro, also making a working visit to the country. ensuring security during a visit of this type is a demanding task for fedpol. the general secretariat of the federal department of home affairs notifies fedpol that it is making the trip to brazil. once the case has been assigned to the appropriate police division, len's* is quick to get things moving; he contacts florian*, the police attache in brasilia. together, they will organise the security measures required. plan, authorise, execute florian makes use of his contacts from brasilia to rio de janeiro. he has a good command of brazilian portuguese and knows the right doors to knock on to start organising the administrative details, a demanding task, but a necessary step, as authorisation from the brazilian federal police and local partners is crucial. having a police attache on the ground simplifies and speeds up arrangements considerably. convoy in the streets of rio de janeiro. brazil, a country with many facets florian provides information about the situation on the ground. the level of crime is the main concern as they finalise the various itineraries. the favelas are lawless zones, no-go areas for the police, except for raids, and then only at their own peril. gun battles between rival gangs are commonplace. these areas are off-limits, and any exposure to this kind of danger is out of the question. the problem is that the motorway between the airport and the city centre cuts through the favelas. the brazilian authorities are aware of this, and plan appropriate measures on the advice of the swiss personal protection team, and make the necessary equipment available. what's more, the city's location is making len rather nervous: situated between the mountains and the coast, it seems confined, with no escape. while the discussions are in full swing, a demonstration takes place, apparently spontaneously, outside the g20 conference building. the demonstrators want their voices to be heard, and to ensure everyone’s safety, the proportionate reaction is to let it go ahead, and fortunately, it goes off peacefully. len is relaxed, confident that the swiss delegation is in no danger. thanks to the synergy and ongoing communication between the teams involved, every challenge can be effectively addressed. experience brings security previous visits have led to improvements in practices and helped consolidate established communication channels. the then president of the national council, martin candinas, visited brazil in may 2023, as did federal councillor guy parmelin in july of the same year, while in february 2024, it was the turn of federal councillor karin keller-sutter. with his experience with the local culture, florian acts as a mediator with the police and other authorities and maintains contact with all the players involved, handling every complex situation with tact. given the situation on the ground, preparation, anticipation and trust are key. a visit that goes smoothly and safely is not just a question of protection, it is also a means of encouraging cooperation and dialogue. ‘in my job, the smallest detail can change everything. in a city like rio de janeiro, it can make the difference between safety and risk.’ len, commissioner * name changed threat reports on the rise a colourful event on thursday 31 october 2024, federal councillor elisabeth baume-schneider attended the meeting of g20 health ministers in rio de janeiro, also making a working visit to the country. ensuring security during a visit of this type is a demanding task for fedpol."},{"id":3266,"permalink":"\/en\/report-2024-en\/protection\/maison-suisse-a-place-of-security\/","breadcrumbs":[{"title":"Report 2024","permalink":"\/en\/"},{"title":"Protection","permalink":"\/en\/report-2024-en\/protection\/"}],"title":"Maison Suisse: a place of security","lead":"For the 2024 Olympic and Paralympic Games in Paris, Presence Switzerland promoted Swiss excellence through the Maison Suisse. This ambitious project required security that was equal to the venue and the expectations. fedpol rose to the challenge.","content":"for the 2024 olympic and paralympic games in paris, presence switzerland promoted swiss excellence through the maison suisse. this ambitious project required security that was equal to the venue and the expectations. fedpol rose to the challenge. presence switzerland has a bold idea: to build the maison suisse within the swiss embassy in paris during the 2024 olympic and paralympic games. the work requires dedication and diligence, so fedpol sends its olympic security liaison officers. for this special assignment, patrick* and nils* have to wear two hats to ensure international olympic cooperation, while at the same time protecting people and buildings under federal jurisdiction. liaison officers, essential to security at the olympics for the olympic and paralympic games, each participating state is granted accreditation for two olympic security liaison officers, or oslos. in switzerland’s case, they provide support and advice on security issues to the swiss representation in the host country and the swiss olympic head of mission. they manage security-related crisis situations and liaise with the local and international authorities involved. depending on the situation, they devise tailor-made strategies, attend briefings in the international cooperation centre and ensure that every event, from vip receptions to athletes' medal ceremonies, takes place in complete safety. protecting the building nils is in charge of protecting the buildings. he takes part in all meetings with presence switzerland and the embassy, as ideas that come to life there have an impact on security. one such idea is the plan to locate the maison suisse in the embassy garden. to get to there, you have to pass through the ambassador's residence. nils ingeniously installs a time tunnel, which provides direct access to the garden of the ambassador's residence, while protecting the location at the same time. once construction of the maison suisse is complete, the french authorities confirm that it meets their safety standards: emergency exits, fire systems and other aspects. everything is in order. for their first international assignment, fedpol's armed public security officers work closely with a private security firm to monitor visitors. they confiscate various prohibited items, some of them surprising, such as a fondue burner. vigilant in the face of suspicious behaviour and potential risks, they intervene with sensitivity and professionalism. their active presence also contributes to the efficient management of visitors, guaranteeing safety and the smooth running of operations. official opening evening of the maison suisse. it's a real balancing act between welcoming the public and complying with anti-terrorist security imperatives. in this atmosphere, the maison suisse offers an escape. an embassy employee tells nils that she feels safe at all times at the embassy during the paris games. cooperative games the ministry of the interior and overseas france asked participating countries for police support, and switzerland was happy to oblige. working closely with the cantonal police forces of zurich, geneva, neuchatel, fribourg, vaud, bern and zug, fedpol assembled a team of 17 police officers. under the direction of the french authorities, this delegation was deployed in paris and lyon. in addition, fedpol set up a response team, operational 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, to effectively manage any exceptional situation, in coordination with its partners. protecting people while nils is busy at the embassy, patrick works with the local authorities to prepare for the arrival of the president of the confederation, viola amherd, federal councillors ignazio cassis and elisabeth baume-schneider, and the president of the national council, eric nussbaumer. coordination requires patience and flexibility. what vehicles are available? how many french police officers will accompany the swiss vips? nils also has to attend the daily general security briefing. fortunately, he can count on the support of andre, the attache from the federal office of customs and border security. thanks to his local network, andre is able to help the swiss liaison officers with their preparations, security arrangements and incident management. \"as an oslo, security and sport involves a balancing act requiring flexibility, diplomacy and composure. long days, little time to relax, but always in the thick of things at this global event.\" nils, specialised security advisor and patrick, commissioner in charge of personal and property security * name changed threat reports on the rise maison suisse: a place of security for the 2024 olympic and paralympic games in paris, presence switzerland promoted swiss excellence through the maison suisse. this ambitious project required security that was equal to the venue and the expectations. fedpol rose to the challenge."},{"id":2823,"permalink":"\/en\/report-2024-en\/information-systems\/","breadcrumbs":[{"title":"Report 2024","permalink":"\/en\/"}],"title":"Information systems","lead":"","content":" information systems "},{"id":3611,"permalink":"\/en\/report-2024-en\/information-systems\/an-imperceptible-defence-against-identity-fraud\/","breadcrumbs":[{"title":"Report 2024","permalink":"\/en\/"},{"title":"Information systems","permalink":"\/en\/report-2024-en\/information-systems\/"}],"title":"An imperceptible defence against identity fraud","lead":"Every day, thousands of people cross the Swiss border with their identity documents in hand. In addition to holograms and raised print, an invisible but essential form of protection reinforces the authenticity of these identity documents: the electronic signature of the data stored on RFID chip. This is the key that enables the authorities to identify illegal entrants.","content":"every day, thousands of people cross the swiss border with their identity documents in hand. in addition to holograms and raised print, an invisible but essential form of protection reinforces the authenticity of these identity documents: the electronic signature of the data stored on rfid chip. this is the key that enables the authorities to identify illegal entrants. at zurich airport, a passenger slides his biometric passport into a machine, while at the bardonnex border post, a customs officer inspects a suspicious car and quickly scans a foreign biometric identity card. in these fleeting moments, a crucial question arises: is this document authentic? we often imagine that checks are based on visible elements, such as optically variable ink or tactile relief patterns. however, there is a key element that is much more discreet in detecting forgery: the electronic signature of the data contained in the document's rfid chip. even the slightest alteration enables the fraud to be detected. this security mechanism is an essential safeguard against forged documents. ‘the electronic signature of data via edoc pki considerably enhances the security of swiss travel documents. since it was integrated into biometric passports, there have been no cases of forgery or tampering, thereby making pki a pillar of the identification system.’ michael, member of the edocpki team edoc pki: a behind-the-scenes look at document verification how does this electronic signature work? in switzerland, it is generated by fedpol using the edoc pki (electronic document public key infrastructure), particularly for electronic documents. this electronic signature ensures authentication. for example, the staff of the federal office for customs and border security (focbs) can see that the document is genuine, has been issued by an official authority and that the data on the chip have not been altered. fingerprints, which provide a unique means of identifying someone, are specially protected by an access method using edoc pki. not all countries are able to read them. in order to read these fingerprints contained in the passport chip, the requesting country and switzerland must have exchanged specific digital certificates. these fingerprints are not systematically verified but, when in doubt, they enable the authorities to carry out a follow-up check, thus affording greater certainty in confirming the person's identity. digital security: upgrading of the edoc pki infrastructure in 2024 switzerland's edoc pki system has been around for nearly 15 years and has proven its worth. moreover, the number of documents requiring access to pki services is constantly increasing. to adapt to current needs, fedpol has acquired new high security modules that meet current standards and are based on the latest technology. fedpol has also developed new software to meet growing demands. the transition to this new system should be finalised in 2025, and the system is expected to remain in use for the next 12 to 15 years. quantum mathematics and computers: a challenge for cryptography with advances in quantum mathematics, ever more powerful computing machines are needed to guarantee a high level of encryption and prevent any falsification of electronic signatures. current cryptography must continually adapt to remain inviolable. the emergence of quantum computers, however, represents a major challenge. these machines, which are much more powerful than conventional computers, could theoretically crack the keys used for electronic signatures. to anticipate this threat, it is essential to adapt to the new, more robust algorithms. the relevant international and swiss authorities are closely monitoring these developments. the international civil aviation organisation (icao) is updating its guidelines to optimise cryptography and make digital keys more secure. like other technologies managed by fedpol, edoc pki must constantly evolve to ensure maximum protection of identity documents. an imperceptible defence against identity fraud every day, thousands of people cross the swiss border with their identity documents in hand. in addition to holograms and raised print, an invisible but essential form of protection reinforces the authenticity of these identity documents: the electronic signature of the data stored on rfid chip. this is the key that enables the authorities to identify illegal entrants."},{"id":2810,"permalink":"\/en\/report-2024-en\/cooperation\/","breadcrumbs":[{"title":"Report 2024","permalink":"\/en\/"}],"title":"Cooperation","lead":"","content":" cooperation "},{"id":2952,"permalink":"\/en\/report-2024-en\/cooperation\/escape-to-a-luxury-paradise\/","breadcrumbs":[{"title":"Report 2024","permalink":"\/en\/"},{"title":"Cooperation","permalink":"\/en\/report-2024-en\/cooperation\/"}],"title":"Escape to a luxury paradise","lead":"Switzerland is an enticing destination for criminal organisations, including for mafia-like groups from Southeast Europe. The Albanian mafia smuggles drugs and works with other groups to do so. Following the trail of Driton* and Luca*, from Solothurn via Belgium, Spain, Albania and Italy to Dubai.","content":"switzerland is an enticing destination for criminal organisations, including for mafia-like groups from southeast europe. the albanian mafia smuggles drugs and works with other groups to do so. following the trail of driton* and luca*, from solothurn via belgium, spain, albania and italy to dubai. analysis shows that the albanian mafia plays a major role in the illegal smuggling and trafficking of narcotics in switzerland. it sells cocaine and heroin. on its own? quite the opposite: south-eastern european criminal organisations often seek out allies. driton and luca are perfect examples of this. driton and luca both lived in the canton of solothurn and were part of a small drug trafficking ring that imported heroin and cocaine into switzerland and sold these drugs locally. their activities did not go unnoticed; in 2021, investigations conducted by the solothurn cantonal police, led by the solothurn public prosecutor's office, resulted in the dismantling of this group. the police managed to seize 15 kilograms of drugs but the two suspects managed to evade the police and cross the border. at this point, fedpol began assisting the cantonal police in the manhunt. they traced the route the suspects took, which first led to belgium and then to spain. this was no coincidence: the suspects most likely had contacts in these two countries, which are major entry points for drugs coming in from south america. driton and luca then left spain for albania, driton's home country. by this time, everyone was working on the case: fedpol investigators, the fedpol police attache in kosovo and the local albanian authorities. driton and luca were soon taken into custody. luca was extradited to switzerland to face criminal charges that had already been filed by the public prosecutor's office in solothurn, and was subsequently convicted of his crimes in switzerland. his story ends there. driton, on the other hand, was not brought to justice in albania and was back on the streets after only a few days. while the swiss judicial authorities continued their efforts to bring driton to trial, he was already back in business. within a period of two years, he rose to the position of middleman, taking responsibility for direct imports from south america to western europe, trafficking much larger quantities than in his solothurn days. driton arranged for the transport of several hundred kilograms of cocaine. in order to plan the logistical routes for the drug smuggling operation, he entered the schengen area using at least one false identity. interoperability within the schengen area swiss police, border control and migration authorities now have access to eu databases such as the schengen information system (sis) and the visa information system (vis). each of these databases must be queried separately. starting in 2027, a new european search portal (esp) will enable authorities to submit search requests to these databases through a single interface. not only that: the esp will also include a multiple-identity detector: by cross-referencing data in the various databases, false or multiple identities can be detected. soon albanian police were once again hot on driton's heels. however, by the time they arrived at the scene, he had disappeared. thanks to biometric identification and support given by fedpol's police attache, they discovered that he had obtained kosovar travel documents. these contained his real biometric data but were issued in the name of a different person. using this new identity, he had managed to flee europe. his destination? dubai. driton did not remain in his self-imposed exile for long though. thanks to the cooperation between fedpol, the public prosecutor's office in solothurn, the albanian authorities and the liaison officers of a partner state, driton was arrested in early 2025. extradition is now only a matter of time… ‘there is no room for a silo mentality in police work. direct contacts on the ground are invaluable and irreplaceable. the network of police attaches, which was set up 30 years ago, confirms this time and again.’ bertram, police attache exchanging information: a crucial part of police work escape to a luxury paradise switzerland is an enticing destination for criminal organisations, including for mafia-like groups from southeast europe. the albanian mafia smuggles drugs and works with other groups to do so. following the trail of driton* and luca*, from solothurn via belgium, spain, albania and italy to dubai."},{"id":3696,"permalink":"\/en\/report-2024-en\/cooperation\/exploited-twice\/","breadcrumbs":[{"title":"Report 2024","permalink":"\/en\/"},{"title":"Cooperation","permalink":"\/en\/report-2024-en\/cooperation\/"}],"title":"Exploited twice","lead":"A kidnapping in Bosnia and Herzegovina – a blackmail in Switzerland. On the migration route, human lives count for little, but they can be monetised. Close police cooperation makes it possible to overcome national borders, language barriers and time constraints.","content":"a kidnapping in bosnia and herzegovina – a blackmail in switzerland. on the migration route, human lives count for little, but they can be monetised. close police cooperation makes it possible to overcome national borders, language barriers and time constraints. bern, 17 january 2024, 5:24 am the hotline of fedpol’s special situations unit in bern has been ringing off the hook. on the other end of the line are the bern cantonal police. they report that a man in the canton of bern, let's call him ariyan*, is being blackmailed. his brother has been kidnapped in bosnia and herzegovina. the perpetrators are now calling ariyan over and over again, and he hears his brother being beaten. the bern cantonal police have a major investigation and requested assistance from fedpol for this international case. ariyan's brother and two other men were travelling along the migration route from iran to various destinations in europe when their journey was abruptly cut short in bosnia and herzegovina. they have been kidnapped and held for ransom. the initial demand for each hostage is eur 10,000, but the kidnappers then demand more. the victims are from iran whereas the perpetrators are from afghanistan. often, it is the other way around. the perpetrators are extremely violent. they say that if the families do not pay the ransom, the perpetrators will kill the hostages or sell them into slavery. the three families in iran and switzerland are panicking. swift and close police cooperation is now crucial. a fedpol crime specialist immediately meets with the bern cantonal police, who are leading the operation. his colleagues at fedpol's local office provide back-up support. the bern cantonal police are in contact with ariyan and are with him during the phone calls with the blackmailers. at the same time, fedpol contacts the state investigation and protection agency (sipa) in bosnia and herzegovina through the european network of advisory teams (eunat; see infobox). this speeds up the investigations on the ground in bosnia and herzegovina. nevertheless, they cannot find the hostages and are unable to buy any more time. the clock is ticking. the deadline the kidnappers have set for payment of the ransom is approaching. all three families decide to pay. european network of advisory teams (eunat) eunat is a network of experienced law enforcement advisors and negotiators from across europe. it provides a platform for sharing good practices in line with each member state’s legal framework. it also serves as a mechanism for immediate international cooperation and rapid support in response to kidnapping, hostage taking and extortion, particularly in situations where people’s lives are at risk. sarajevo, 17 january 2024, 4:00 pm within 12 hours of fedpol's involvement, ariyan's brother and his two travel companions are released. bosnian police are directed to a warehouse in an industrial area where the hostages have been held. the exhausted men, two of whom are severely injured, are then taken to the hospital for treatment. with the release of the hostages, the critical phase is over. however, police specialists still have work to do: in switzerland, they continue their investigations on the blackmailing case. in bosnia and herzegovina, the police arrest four afghan nationals, one of whom had already committed a murder the previous week. they belong to a criminal group specialising in human smuggling. following this initial breakthrough, the police are now zeroing in on the network behind the kidnapping. the bernese cantonal police are providing the necessary support. migrants are at the mercy of their smugglers and are sometimes exploited twice over. they pay large sums to be smuggled across the border – a lucrative business. and if they are kidnapped, their relatives are also blackmailed. paying the ransom is often the only way to free the hostages. many relatives, especially of irregular migrants, do not dare to go to the police. the number of unreported victims is high. ‘kidnapping migrants is an additional source of revenue. the proceeds go to organised crime groups operating across borders.’ pia, special situations officer * name changed exchanging information: a crucial part of police work exploited twice a kidnapping in bosnia and herzegovina – a blackmail in switzerland. on the migration route, human lives count for little, but they can be monetised. close police cooperation makes it possible to overcome national borders, language barriers and time constraints."},{"id":2826,"permalink":"\/en\/report-2024-en\/zahlen\/","breadcrumbs":[{"title":"Report 2024","permalink":"\/en\/"}],"title":"fedpol in figures","lead":"","content":" fedpol in figures "},{"id":2898,"permalink":"\/en\/report-2024-en\/zahlen\/fedpol-in-figures\/","breadcrumbs":[{"title":"Report 2024","permalink":"\/en\/"},{"title":"fedpol in figures","permalink":"\/en\/report-2024-en\/zahlen\/"}],"title":"fedpol in figures","lead":"1073 employees were working for the security of Switzerland in 2024.","content":"1073 employees were working for the security of switzerland in 2024. staffwomen34,8 %men65,2 % languagesgerman73,4 %french20,3 %italian5,9 %romansh0,4 % in trainingapprentices and interns from commercial schools30university interns29 own expenditurechf (millions)in %staff costs17762it costs6222other costs*4716amount286100* included are non-it capital expenditures (2 million), depreciation (7 million), real estate costs and rent (26 million) and operation of police and customs cooperation centres, equipment, transport, office supplies, services and expenses (12 million). fedpol in figures 1073 employees were working for the security of switzerland in 2024."},{"id":2994,"permalink":"\/en\/report-2024-en\/zahlen\/exchanging-information-a-crucial-part-of-police-work\/","breadcrumbs":[{"title":"Report 2024","permalink":"\/en\/"},{"title":"fedpol in figures","permalink":"\/en\/report-2024-en\/zahlen\/"}],"title":"Exchanging information: a crucial part of police work","lead":"fedpol is responsible for national and international police co-operation and the exchange of information. Reliable and secure information systems are the prerequisite for this - and ensure that fedpol has a complete picture of the situation.","content":"fedpol is responsible for national and international police co-operation and the exchange of information. reliable and secure information systems are the prerequisite for this - and ensure that fedpol has a complete picture of the situation. crime knows no borders. the exchange of information between the various national and international authorities is therefore crucial in the fight against crime. the dna profile database (codis), the fingerprint database (afis), the national automated police search system (ripol) and the schengen information system (sis) are indispensable tools in the fight against crime for all swiss law enforcement and security authorities as well as for the migration and border control authorities. as in previous years, the number of incoming reports will increase again in 2024 to a total of 451,418. national and international police support20202021202220232024incoming communications fedpol oac\/sirene\/europol\/interpol339715381487394266423115451418incoming communications pcccs and police attaches2746329945337343551938109processed europol communications2209726162272083019435031incoming interpol communications157529186502161925167254310589**outgoing communications for interpol180378183743196600196527219850* pcccs: police and customs cooperation centres in geneva and chiasso. further information on police attaches (admin.ch) on our website.** one of the reasons for the increase in the volume of incoming reports is that since 2024 interpol (source of the figures) has also included incoming multinational reports in its statistics - and not just bilateral reports as was previously the case. processing orders in afis and codis20202021202220232024automated fingerprint identification system afisquick requests (fps*)107161133740263781341509315875requests for police investigations (cps**)4779050475621826365160402fingerprints\/palmprints1027510595110531224114038combined dna index system codisdna profiles of people11694103041011993537272dna profiles from trace evidence1159811701126551555516595total identification requests (afis and codis)188518216815359790442309414182* fps = fast print submission (formerly 2-finger requests)** cps = common print submission (formerly 10-finger requests) national computerised police search system ripol ripol database20202021202220232024persons273731243039239633238847257057vehicles (incl. bicycles\/motorcycles)592579569295552894542509536914vehicle registration numbers441854409384374025342764312437unsolved crimes28185952801055279644628037122846879objects29438462837320280719228033172825447descriptions of persons8163581947825018498287363 data entered on searches for persons (ripol)20202021202220232024arrest warrants6884263033750297809287063address enquiries3318929182376944526651429entry bans29973599463860926745detention1362113821151641704017647serving sentences and undergoing measures411421333363387missing persons33183657432845476744prevention of child abduction271267382550609bans on travel to a given country (hoogan)0046021covert surveillance118312186130190covert surveillance - state security435447320333698targeted checks128162247targeted checks - state security11471728851 data entered on searches for property (ripol)20202021202220232024cases137761152933182002198122209900personal descriptions55735180570763926293items of property104887117851146 884161697182682 data entered on vehicle searches (ripol)20202021202220232024vehicles39994140514862726695bicycles, motorcycles and stolen vehicle identification numbers (vins)2455724422283973229234630number plates3195132623353313910841675bicycle, motorcycle number plates20622147239423302363 data entered on active searches (ripol)20202021202220232024urgent messages regarding persons1714917862193752091421617 positive responses in the schengen information system (sis) in 2024switzerlandresults abroad based on swiss dataarrests for extradition390309entry bans45823300missing persons1098268persons sought by the courts (e.g. witnesses)1885750covert registration*59401263objects (vehicles, identity cards, weapons)29301291total2146822992* covert registration in the sis enables the movements of persons suspected of being involved in terrorist activities to be tracked. phishing scam by an international network uncovered burgenstock: a high-risk conference escape to a luxury paradise exploited twice exchanging information: a crucial part of police work fedpol is responsible for national and international police co-operation and the exchange of information. reliable and secure information systems are the prerequisite for this - and ensure that fedpol has a complete picture of the situation."},{"id":2847,"permalink":"\/en\/report-2024-en\/zahlen\/entry-bans-and-expulsions\/","breadcrumbs":[{"title":"Report 2024","permalink":"\/en\/"},{"title":"fedpol in figures","permalink":"\/en\/report-2024-en\/zahlen\/"}],"title":"Entry bans and expulsions","lead":"In order to protect internal and external security, fedpol has the power to issue entry bans and expulsion orders against foreign nationals. In 2024, fedpol imposed an expulsion order for war crimes for the first time.","content":"in order to protect internal and external security, fedpol has the power to issue entry bans and expulsion orders against foreign nationals. in 2024, fedpol imposed an expulsion order for war crimes for the first time. based on article 67 paragraph 4 and article 68 of the federal act on foreign nationals and integration, fedpol may impose entry bans and expulsion orders on foreign nationals on the grounds that they pose a threat to switzerland's internal or external security. fedpol does this either on the basis of its own findings or at the request of other authorities, in particular the federal intelligence service (fis). entry bans20202021202220232024terrorism144921981126violent extremism002135organised crime425151643espionage19702767534total167187312173238 the number of entry bans rose sharply in 2024 compared to the previous year; the majority relate to terrorism. in cases of terrorism and organised crime, information from foreign partners that is admissible in court helps to impose entry bans with a low expenditure of resources. fedpol received more information from abroad in 2024 and was therefore able to issue more entry bans. espionage continues to return to pre-2022 levels; 2022 marked the outbreak of the war in ukraine. expulsions20202021202220232024terrorism32243organised crime00140war crimes00001total32384enforced11233not\/not yet enforced21151 four expulsions were ordered in 2024. fedpol ordered the expulsion of three terrorist suspects. for the first time in history, fedpol issued an expulsion order for war crimes. in its statistics, fedpol distinguishes between enforced and non-enforced expulsions, as not every expulsion order can be implemented immediately. there are many reasons for this, such as the principle of non-refoulement* or ongoing appeal or criminal proceedings. * no contracting state shall expel or return a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion (art. 33, convention relating to the status of refugees, available in german, french and italian). radicalisation: clicks that lead to action successful strike against international people smuggling ring hamas code entry bans and expulsions in order to protect internal and external security, fedpol has the power to issue entry bans and expulsion orders against foreign nationals. in 2024, fedpol imposed an expulsion order for war crimes for the first time."},{"id":2883,"permalink":"\/en\/report-2024-en\/zahlen\/counter-terrorism\/","breadcrumbs":[{"title":"Report 2024","permalink":"\/en\/"},{"title":"fedpol in figures","permalink":"\/en\/report-2024-en\/zahlen\/"}],"title":"Counter-terrorism","lead":"The Federal Act on Police Counter-Terrorism Measures came into force in 2022. Since then, the Federal Intelligence Service (FIS) and the cantons have made ten requests for measures to be carried out, four of which were made in 2024.","content":"the federal act on police counter-terrorism measures came into force in 2022. since then, the federal intelligence service (fis) and the cantons have made ten requests for measures to be carried out, four of which were made in 2024. the aim of police counter-terrorism measures (ctms) is to protect the population from potential terrorists. fedpol can order measures at the request of the cantons or the federal intelligence service (fis). the cantons are responsible for implementing the measures. ctms can be applied before criminal proceedings, after the execution of a sentence, under certain circumstances during criminal proceedings - as a supplement to coercive measures - and during the execution of a sentence. fedpol can impose reporting and interview requirements, a ban on contact, an order restricting movement to or from a particular area, a ban on leaving the country, and a house arrest order; electronic surveillance and mobile phone tracking are among the other options. the following statistics first appeared in the 2022 annual report. requests from the cantons and the fis202220232024requested by the fis110requested by the cantonal authorities044number of cases154 ctms* in 2024 in accordance with the internal security act (isa) requestsmeasures ordered202220232024202220232024obligation to report and participate in interviews (art. 23k isa)163101contact ban (art. 23 isa)**0424006inclusion and exclusion (art. 23m isa)142101ban on leaving switzerland (art. 23n isa)041001house arrest (art. 23o et 23p isa)000000electronic surveillance and mobile phone tracking (art. 23q isa)163101there were no rejected requests between 2022 and 2024. * several measures are possible in any individual case. these figures reflect the situation on 31 december 2024. not all requests had been dealt with by then, either because: the decision was still under review; the decision had been taken, but was not yet legally binding (as an appeal was still possible or was ongoing); the issuing authority had withdrawn its request; the ordered measure was being challenged on appeal. ** in 2024, the number of contact bans was higher than in previous years. this can be explained by the fact that in two cases nine contact bans were applied for. these measures aim to restrict as far as possible relationships that could encourage or facilitate radicalisation. implementation of measures202220232024appeals011prosecutions for breaches of measures001 terrorist activities the law defines terrorist activity as ‘efforts to influence or change the institutional framework that are to be achieved or facilitated by committing or threatening to commit serious criminal offences or by spreading fear and terror’ (available in german, french and italian). measures for minors children and young people can also be receptive to radical ideologies and become involved in terrorist activities. fedpol is well aware of this from experience in switzerland and abroad. ctms can be ordered against children aged twelve and older, and thus also serve to protect children and young adults. the prevention measures in the second national action plan to prevent and counter radicalisation and violent extremism are intended to stop radicalisation and allow the authorities to intervene before young people commit an offence. conditions for measures when it comes to prevention, other cantonal measures, whether social, integrative or therapeutic, always take precedence – as do cantonal measures for the general prevention of threats and measures based on the criminal procedure code. in the case of minors, educational or child protection measures must always be taken before ctms, which may only be ordered once these other measures have been exhausted or have proven ineffective. radicalisation: clicks that lead to action hamas code counter-terrorism the federal act on police counter-terrorism measures came into force in 2022. since then, the federal intelligence service (fis) and the cantons have made ten requests for measures to be carried out, four of which were made in 2024."},{"id":2863,"permalink":"\/en\/report-2024-en\/zahlen\/united-against-paedophile-crime\/","breadcrumbs":[{"title":"Report 2024","permalink":"\/en\/"},{"title":"fedpol in figures","permalink":"\/en\/report-2024-en\/zahlen\/"}],"title":"United against paedophile crime","lead":"Children and teenagers are living an increasing part of their lives online. And wherever they are, paedophiles are not far away. This is borne out by the figures.","content":"children and teenagers are living an increasing part of their lives online. and wherever they are, paedophiles are not far away. this is borne out by the figures. the national center for missing & exploited children (ncmec) in the usa is one of fedpol’s most important non-police partners in the fight against paedophile crime. internet platforms and social media such as google, facebook, instagram, snapchat and many more have a duty to report prohibited pornographic content to the non-profit us organisation. if there is a link with switzerland, the ncmec forwards the suspicious activity reports to fedpol. in 2024 fedpol received 15,736 ncmec reports. the figures have risen again compared to previous years. on the one hand, more suspicious activity reports mean that the algorithms of internet platforms and social media are becoming ever more precise and discovering more material. on the other, the amount of illegal pornographic material on the internet is undeniably increasing. for example, there are more and more pictures and videos in circulation that children and teenagers produce and post of themselves. young people in this age group are often unaware that they may be committing a crime, nor of the possibility that they and their material will be exploited. after receiving the reports, fedpol checks whether the content suggests any criminal conduct under swiss law and, if necessary, carries out further enquiries. if there is evidence that a crime has been committed, fedpol reports the matter to relevant cantonal authorities. in 2023, fedpol filed 1,895 such reports. a report can contain several images and videos and is used by the cantonal police as the basis for further investigations and for deciding whether to open criminal proceedings against the perpetrators. in 2024, fedpol filed 2,038 reports. ai for child pornography: can it be morally acceptable? united against paedophile crime children and teenagers are living an increasing part of their lives online. and wherever they are, paedophiles are not far away. this is borne out by the figures."},{"id":2858,"permalink":"\/en\/report-2024-en\/zahlen\/threat-reports-on-the-rise\/","breadcrumbs":[{"title":"Report 2024","permalink":"\/en\/"},{"title":"fedpol in figures","permalink":"\/en\/report-2024-en\/zahlen\/"}],"title":"Threat reports on the rise ","lead":"The number of threats reported initially decreased with the lifting of the Covid measures, but a slight increase can now be observed again. The tone of the threats remains just as aggressive.","content":"the number of threats reported initially decreased with the lifting of the covid measures, but a slight increase can now be observed again. the tone of the threats remains just as aggressive. in 2024, fedpol received and examined 689 reports. the nature of these threats is alarming, their tone particularly aggressive. politics in switzerland and around the world is polarising and sparks heated debates, especially on social media. users often have unrestrained discussions there; the topics reflect all manner of public concerns. this can lead to emotional reactions, which regularly result in threats against senior members of the federal government and other officials. in 2024, there was evidence of a genuine security threat in 71 cases - around 10 per cent of the total of 689 reports. if there is good reason to believe that someone will commit a criminal offence against a person or property, fedpol can take protective measures such as issuing warnings or sending cease-and-desist letters. however, if there is no obvious danger, for example in the case of insults, it is not permitted to record personal data in the information and documentation system. in such cases, it is up to the persons on the receiving end to take legal action themselves or to seek advice and support from the police, for example. number of threat reports in 202420202021202220232024reports8851215528593689actual threats\/potential danger to others64120686271 note on the statistics: if someone sends several reports on the same day, they are recorded as one report. fedpol, however, evaluates and analyses all reports separately. since autumn 2022, members of parliament, government ministers and senior judges have also been able to submit reports using an app created by fedpol, ensuring quick and direct transmission of information to the federal security service. in all cases, fedpol conducts a detailed analysis of the situation. security police tasks20202021202220232024security assessments for government ministers and senior judges*519465646731843security measures for foreign diplomatic representations141259420435580number of cases processed**201616144* detailed assessments of specific persons** special or extraordinary events dealt with by fedpol’s special police intervention groups. foreign visitors entitled to protection under international law20202021202220232024number of visitors52550610578841169number of personal protection measures241137229234340number of permits to carry weapons issued to foreign security officers662780658644793 the fluctuating numbers in relation to international visits are due to the current political situation. in 2024, for example, the summit on peace in ukraine on the burgenstock was attended by a large number of persons protected under international law. the level of protection depends on the risk assessment for each of these people. in other words, an individual person considered to be at high risk may receive a higher level of protection than a group considered to be at low risk. risk analyses20202021202220232024risk assessments for visitors protected under international law335210304273303risk assessments for the protection of high-profile officials and foreign missions288325368422465situation assessments for federal property in switzerland and abroad*1218152529* assessments are made based on the circumstances or at the request of the property owner\/manager. fedpol analyses vulnerabilities and proposes improvements. the federal palace and federal government buildings represent the heart of political power in switzerland. their symbolic significance is one of the reasons why these buildings are repeatedly the target of campaigns. fedpol prepares situation and threat assessments for buildings under federal jurisdiction in order to take appropriate protective measures. burgenstock: a high-risk conference a commitment, a culture a colourful event maison suisse: a place of security threat reports on the rise the number of threats reported initially decreased with the lifting of the covid measures, but a slight increase can now be observed again. the tone of the threats remains just as aggressive."},{"id":2868,"permalink":"\/en\/report-2024-en\/zahlen\/money-laundering-twice-as-many-reports-as-two-years-ago\/","breadcrumbs":[{"title":"Report 2024","permalink":"\/en\/"},{"title":"fedpol in figures","permalink":"\/en\/report-2024-en\/zahlen\/"}],"title":"Money laundering: Twice as many reports as two years ago","lead":"The number of reports received by the Money Laundering Reporting Office Switzerland (MROS) has been rising substantially for years. Since the introduction of the goAML 2020 information system, the volume of data has almost tripled.","content":"the number of reports received by the money laundering reporting office switzerland (mros) has been rising substantially for years. since the introduction of the goaml 2020 information system, the volume of data has almost tripled. compared to the previous year, mros recorded a 27.5 per cent increase in suspicious activity reports in connection with money laundering and terrorist financing. mros analyses the reported cases and supplements them with its own information. it decides on a case-by-case basis whether or not to report the offence to a law enforcement agency. in its annual report, mros uses statistics and background information to provide an in-depth insight into its tasks in the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing. untouchable? think again! in the eye of the storm money laundering: twice as many reports as two years ago the number of reports received by the money laundering reporting office switzerland (mros) has been rising substantially for years. since the introduction of the goaml 2020 information system, the volume of data has almost tripled."},{"id":2873,"permalink":"\/en\/report-2024-en\/zahlen\/licensing-and-purchasing-of-precursors-for-explosive-substances\/","breadcrumbs":[{"title":"Report 2024","permalink":"\/en\/"},{"title":"fedpol in figures","permalink":"\/en\/report-2024-en\/zahlen\/"}],"title":"Licensing and purchasing of precursors for explosive substances","lead":"For two years now, shops have been registering every purchase of precursors by private individuals in the fedpol information system. The first conclusion: the technical implementation of the law is going well.","content":"for two years now, shops have been registering every purchase of precursors by private individuals in the fedpol information system. the first conclusion: the technical implementation of the law is going well. precursors are chemical substances that are found in a variety of everyday products, such as hydrogen peroxide for disinfecting swimming pools, or ammonium nitrate, which is used as a fertiliser. at first glance, these substances appear harmless, but on closer inspection they can be very dangerous. this is because in a certain concentration and dose, they can be used to produce explosives. if this production takes place in an improvised laboratory outside of industrial production, the product is referred to as a ‘homemade explosive’ (hme). hmes can be used by terrorists and members of criminal gangs to carry out attacks or blow open atms, for example. hmes also pose the risk that they will explode during the manufacturing process, polluting the environment in the vicinity of the production site and endangering members of the emergency services who have to secure the area and remove the explosive remains. numerous incidents in switzerland have highlighted this danger. transactions and licences20232024number of transactions (total)29533023number of purchase licences issued2449719 in order to prevent the misuse of precursors and the associated risks, a federal licence is now required in order to purchase precursors in certain concentrations. this regulation came into force in 2023 with the new law on precursors for explosive substances (available in german, french and italian). in 2024, the number of purchase licences issued was significantly lower: 719 (compared to 2,449 in the previous year). the reason for this is the three-year validity of the licence, which makes it possible to purchase precursors without having to submit a new application for each transaction. persons who were granted a licence in 2023 do not need to apply for a new one in 2024. nevertheless, shops have been registering every purchase involving precursors by private individuals in the fedpol information system. this makes these products and purchases more easily traceable: a decisive step towards greater safety for the population. the legislation on precursors is being implemented as planned, from the granting of purchase licences to the registration of transactions and the monitoring of sales outlets. in 2024, five criminal cases were opened, most of which were due to ignorance of the new legislation. licensing and purchasing of precursors for explosive substances for two years now, shops have been registering every purchase of precursors by private individuals in the fedpol information system. the first conclusion: the technical implementation of the law is going well."},{"id":2878,"permalink":"\/en\/report-2024-en\/zahlen\/violence-at-sporting-events-level-remains-stable\/","breadcrumbs":[{"title":"Report 2024","permalink":"\/en\/"},{"title":"fedpol in figures","permalink":"\/en\/report-2024-en\/zahlen\/"}],"title":"Violence at sporting events: Level remains stable","lead":"Violent incidents can occur at sporting events - especially ice hockey and football matches. fedpol operates the HOOGAN information system to support the cantons. Among other things, it records the details of people who have been issued with a stadium ban.","content":"violent incidents can occur at sporting events - especially ice hockey and football matches. fedpol operates the hoogan information system to support the cantons. among other things, it records the details of people who have been issued with a stadium ban. the hoogan information system records data on people who have behaved violently at sporting events in switzerland or abroad. at the beginning of july each year, fedpol publishes the latest figures on the persons and measures recorded in hoogan. data on a specific person remains stored for three years after the last measure against that person has expired. the data are then deleted. hoogan serves as the basis for the electronic presentation of the swiss sport situation report (gesamtschweizerisches lagebild sport , gsls report), which is used to analyse matches based on incidents. number of people and active measures in hoogan20202021202220232024active measures995645469519533people subject to active measures622431315332357persons newly recorded21668115183171persons deleted270250338286270total of persons recorded1 5251 3431 1201 017918 there was a slight increase in violent incidents in both 2023 and in 2024. the level was unusually low between 2020 and 2022 due to the covid pandemic. swiss sport situation report (gsls report) after each match day, the partners involved (police, sports associations and sbb) provide fedpol with security-related information on violent incidents. fedpol analyses the data on incidents at every football or ice hockey match and produces the gsls report once a year. in the 2023\/2024 season, 1,220 matches were assessed and the results published in the gsls system. particularly serious violent incidents occurred at 99 matches. the statistics in the gsls report show that violence has returned to pre-pandemic levels since the 2021\/2022 season. the figures are stable, with a slight upward trend. this is also reflected in the hoogan figures (see table), which again rose in 2024 when compared with the previous year. for example, the number of people against whom active measures have been imposed increased. identifying violent fans often takes time, with the result that measures are not taken immediately after an incident. this is also reflected in the statistical data. violence at sporting events: level remains stable violent incidents can occur at sporting events - especially ice hockey and football matches. fedpol operates the hoogan information system to support the cantons. among other things, it records the details of people who have been issued with a stadium ban."}]